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IntroductionREFORMING EUROPE? 
WHEN ECONOMISTS, LAW SCHOLARS AND POLITICAL 
SCIENTISTS CARE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE EU
Christophe Blot1, Olivier Rozenberg2, Francesco Saraceno1  
and Imola Streho3
Europe is in crisis and doubts emerge about the capacity of the 
European Union (EU) to overcome it. This crisis and those doubts share 
many similarities. They are severe, multidimensional and possibly 
durable. Understanding them and proposing a few modest solutions 
require adopting a comprehensive approach mixing the three domi-
nant patterns of the EU: an economic market based on trade and 
solidarity, a set of constraining norms protected by judicial institutions 
and a political space under construction characterised by the interac-
tion between a (weak) central core and (strong) domestic arenas.
The impact and nature of what is usually labelled under the name 
of “crisis” can be differentiated for each of those three aspects. We do 
it through a few quantitative data over a recent period by comparing 
the EU to one of its members, France, and to the United States of 
America (US). At the economic level, figure 1 shows the decline of 
GDP in 2009 for the three areas. The slack was rude and, even if the 
worse seems to be behind us, growth rates obtained before the crisis 
have not been reached since, regarding the EU 27 as well as France 
alone – contrary to the US.
1. OFCE, Sciences Po.
2. Sciences Po, Centre d’études européennes.
3. Sciences Po, École de droit and Centre d’études européennes.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
Christophe Blot, Olivier Rozenberg, Francesco Saraceno and Imola Streho8Regarding the second aspect, Figure 2 indicates that the number of 
directives and regulations adopted over the recent period tend to 
decline. This trend is seemingly not limited to Europe as the last US 
Congress has also been less productive than the previous ones. France, 
by contrast, is more stable. Researches still have to be done for 
explaining those complex evolutions. They may indicate that the diffi-
culties of the EU are not limited to economic performances and affect, 
in one way or another, the capacity of the EU to regulate public policies.
The last aspect of our focus concentrates on the level of public 
support for the EU level of government. Data presented in Figure 3 
depict a rather contradictory image in that respect. On the one hand, 
trust in the EU has declined severely with a loss of 26 points over seven 
years. The economic and financial crises have destroyed nearly half of 
the credit that the EU had patiently cumulated year after year. On the 
other hand, the average trust vis-à-vis the EU of the public opinions of 
the Twenty-Seven is still superior to the average trust of each domestic 
public opinion vis-à-vis their own government. The distance has 
diminished but there is still one. The only exception to that is the so-
called honey-moon period after domestic elections but the French 
decline after the summer of 2012 shows that it does not last.
This rapid and partial overview highlights the multidimensional 
feature of the on-going EU crisis. As indicated by the comparison with 
the US or with member states, the EU is not the only level where the 
capacity to govern efficiently and with legitimacy is challenged. Yet, 
Figure 1. Real GDP
  2007Q1 = 100
Source: Eurostat, INSEE and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Reforming Europe? 9what may be more specific to the EU is this multidimensionality 
as economic results, law production and support rates are all matters 
of concerns.  
Figure 2. Legislations passed
Sources: EU: EU Legislative Output 1999-2010 (05/06/2010) [database], Centre for Socio-political Data (CDSP, 
CNRS – Sciences Po) and Centre for EuropeanStudies (CEE, Sciences Po) [producers], Centre for Socio-politicalData 
[distributor]. France: French National Assembly (international agreements excluded). US: US Senate, data for 2007-
2008, 2009-2010 and for 2011-2012 have been divided by two.
Figure 3. Trust in the EU and national governments
Sources: Eurobarometers Standard 67-80. The question was: “I would like to ask you a question about how much 
trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or 
tend not to trust it. The (nationality) government / The European Union”.
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Christophe Blot, Olivier Rozenberg, Francesco Saraceno and Imola Streho10Faced to those deep and probably unprecedented challenges, the 
debate leading to the European elections remains mostly hostage of 
two polar views. Either a sort of self-complacency, that prides itself of 
the fact that the crisis did not lead to a collapse of the single currency, 
and finds into this very fact a sort of validation of current European 
policies and of the institutions that accompany them. Or, at the other 
extreme, the view that the crisis, and the disruption that it brought 
especially  to Eurozone peripheral countries,  is an unavoidable effect 
of the European construction, that can only be addressed by rolling 
back on the European integration project.
A reformist approach
We subscribe to neither of these polar views. This volume, and the 
workshop that preceded it, were born from our deep dissatisfaction 
from the management of the crisis. We actually believe that the crisis 
exposes a number of flaws in European construction. European insti-
tutions failed to prevent growing imbalances, and were not adapted 
for managing the ensuing problems. There are a number of reasons, 
which emerge in many of the contributions to this volume, which 
lead to believe that the crisis could have been significantly less harsh, 
were it met with better policies and well-functioning institutions. For 
the same reasons, some of the institutional advances that were trig-
gered by the crisis do not seem to address the structural flaws of the 
European construction. This is why we also believe that the self-
congratulatory attitude of European leaders misplaced. 
This does not mean that we adhere to the view that current policies 
are an intrinsic feature of the European construction, that therefore 
cannot be reformed. Mounting euro skeptic movements tend to 
convey the idea that there is no alternative to current policies, that are 
built into the European construction since its beginning. The perni-
cious effects of austerity and of crisis management would then leave 
no other option than a breaking of the single currency or even of the 
EU itself, as the debate on the possible British referendum of 2017 
stands to show.
In January 2014 we held a workshop at Sciences Po in Paris on 
“Reforming Europe”, whose objective was to gather researchers 
unhappy with the current state of the debate on the EU, in particular 
within the perspective of the European Elections of May 2014.In 
organizing the workshop we felt it to be a duty, for intellectuals 
engaged in the public debate on European policies, to try to break the 
dualism between complacency and Euroskepticism. Exposing the 
Reforming Europe? 11shortcomings of the European construction, the idiosyncrasies in the 
Union’s decision making process, and the mistakes in the manage-
ment of the crisis, needs not to challenge the whole concept of 
European construction.
While the crisis is financial and economic, it exposed flaws of the 
European governance that go well beyond the field of economics. This 
is why we have adopted an interdisciplinary approach, having political 
scientists, law scholars and economists, bring their own perspective, 
and the perspective of their discipline into an open debate.
This volume has the ambition to feed the discussion leading to the 
elections of May 25 (and possibly beyond). This is why we chose the 
format of short policy briefs, when possible aimed at providing specific 
policy prescriptions, rather than fully fledged academic contributions. 
Our objective is to reach a vast public of policy makers, candidates, 
political parties, unions, entrepreneurial associations, and citizens. The 
researchers who contributed to this volume share the view that 
reforming Europe is necessary and possible at the same time. But the 
reader will not find many other commonalities, and may even find 
contradictory recommendations. The objective of this project is not to 
provide a coherent set of solutions, that would require much more 
than a volume. Ideally, our contributions would serve as a basis and 
starting point for debates that will eventually lead to political choices.
It is noteworthy to underline that all the authors took great care 
while drafting their policy briefs to suggest at least some if not exclu-
sively policy prescriptions that do not require treaty changes and can 
therefore be implemented without having to convey an IGC. Yet, it 
does not mean that changes in treaties would be excluded by prin-
ciple. The reader may then also find a few propositions to this end.
The contributions of this volume are organized under three main 
themes. The first part deals with issues relating to democracy and citi-
zenship, the second with European governance and the third with 
European public policies.
Democracy and European Citizenship
European Union is indeed not a nation state but it is nonetheless a 
political entity with its own institutions – not completely discon-
nected from national institutions –, defining its own rights, laws and 
rules. The exercise of democracy in the EU has then some very specific 
features that must be taken into account notably because the idea of 
citizenship is not well established as in the member states. This is why 
measuring regularly sentiment towards European construction is a 
Christophe Blot, Olivier Rozenberg, Francesco Saraceno and Imola Streho12first and necessary step to understand democracy issues. In this 
respect, recent Eurobarometer surveys indicate that EU institutions 
suffer from a lack of confidence. But, Bruno Cautrès shows that 
Europe is not blamed per se and exit strategies from the euro area are 
not yet considered significantly. Surveys would rather indicate that 
Europe seems far from citizens. The issue of citizenship is then crucial. 
In EU, it often boils down to mobility issues. Even if it has 
been considered as a major success of European construction, 
Anastasia Iliopoulou-Penot reminds that progresses remain to be 
done. Migrants (inactive citizens, students and Roma population) 
have still significant difficulties. For Selma Bendjaballah, 
Stéphanie Novak and Olivier Rozenberg, the drop in the number of 
legislative decisions reflect the ‘existential doubt’ about EU institu-
tions. They consequently stress that a better expression of political and 
institutional divides is needed. Beyond the number of legislative deci-
sions, the duration of the decision-making process is another source of 
concern. This paralysis results from strategic behavior aimed to control 
the policy agenda. Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon recommends a number 
of reforms of the rules governing the use of time under co-decision. 
More generally, the method ruling EU functioning has evolved. The 
intergovernmental practices have gained momentum whereas the 
community method has been diluted. Delphine Dero-Bugny claims 
yet that Intergovernmental methods are often used for temporary 
periods, and are finally integrated by the Community method. There 
is then no opposition between the two approaches. They should be 
made complementary by rethinking the role of the European Council 
and integrating emergency procedures in order to be able to respond 
quickly in case of crisis. According to the great and charming 
Imola Streho, European Institutions are now more open and trans-
parent. To improve the trust in institutions, the European Parliament 
should pay attention to good administration, which is referred to in 
the primary law of the EU. To this end, the role of the European 
Ombudsman should notably be emphasized and the wide range of 
administrative assistance should be improved. Finally, Antoine Bailleux
considers that a significant strain has been placed on the protection of 
fundamental rights. This is the consequence of the economic, social and 
identity crisis in the EU. It is then incumbent upon the European Parlia-
ment to ensure that fundamental rights continue to serve as a compass 
and frame of reference for EU policies.
Reforming Europe? 13European Governance
When considering a multidisciplinary approach, European govern-
ance is clearly central as it relates to institutions and implementation 
of economic policies in the EU. The contributions gathered in the 
second part all focus on these issues. The crisis has clearly highlight 
the need for an improvement of governance. It has actually been rein-
forced through “anti crisis” measures. The scope of economic 
surveillance has been enlarged. Fiscal rules have been strengthened 
and banking Union is under way. These recent developments have left 
aside the role European and national Parliaments, regarding notably 
the legislative process. Laure Clément-Wilz considers that increasing 
their role would then provide a clear legal basis for the new missions of 
the EU institutions and strengthen democratization. According to 
Frédéric Allemand and Francesco Martucci, this means avoiding the 
use of intergovernmental agreements, organizing a “euro area” 
committee within the European Parliament and holding an annual 
socio-economic convention to establish the broad thrust of EMU poli-
cies. Another key issue relates to the ability of national governments 
to coordinate their decisions on economic policies more efficiently. 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak remind indeed the flaws of 
the current governance. They notably insist on the failure of existing 
rules and the lack of solidarity among member states. EMU is structur-
ally heterogeneous and is diverging due to erroneous policy choices. 
Coordination is then the only way out of the crisis. The European 
governance should explicitly aims at providing growth, full-employ-
ment and reducing macroeconomic imbalances. The creation of a 
European tax would also be a significant step towards increased inte-
gration. To this end, the European Union needs to levy taxes for itself. 
The tax base should then be chosen with great care, in line with 
intended objectives, as emphasized by Alexandre Maitrot de la Motte. 
Besides, a better regulation of the financial system is needed. The 
banking union goes in that direction. But it suffers from severe short-
comings. On the one side, the ECB will be in charge of banking 
supervision. But, on the other side, the resolution fund will not be 
fully operational. Moreover, as stressed by Jean-Paul Pollin, regula-
tion should not boil down to a banking union. Separation between 
commercial banking activities and investment activities would 
complement the banking union. In addition, the new task entrusted 
to the ECB raises coordination issues. Christophe Blot, Jérôme Creel, 
Fabien Labondance and Paul Hubert note that, de facto, the ECB will 
deal with a triple mandate (price stability, growth and financial 
stability) and they call for the set up ex nihilo of a supervisory body of 
Christophe Blot, Olivier Rozenberg, Francesco Saraceno and Imola Streho14the ECB, responsible for discussing and analysing the relevance of the 
conduct of monetary policy under the broader objectives of the ECB.
Issues in European Public Policies
Finally, the debate preceding the European elections should trigger 
public debate on the key issues regarding public policies. Reforming 
institutions should not go without a large reflection on the policies of 
these institutions. This is the aim of the third part of the volume. 
Reducing inequalities should be made a top priority in the EU. 
Francesco Saraceno notably emphasizes that macroeconomic imbal-
ances have been fuelled by inequalities. The crisis has in turn 
exacerbated the problem, especially in peripheral Eurozone countries. 
The struggle against inequalities is therefore strongly connected 
to governance issues. This is why fiscal policies and regulation need to 
be part of the effort to curb inequality. Another dimension of inequali-
ties is related to gender inequalities. Françoise Milewski and 
Réjane Sénac present the ways in which European policy on equality 
have dealt with this issue through EU law on non-discrimination. 
Then, they take up the debates provoked by policy changes, both in 
regards to the aims and their implementation. The problem of 
inequalities necessarily refer to questions about the functioning of 
labour markets and social protection systems. With austerity meas-
ures, most European member states have engaged in structural reforms 
and have cut social spending. Competition has been strengthened in 
social services. In the labour market, Gérard Cornilleau develops the 
alternative between a liberal model of work sharing and a social model 
with unified social rights. Complete social unification may yet be hard 
to achieve so that social frontiers may be defined so as to allow both 
the mobility of workers and their effective social protection. 
Bruno Palier also considers that austerity measures and the structural 
reforms, which have followed, have destroyed social cohesion. Conse-
quently, Europe must now put solidarity at the center of its policies 
and support countries to reinvest in social policies. 
Investing in the future is also the key message carried by 
Xavier Timbeau. He calls for a green “new deal” to foster the transi-
tion to a low carbon economy. To this end, a public-private 
investment plan in the energy transition of the order of 2 points per 
year of European GDP is needed. Those investments would also 
certainly influence the industrial policies measures implemented at 
the European level. They would certainly need to be coordinated. 
Divergences among countries have increased. Both national and Euro-
pean policies should then be reconsidered. For Jean-Luc Gaffard and 
Reforming Europe? 15Lionel Nesta, supply reforms would then consist in a properly 
designed industrial policy that would consist in establishing a frame-
work aimed at supporting both competition and cooperation between 
the various players of innovation, and thus allowing firms’ strategies to 
be successful. Public policies should also encompass immigration and 
asylum policies. Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche claims that the 
current approach is based on a misdiagnosis and the mismanagement 
of this politically sensitive issue has unfortunately harmed the compe-
tiveness and credibility of the EU and its Member States. Finally, EU 
has been recently engaged in the negotiation of numerous preferential 
trade and investment agreements. Starting from this, Pierre Boulanger
and Patrick Messerlin analyse EU’s trade policy and propose a distinc-
tion between a policy for a “near circle” (countries neighboring the 
EU), dominated by a goal of political stability, and a policy for a “broad 
circle” (countries with a level of development comparable to that of 
the EU), dominated by a goal of economic growth.
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Part 1

A COLLAPSE IN TRUST IN THE EU? 
EUROPEANS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPE 
DURING THE GREAT RECESSION
Bruno Cautrès
Sciences Po-CEVIPOF, CNRS
The period of the “Great Recession” since 2008 has led to a downward trend 
in many indicators of support for European integration. From the point of view 
of the trust that Europeans have towards Europe (an important dimension of 
diffuse support for the EU), we can even speak of a deep crisis of trust in the 
European Union action, as recorded since 2008 in the opinions of Europeans. 
In some countries (like Greece), we even recorded a collapse of confidence. The 
analysis of two Eurobarometer studies, one at the beginning of the crisis and 
another in 2011, shows that if the collapse is certainly there, and not only on 
indicators of diffuse support towards EU integration, Europeans do not impute 
responsibility for the crisis to the EU only: Europeans perceive the crisis and the 
role of Europe in the crisis through the prism of their national experiences, in 
particular confidence in their governments and the perception of the economic 
situation of their country. Moreover, the crisis of trust in the EU does not entail 
ipso facto a serious crisis of confidence in the euro: we do not observe for euro 
a comparable collapse to that observed in terms of overall trust in the EU. 
Among euro-zone countries, evolutions are slightly declining but not very 
significantly; it is in countries that are outside the euro-zone or those who are 
candidates to enter in that the lower support for the euro can be observed.
The financial crisis that began in August 2007 in the United 
States and then spread in several European economies to become a 
sovereign debt crisis poses more than ever the question of the link 
between the action of the European Union and how people and 
citizens perceive it: the combination of financial bailouts of banks, 
fiscal policies programs and of lower tax revenues linked to the Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
Bruno Cautrès 20decline in economic activity in general has resulted in a very 
significant deterioration of the budget situation and of the public 
debt ratios, as had never been seen before in peacetime.
In the 17 euro-zone countries, this situation has revealed that 
the public debts do not benefit from any institutional guarantee. 
As Patrick Artus (2012) has analyzed this very well, this situation 
strongly poses a real European dilemma and raises in a particularly 
crucial way the question of the democratic legitimacy of the Euro-
pean Union, “the choices seem a priori clear: on one side, the move 
towards a more integrated politico-economic system at the level of 
the euro-zone, on the other side, the national withdrawal, poten-
tially until the breakup of the monetary union. Although since the 
beginning of the crisis, an in-between has become, since Member 
States have chosen to favor one mode of intergovernmental deci-
sion that apparently ensures national interests and weakens the 
institutions that guarantee the common interest, such as the 
Commission and the European Parliament. At the same time, the 
decisions taken under the pressure of the financial markets are 
going in the direction of ever greater fiscal solidarity and of 
strengthened supervision rules. This in-between is probably due to 
the paradoxical situation in Europe: the combination of the 
sudden experience of economic interdependence on the one hand, 
and on the other, strong differences that lead Member States to 
want to keep a veto right on EU decisions”. 
According to Patrick Artus, this “policy of small steps, (through 
the implementation of ESM or through the strengthening the role 
of the European Central Bank) cannot provide a comprehensive 
response to “a well established systemic crisis,” neither a reply to 
the challenge of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union 
and the euro zone: “This is that deficit, i.e. the absence of a clear 
political leadership with a strong democratic legitimacy, which 
currently feed distrust among the seventeen members of the euro-
zone. On the one hand, the Southern countries affected by the 
crisis count on the financial solidarity of their partners and protest 
against austerity policies they regard as being' imposed from 
outside. On the other, some Northern countries expect structural 
reforms of their neighbours, or even an independent oversight of 
national budgets, while their citizens whose assistance is sought 
A collapse in trust in the EU? 21through solidarity policies, fear that they do create windfall effects 
and encourage laxity governments of other states”. 
This analysis nicely summarizes the main aspects of the deep 
crisis of trust in the European Union that we see since 2008 in the 
opinions of European citizens. Before we analyze this trend few 
methodological precautions must be posed. First, any analysis of 
the evolution of public opinion must take the time dimension in 
consideration: the less favorable assessment that Europeans relate 
to European integration does not date from the current crisis. It 
dates from the early 1990s when the conjunction of the “post-1989 
world” and public debates on the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty introduced in public opinion a series of questions about the 
limits, the scope and meaning of economic and political European 
integration. In addition, the indicators that measure the attitudes 
of European citizens vis-à -vis European integration have been the 
subject of lively debates in academic research literature: these 
researches reflect the question of the views of European citizens 
towards the EU in terms of “support”, a concept which itself is 
linked in the tradition of political analysis to the question of the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. These researches make a distinc-
tion between the “diffuse support” and the “specific support”, a 
distinction coming from David Easton analysis who had suggested 
in the 1960s that any political system owed its stability to a 
“diffuse support” of citizens defined in terms of “feelings of trust or 
affection” while it was in the same time evaluated by the citizens in 
terms of functioning. This distinction is, in the literature on Euro-
pean citizens attitudes towards European integration, endorsed by 
a distinction which is almost isomorphic: the one made by Fritz 
Sharpf between support by the “inputs” and by the “outputs”: on 
the one hand political choices are legitimate if they reflect the will 
of the people expressed through the mechanisms of political 
participation or speaking up in civil society, on the other hand 
political choices are legitimate if they are finalized with respect to 
the collective good and the good functioning of the system.
These methodological considerations are important because, 
from the point of view of the analysis of the reactions of citizens 
towards the crisis and the European integration, and towards the 
EU in the crisis, we cannot avoid the question of whether the 
effects of the crisis are on “specific” or “diffuse” support levels: in 
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and communicating circuit between the two levels, diffuse support 
being in his words, a “reservoir of favorable attitudes” which can 
compensate for the loss of “specific” support when the political 
system does not “deliver” to its citizens. In this latter case, the 
crisis of trust that we see in the EU action does not question the 
commitment and the general support of Europeans towards the 
overall objectives of European integration and a significant leeway 
exist for the EU to create (or resuscitate...) the public demand for 
European public policies.
The table below compares some indicators of these two forms of 
support from two Eurobarometer surveys in 2009 and 2011, one 
survey at the beginning and the other one at middle of the crisis. 
Even limited to a few indicators, the comparison shows a clear fall 
in support for the EU and its actions whatever the “diffuse” or 
Table 1. The two forms of European citizens support towards EU
% for the EU27 members in 2009 and 2011
EB71.1 (2009) EB76.3 (2011)
%
% 
« dont’ 
know
% % « dont’ know»
« Diffuse » 
support
In favor of a monetary 
union with only one 
currency, the euro
64 7 56 8
Membership to EU is 
a « good thing » 53 4 – –
Trust in the European 
Union 50 11 39 10
In favour of EU enlarge-
ment to other countries  
in the coming years
48 12 43 11
« Specific » 
support
(*)
In favor of 
more decision 
taken at the 
EU-level to
Fight against terrorism 80 4 82 2
Fight for environment  
protection 73 4 66 2
Fight against 
unemployment 61 5 39 2
Trust in the European 
Commission 47 22 40 20
Positive image of EU 44 2 33 2
Things are going in the 
good direction in the EU 36 11 23 9
Sources: Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009; Eurobarometer 76.3, November 2011. Data have been analyzed by the 
author and weighted.
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negative impact on the general or specific support to EU actions or 
institutions. 
 Other indicators from more recent or complementary to Euro-
barometer surveys complete the picture. At the most general level 
of support for European integration (“diffuse” support), the spring 
2012 Eurobarometer records (for the first time since the creation of 
this indicator) equality between positive and negative opinions 
about the functioning of democracy in the European Union. While 
in 2007 and until 2009, only 32% of Europeans declared them-
selves dissatisfied with the way EU functions, in 2012 the increase 
was 12 points at the same time that the number of satisfied went 
down by 10 points. At this very general and diffuse level of support 
for the EU, this decline is particularly striking. And dissatisfaction 
gains dramatically in Greece (from 40% in 2007 to 70% in 2012), 
but also in Spain (14% in 2007, 30% in 2009 and 52% in 2012), 
Italy and Portugal (37% in 2007, 39% in 2009, 66% in 2012). These 
countries, both exposed to the reality of the crisis and the condi-
tionality of the aid to rescue their banking sector and restructuring 
of public debt, are more than any other the theatre of a real 
collapse of the trust in the EU. The image of the EU is of course also 
deteriorated not only for the overall European level (20% of Euro-
peans in the Spring 2011 Eurobarometer have a negative image of 
the European Union against 15% in 2007), but also very deterio-
rated in the countries who were highly exposed to the crisis: the 
negative image of the European Union now brings 40% of Greeks 
(13% in 2007), 25% of Portuguese (12% in 2007) or 16% of Spanish 
(6% in 2007). While these evolutions are strongly or very strongly 
downward we can nevertheless observe that the negative image of 
the EU remains at levels below 50%.
These data are well summarized by the indicator of trust in 
European integration. Many researches have shown the link 
between political trust and support for the political system; polit-
ical trust is an essential dimension of “diffuse” support”, one of the 
most synthetic indicators of this support. Declining trust in the EU 
since 2008 is first strong and widespread: there are only two coun-
tries among the 27 members of the EU in 2011 for which there is 
increasing trust in the EU compared to 2007: Sweden (+2 points) 
and Finland (+10 points), two countries whose levels of pro-EU 
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ions were able to welcome the affirmation of budgetary rules at 
European level. But in all other countries, “large” or “small” Euro-
pean countries, regardless of the time of accession to the EU, net 
“contributors” or “recipients”, we are witnessing a particularly 
significant drop in trust (Armigeon and Ceka , 2014).
Nevertheless, these data do not allow to assign the responsi-
bility for the collapse of support for European integration in the EU 
alone: Europeans perceive the crisis and the role of Europe in the 
crisis through the prism of the national experience they have had 
of it, in particular trust in their governments and the perception of 
the economic situation in their countries (Hobolt et al., 2013). It is 
also the confidence in national governments and in particular the 
confidence in the ability of these governments to cope with the 
economic crisis that is involved. 
But what about support for the euro? One might expect that the 
support for the euro experiencing a very important decline in trust: 
as Patrick Artus summarized in its analysis, the governance of the 
euro area is actually at the heart of issues of legitimacy and citizens 
support, including their “diffuse” dimensions. If the level of 
support for the euro has actually declined between 2008 and 2012, 
there has not been a comparable collapse to that observed in terms 
of the overall trust in the EU. In countries members of the euro-
zone the evolutions are slightly declining but not are not very 
significant. And it is remarkable to see the small differences 
between the countries members of the euro-zone who are 
“debtors” (those exposed to austerity plans and constraints of the 
EU and the IMF) and those who are “creditors”. The collapse of 
support for the euro still exists elsewhere, but outside the euro-
zone, in the countries that have chosen (such as the United 
Kingdom) not to join the euro-zone but also in countries which are 
candidate to join the euro-zone. A recent work by Sara Hobolt thus 
clearly shows that in the countries of the euro-zone, the majority 
of citizens still think that the European Union is more able to 
resolve the crisis than the national government (Hoblot , 2013).
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The data presented here show that the opinions of European 
citizens towards European integration do not let themselves be 
grasped by simplistic opposition between “pro” and “anti” 
European. Multidimensionality of these opinions is the rule. More 
than during the “Maastricht years”, European citizens have 
questions at several levels on European integration: the debate can 
no longer be summarized in just splitting between supporters of 
national sovereignty and “integrationist”. European integration 
has, by its own dynamics, both homogenized and heterogenized 
the representations that Europeans have the European integration 
process. “What are the contributions of the EU vis-à-vis the actions 
of national governments? Where are the limits of European public 
policy, particularly in economic matters? Europe for whom or for 
whose benefit? Where are the boundaries?”, are just some of the 
questions that now oppose popular representations schemes of 
European integration. More recently, researchers have even 
suggested that it is more the growing “indifference” to Europe than 
opposition to European integration that characterizes the 
disoriented public opinion today (Duchesne et al., 2013).
For all these reasons, it is particularly important that the main 
tool the researchers can access to analyze the dimensions of the 
opinions of Europeans toward European integration is shifted in a 
more “academic” direction. The Eurobarometer is a survey 
conducted and funded by the European Commission; if it does not 
ignore the links with the academic community, it is not fully an 
“academic” survey in the traditional sense of the term.
If Eurobarometer has contributed in a fundamental and irre-
placeable way to the development of academic research and 
constitutes one of the largest databases available to researchers and 
the public, it sometimes lacks consistency in its questionnaires and 
indicators: if a good part of the indicators to distinguish the forms 
of “diffuse” and “specific” support are there, all are not there and 
are not there systematically. The result is a sometimes optimistic 
presentation of the Eurobarometer data in reports prepared by the 
services of the European Commission. More annoying is the often 
one-dimensional nature of the collected data: too many indicators 
measure the same dimension (favorable/unfavorable to European 
integration) and too little measure alternative dimensions: Europe 
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the politicization of issues of European integration that citizens 
may give more meaning to European integration and could reduce 
the dissonance between the ideological compass used for issues of 
national politics and the absence of such ideological benchmarks 
that raise Europe in their minds (Hix and Bartolini, 2006; Belot et 
al., 2013).
Finally, it seems increasingly clear that more qualitative and 
contextual observation devices should complement the range of 
available data: the micro-social and territorial contexts of produc-
tion of political attitudes are, for European integration more than 
for any other object of analysis, fundamental to grasp.
CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION, MOBILITY 
AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN AREA
Anastasia Iliopoulou-Penot
University Paris Est Créteil 
While it is often heralded as one of the great successes of European 
integration, the mobility of EU citizens in Europe still experiences difficulties. 
These concern internal market actors such as migrant workers, including 
frontier workers. Their access to social rights in the host State is currently facing 
resistance that one might have thought overcome by now. Meanwhile, 
economically inactive citizens’ right to residence is threatened by expulsion 
measures that are often taken in an automatic manner, when a citizen lacks 
adequate resources. More generally, we still witness efforts to prevent the long-
term settlement of migrant citizens in the host State. In addition, special 
attention is paid to student mobility, which raises the issue of access to 
university studies and its financing. Finally, the treatment of the vulnerable 
Roma population is a problem with an inarguably European dimension that 
must be addressed without delay. 
1. Introduction: access to citizenship of the Union  
and its importance for mobility
Malta’s recent decision to put its national citizenship on sale, 
and consequently turn citizenship of the Union into a market 
good, has elicited strong reactions from European actors.1 This 
decision, along with the existence of other national provisions 
(Cyprus, Austria, Belgium, Portugal) allowing third-country 
nationals to acquire national citizenship in return for substantial 
1. See, for example, European Parliament Resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU citizenship for 
sale, 2013/2995 (RSP).  Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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between citizenship of the Union and Member State nationali-
ties. Under article 20.1 TFEU, holding Member State nationality 
automatically confers citizenship of the Union. Since granting and 
withdrawing nationality lies within the field of States’ reserved 
competence, the Union cannot define its subjects in an autono-
mous manner, which is paradoxical for a transnational political 
and social community. Yet, as European Commission Vice-Presi-
dent Viviane Reding highlighted, “awarding citizenship to a person 
gives this person rights vis-à-vis the 27 other Member States.” Thus, 
given that a State’s decision to grant its nationality produces trans-
national effects, this power should be exercised in accordance with 
Union law,2 which includes a set of common values. 
Both legally, in terms of the treaties, and conceptually, in the 
mind of the citizens themselves,3 citizenship of the Union is essen-
tially associated with mobility. The latter takes shape through the 
right to move and reside freely, provided for in article 21.1 TFEU 
and implemented by directive 2004/38.4 The mobility of people 
throughout the European Union is crucial to forging a European 
identity and consciousness. While the European legal regime of 
mobility is a noteworthy achievement, there are still gaps to be 
filled and problems to be solved. The approval of the proposal 
“against mass immigration” (which is mainly intra-European) in 
the Swiss referendum held on 9 February 2014 illustrates the 
urgency of initiating an enlightened debate touching upon all of 
these issues. 
2. Access to social rights for migrant workers, including 
frontier workers
The free movement of workers, which constitutes the founda-
tion of citizenship of the Union and the most complete form of 
mobility of people, is currently facing considerable resistance in 
2. See ECJ, 7 July 1992, Micheletti, C-369/90 and ECJ, 2 March 2010, Rottmann, C-135/08. 
3. According to the responses of European citizens themselves to various surveys conducted 
by the European Commission, the Union essentially signifies the freedom to travel, study and 
work everywhere in Europe. 
4. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, OJEU L 158 of 30 April 2004, p. 77.  
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sively) focuses on the arrival of workers from central and eastern 
European countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007.5 It 
partly stems from the economic crisis: the constraints the crisis has 
placed on national budgets and the increase in unemployment. 
However, most worrisome is that reservations about European 
immigration are voiced not only by populist political parties 
(whose growing importance is itself a matter of concern), but also 
feature in the official discourse of national governments and legis-
lators, in blatant disregard of European commitments. The best 
example is the debate in the United Kingdom about social advan-
tages, especially family benefits paid to Polish workers. According 
to statements made by Prime Minister David Cameron in January 
2014, it is “wrong” to pay child benefit to support migrant Polish 
workers’ family remaining in Poland. However, this issue should 
be considered to have long been definitively resolved. Under 
article 7.2 of Regulation 1612/1968,6 now replaced by article 7.2 of 
Regulation 492/2011,7 migrant workers have access to the same 
social (and tax) advantages as national workers.8 The measure’s 
rationale is hard to dispute: the idea is to recognise and reward the 
migrant worker’s contribution to the host country’s economy. 
Indeed, from the taxpayer’s perspective, by paying contributions 
and taxes migrant workers participate in the funding of the host 
country’s welfare state, from which they can therefore not be 
excluded. Yet current British reactions to the alleged “social 
tourism” of Polish workers sadly illustrates that the free move-
ment of workers is not sociologically recognised as a done deal; 
European and State actors must continuously renew their 
commitment to it. Public awareness campaigns should be held
so that citizens might properly appreciate the (very often misun-
5. See, most recently, the fears expressed in the political and journalistic circles of several 
Member States about the lifting, since 1 January 2014, of transitional measures for Romanian 
and Bulgarian workers. 
6. Regulation 1612/68/EEC of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community, OJCE L 257 of 19 October 1968, p. 2.
7. Regulation 492/2011/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union, OJEU L 141 of 27 May 2011, p. 1. 
8. The Court of Justice provided a generous interpretation of this provision, which usefully 
completes Regulation 883/2004/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems (OJEU L 166 of 30 April 2004, p.1), which replaced 
Regulation 1408/71/EC on the same subject. One of the cardinal principles of this instrument is 
the equal treatment of national and migrant workers. 
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development of their country.9 More generally, civil society actors 
and academics should conduct comprehensive studies to evaluate 
national implementation of the European framework for the 
mobility of people10 and alert citizens and European actors of 
possible deviations in this area.11  
Furthermore, among migrant workers, special attention 
should be paid to the category of frontier workers, who face 
particular and thorny difficulties, which the Commission and 
European Parliament have long singled out.12 A recent problem 
stemming from the case law of the Court of Justice is of special 
note. Indeed, while frontier workers should not be treated any 
differently from migrant workers in terms of access to social bene-
fits, the Court of Justice recently approved national measures 
requiring frontier workers to demonstrate sufficient links with the 
State of employment.13 In its Giersch ruling, the Court held in a 
broad statement, that “the frontier worker is not always integrated 
in the Member State of employment in the same way as a worker 
who is resident in that State.”14 This situation justifies that the 
State of employment ask the frontier worker to demonstrate a 
connection beyond participation in the labour market15. To this 
end, the Court has accepted that student financial aid to the chil-
dren of a frontier worker may be conditional on the parent having 
worked in Luxemburg “for a certain minimum period of time.”16 This 
solution considerably weakens the position of frontier workers, by 
9. In this respect it is unfortunate that the British government is delaying the publication of 
an official report of the Home Office that debunks the theory of social tourism and shows all the 
benefits of European immigration for the British economy.   
10. See, for example, the 2013 research report by J. Shaw, N. Miller & M. Fletcher, Getting to 
grips with EU citizenship: understanding the friction between UK immigration law and EU free 
movement law, http://www.law.ed;ac.uk/overlap. 
11. See, for example, the editorial by N.N. Shuibhne, “Quicksand”, (2013) 38 European Law 
Review, p. 135.   
12. See, already in the 1980s, the communication of the Commission to the Council, to the 
European Parliament and to Member States on the issue of frontier populations, COM/85/529 
final, October 1985 and the European Parliament’s report on the problems of frontier workers in 
the Community of 21 October 1988, doc. A2-227/88. 
13. ECJ, gr.ch., 18 July 2007, Hartmann, C-212/05; ECJ, gr.ch., 18 July 2007, Geven, C-213/05; 
ECJ, 11 September 2007, Hendrix, C-287/05; commentary on the three rulings by Ch. O’Brien, 
45 (2008) Common Market Law Review, p. 499. ECJ, 20 June 2013, Giersch, C-20/12; comm. D. 
Martin, Journal de Droit Européen, September 2013, p. 270. 
14.  Point 65 of the Giersch ruling.
15.  Even though this participation suffices, in principle, to attest to integration: see ECJ, 14 
June 2012, Commission/Netherlands, C-542/09.  
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conditions compared to other migrant workers for them to enjoy 
social advantages. This is questionable in the light of the tradi-
tional approach that solely focuses on the status of “worker”.
3. The expulsion of economically inactive citizens
Regarding economically inactive European citizens, it is 
important to note the very large increase since 2011, and particu-
larly in 2013, in expulsions of European citizens (especially French 
nationals) from Belgium on grounds of lacking adequate means of 
support. It is true that directive 2004/38 provides that, in order to 
be able to reside in the host State between 3 months and 5 years,17
a citizen without any professional activity and the members of his/
her family must have medical insurance and sufficient resources 
not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance 
system. Yet, codifying on this point the solution of the Grzelczyk
ruling,18 the same directive specifies that the removal of a migrant 
citizen cannot be an automatic consequence of the migrant’s claim 
to social assistance.19 In such a case, national authorities must 
examine whether the claim stems from temporary difficulties and 
take into account the migrant citizen’s personal circumstances, the 
length of residence, and the amount of aid granted.20 More gener-
ally, national authorities must implement directive 2004/38 in 
the light of the requirements of citizenship, of fundamental 
rights, of the principle of proportionality, and (in the case of 
French nationals expelled from Belgium) of the reality of cross-
border regions that have contributed so much to European inte-
gration in everyday life.  
16. Point 80 of the Giersch ruling. According to the Court, requiring a certain period of work 
can also prevent the risk of “student grant forum shopping” (ibid). A period of 5 years seems 
reasonable in this respect. 
17. According to the graduated system established by directive 2004/38, residence of up to 3 
months is not subject to any conditions besides possession of a valid passport or identity card. 
This right is maintained so long as the migrant does not become an unreasonable burden on the 
social assistance system of the host State. After five years of legal and continuous residence, the 
citizen of the Union and family members acquire the right to permanent residence, free of any 
economic constraint. 
18. ECJ, 20 September 2001, Grzelczyk, C-184/99. 
19. Article 14.3 and recital 16 of directive 2004/38. 
20. Recital 16 of the directive 2004/38. 
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in the host State
Moreover, several barriers are frequently raised to the long-
term settlement of migrant citizens in the host State, reflecting 
the will to “keep them out”. Thus, despite a solid legislative and 
case-law acquis forbidding them, various restrictions on acquiring 
real estate21 and the levying of discriminatory local taxes or regis-
tration fees22 continue to exist. In the same spirit, national 
authorities tend to restrictively interpret the 5-year “legal resi-
dence” that is necessary to acquire the right of permanent 
residence (free of any economic condition and allowing for almost 
complete equal treatment with nationals).23 Thus, residence under 
national humanitarian law,24 or even under Union law, that does 
not fulfil the economic conditions of possession of sufficient 
resources and health insurance,25 does not allow for the acquisi-
tion of the right of permanent residence. These solutions, which 
the Court of Justice has unfortunately validated, are regrettable 
because they ignore the reality of citizens’ integration into their 
living place. Directive 2004/38 should be amended by the Euro-
pean legislator in order to allow, in view of acquiring the right 
of permanent residence, to take into account legal residence for 
a continuous period of 5 years in the host State irrespective of its 
particular circumstances. 
5. Access to university studies and the funding of student 
mobility
European integration is significantly advanced by student 
mobility. Indeed, education shared among several States is an 
important means of strengthening solidarity and tolerance, and is 
a factor driving the dissemination of culture throughout the 
Union. The increase in the financial package allocated to the 
21. See the recent Flemish regulation making land purchases conditional on the existence a 
“sufficient link” between the purchaser and target district, condemned in: ECJ, 8 May 2013, 
Libert and others, C-197/11 and C-203/11; L.W. Gormley, “Keeping EU citizens out is wrong”, 
Journal de droit européen, 2013, p. 316. 
22. See, for example, the Anvers authorities’ intention, announced in February 2013, to 
increase registration fees for non-nationals from 17 to 250 euros. 
23. This is the key innovation of directive 2004/38, provided for in its article16. 
24. ECJ, gr.ch., 21 December 2011, Szeja and Ziolkowski, C-424 and 425/10.
25. ECJ, 8 May 2013, Alarape, C-529/11.  
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decreased compared to the previous programming, sent an impor-
tant political signal recognising student mobility as a European 
priority. Yet this mobility, which goes beyond the Erasmus frame-
work, raises two important issues: the funding of studies and access 
to specific University courses.   
— Regarding the first issue, since most migrant students cannot 
benefit from the host State’s student maintenance aid provisions,26
they are increasingly turning to their home State to secure the 
necessary funding. It would therefore behove States to provide 
portable grants and loans. States that already provide these, such as 
Germany, should ensure that the conditions of portability are not 
disproportionate and therefore ultimately restrictive of the free 
movement of students.27 Eventually, States should agree on a 
binding European instrument regulating the funding of 
student mobility; this system would provide for the inter-State 
transfer and reimbursement of tuition costs in proportion to the 
professional career of those benefiting from it.28
— Regarding the second issue, solutions should be found to the 
particular problem creating tensions in Belgium and Austria. 
These two countries have set conditions that discriminate
against EU students concerning access to medical and para-
medical University studies. These conditions aim to staunch the 
flow of French and German students who come to study (respec-
tively) in Belgium and in Austria, and then return to practice their 
profession in their home State. The Belgian and Austrian govern-
ments pleaded before the Court of Justice29 that this situation 
26. Under article 24.2 of directive 2004/38, the host State is not obliged, prior to acquisition of 
the right of permanent residence (that is, before completing 5 years of legal and continuous 
residence), to grant maintenance aid for studies in the form of grants or loans, to persons other 
than workers, persons who retain such status and members of their families. Thus, students who 
arrive to a Member State cannot apply for maintenance aid for studies. However, they can 
benefit, on an equal footing with national students, from aid linked to access to education, such as 
aid that covers registration fees.   
27. Several rulings of the Court of Justice deal with the restrictive conditions that several 
German Länder imposed on the portability of student funding : ECJ, gr.ch., 23 October 2007, 
Morgan and Bucher, C-11/06 and C-12/06; ECJ, 18 July 2013, Prinz and Seeberger, C-523/11 and C-
585/11; ECJ, 24 October 2013, Elrick, C-275/12; ECJ, 24 October 2013, Ingemar, C-220/12. 
28. For thought-provoking observations on this subject, see M. Gérard, “Le financement de la 
mobilité des étudiants ‘Bologne’”, Revue économique, 2010/3, p. 577. 
29. ECJ, 7 July 2005, Commission v. Austria, C-147/03; ECJ, gr.ch., 13 April 2010, Bressol, C-73/
08; comm. S. Garben, (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review, p. 1493 
Anastasia Iliopoulou-Penot34threatened the quality of their national education systems and 
represented a risk for public health given the shortage of doctors 
and veterinarians in certain parts of their territory. A solution 
balancing these legitimate concerns with the need to guarantee 
student rights should be reached through political dialogue, which 
could be promoted by European bodies. 
6. The Roma, European citizens “unlike the others”
Finally, the greatest challenge facing citizenship of the Union 
nowadays is the situation of the Roma, citizens “unlike the 
others”. Victims of systemic discrimination, great poverty and 
racist violence in their home States, the Roma also face particularly 
hostile reactions in the host States. French Minister of the Interior 
Manuel Valls made telling statements in this regard on the “voca-
tion” of the Roma to remain in, or return to, Romania, and on their 
“lack of vocation” to integrate into French society. Through both 
these statements and his actions, the Minister fell in line with the 
attitude of the previous French government. The dismantling of 
several Roma camps in the summer of 2010 and the expulsion of 
several hundred Roma of Romanian and Bulgarian nationality to 
their home State had led to a vigorous conflict with the European 
Commission in the fall of 2010.30 This episode revealed that French 
authorities had failed to correctly implement several provisions of 
directive 2004/38, particularly those on substantive and procedural 
guarantees to which a citizen facing expulsion is entitled.31 
The experience of exclusion that most often ensues when the 
Roma exercise their right of residence contrasts with the perma-
nent requirement for inclusion, which is inherent to any 
citizenship, including citizenship of the Union. The application of 
directive 2004/38 alone cannot be an adequate response, because it 
was conceived for a type of mobility that has different characteris-
tics; this directive does not take into account the particularities of 
the collective migration of members of a “disadvantaged and 
30. For more on this entire issue, see our paper “‘Le temps des gitans’: à propos de la libre 
circulation des Roms dans l’Union”, Europe, January 2011, p. 5. 
31. The application of European guarantees in the event of an expulsion of citizens of the 
Union has faced difficulties in several countries. With regard to Spain see N. Ferreira, “The EU 
free movement of persons from a Spanish perspective: exploring its evolution and derogations”, 
(2013) 19 European Public Law, p. 397. 
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quently, it needs to be completed through the adoption of 
legislative and other measures on the Roma in which both 
home States and host States bear responsibility. Indeed, the situ-
ation of the Roma in Europe is a test case for the Union and its 
citizenship. The ability to guarantee the rights of the most vulner-
able is proof of the effectiveness of European citizenship as a legal 
status protecting individuals.    
7. Conclusion/recommendations 
— Public awareness campaigns should be held so that citizens 
might properly appreciate the (very often misunderstood) 
contribution of migrant workers, including frontier workers, 
to the economic development of their country.
— European institutions should remain firm in the face of State 
attempts to roll back the legislative and case-law acquis on 
migrant workers’ (including frontier workers’) access to 
social rights in the host State. 
— Directive 2004/38 must be implemented by national author-
ities in the light of the requirements of citizenship, of 
fundamental rights, and of the principle of proportionality. 
This directive should be amended by the European legislator 
in order to allow, in view of acquiring the right of permanent 
residence, to take into account legal residence for a contin-
uous period of 5 years in the host State irrespective of its 
particular circumstances. 
— A binding European instrument regulating the funding of 
student mobility should be adopted. This system could 
provide for the inter-State transfer and reimbursement of 
tuition costs in proportion to the professional career of those 
benefiting from it. 
— Legislative and other measures promoting the social inclu-
sion of the Roma, such that both the home State and the host 
State bear responsibility, should be adopted.
32. Terms used by the European Court of Human Rights in its Grand Chamber judgments of 13 
November 2007, D.H. and others v. Czech Republic, req. n° 57325/00 and of 16 March 2010, Orsus 
and others v. Croatia, req. n° 15766/03.  
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This contribution endeavors to explain several dysfunctions in the Euro-
pean Union’s legislative procedure: the drop in the number of legislative 
decisions, the high degree of consensus in the European Parliament, the 
opacity of the Council of Ministers, the generalisation of premature agree-
ments in co-decision, and the granting of symbolic rights to national 
parliaments. These phenomena are interpreted as symptoms of the crisis of 
confidence afflicting different European institutions’ ability to govern effec-
tively and legitimately. To confront this existential doubt, we conclude by 
suggesting several mechanisms aimed at a better public awareness of intra- and 
inter-institutional conflicts. 
An original feature of the EU is the fact that its law is both 
constraining and extensively developed. Public action at the Euro-
pean level consists mostly in legislative output relying on the EU 
Treaties. This paper argues that the legislative process is marred 
with weaknesses that have triggered a decrease of legislative 
outputs and deteriorated the legislative process itself. These flaws 
originate in a phenomenon that one may designate as the “exis-
tential doubt” of EU institutions. The fact that the institutions 
have not found satisfying solutions to the economic crisis, the rise 
of populism, abstention during European elections and the Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
Selma Bendjaballah, Stéphanie Novak and Olivier Rozenberg38repeated rejections of EU treaties by popular referendums leads the 
institutions to have doubts over their legitimacy and capacity to 
act. This paper contends that because of a lack of self-confidence, 
the institutions do not legislate well – that is, their legislative 
outputs have dramatically lowered and they act in an opaque 
fashion and, at some stages, with improper haste. On the basis of 
this analysis, the paper puts forward several recommendations 
aiming at a better expression of political and institutional divides 
entailed by the negotiations of directives and regulations.
1. The European Union is less and less able to enact 
legislation
Since 2009, the proportion of definitive legislative acts adopted 
has decreased by a third (Figure 1). 
This decrease is partly due to technical factors. Before the 
Lisbon Treaty, 24% of EU legislative activity dealt with agriculture 
and fisheries affairs (2002-2008). Now, following the enactment of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, these acts have lost their ‘legislative’ nature. 
Figure 1. Adopted definitive legislative acts (1999-2013)
Note: Decisions = Decisions from the Council; Directives = Directives from the European Parliament and the Council 
and/or Directives from the Council. For 2013, all the data are related to a period from January to October 
(included).
Source: CDSP and CEE, EU Legislative Output 1999-2010*.
* EU Legislative Output 1999-2010 (05/06/2010) [database], Centre for Socio-political Data (CDSP, CNRS - 
Sciences Po) and Centre for European Studies (CEE, Sciences Po) [producers], Centre for Socio-political Data [distrib-
utor]. All the data displayed in this article originate from this source except when another is mentioned.
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How institutions doubt 39Besides, all the regulations, directives and decisions adopted 
without the European Parliament’s participation are now consid-
ered as non-legislative acts (article 289).  
Nevertheless, these technical factors alone cannot explain this 
one-third decrease. Some political explanations could also be prof-
fered. First, the Better Regulation and Smart Regulation Programs 
implemented by the Commission as of 2000 are producing results. 
By reducing administrative costs and the number of impact assess-
ments, these programs have certainly simplified EU law. They also 
have made legislative activity more hazardous.
Second, facing the Eurozone crisis since 2008, member states 
are increasingly reluctant to enact legislation. Whereas on average 
five acts were adopted per year at the request of national govern-
ments from 1999 to 2009, no single act has been adopted at the 
request of a member state since 2010. Lastly, year after year, the 
European Commission has made both internal and external 
consultation procedures more cumbersome in the stage preceding 
the adoption of proposals. This automatically leads to a decrease in 
the number of adopted acts. 
It seems as though EU institutions, obsessed with the political 
agenda set by the economic crisis and the difficulty in facing it, 
have turned away from ordinary legislative activity. It has seem-
ingly become more urgent to agree on deficit-control rules than to 
deepen the internal market or to regulate the CAP.
2. The European Parliament consistently seeks consensus 
Despite the direct election of MEPs in 1979, consensus rules the 
European Parliament. Since 1979, three out of four MEPs have 
sided with the majority. To focus on the two major groups, the 
European People's Party (EPP) and European Socialist Party (ESP) 
MEPs vote in the same way 70% of the time (Table 1). This trend 
has been accelerating since 2004.
All policy fields are ruled by consensus, even those expected to 
be the most conflictive. From 2009 to 2014, when it comes to 
voting on employment and social affairs, the EPP and ESP MEPs 
agree 72% of the time.1 Both organisational and institutional 
1. Source: VoteWatch.
Selma Bendjaballah, Stéphanie Novak and Olivier Rozenberg40explanations might be considered to account for this trend. From 
an institutional point of view, O. Costa evokes a “raison d’institu-
tion” (Costa 2001). The search for consensus reveals MEPs’ effort to 
offset the decisional weakness of the EP. Consensus-seeking is a 
show of rational behaviour, in turn rewarded by an increase in 
formal powers.
EP rules and regulations also lead to consensus. When a text is 
dealt with during a second reading in codecision, an absolute 
majority from MEPs is required. At a more organisational level, the 
management of parliamentary groups also explains the search for 
consensus: leaders of parliamentarian groups cannot foster the 
interests and career goals of their members. Leaders can promote 
neither the re-election of their colleagues nor their national 
careers. Hence MEPs can join concurrent parties coalitions without 
any risk for ther own career.
Lastly, the daily tasks of committees drive MEPs to search for 
consensus. Two factors may be emphasised. First the technical 
content of committee discussions favours the negotiation of 
compromises. Furthermore, the most prestigious positions, such as 
rapporteurs or group coordinators, are allocated in committees to 
those MEPs most adept at building and maintaining consensus 
(Bendjaballah, 2011). These positions are, indeed, prized because 
they offer the most ambitious MEPs a representational role in 
inter-institutional negotiations.
Finally, this obstinate search for consensus, whatever its source 
(rules and regulations, committees’ organisation, parliamentary 
group management), does not only reflect the aim to display 
strength and power to the Council. Is rooted above all MEPs’ inse-
curity concerning their own legitimacy (Rozenberg 2009). MEPs’ 
shared views that their institutions cannot afford a lasting division 
and has to prove its value amendment by amendment, explain 
that they vote in the same way most of the time. The uncertain 
Table 1. Proportion of EPP and ESP MEPs voting in the same way (1979-2014)
In %
1979-1984 1984-1989 1989-1994 1994-1999 1999-2004 2004-2009 2009-2014
61 68 71 69 65 70 73
Sources: Hix et al. 2007, p. 151 and, for 2007-2014: http://www.votewatch.eu/en/epg-coalitions.html#/#0/0/2009-
07-14/2014-07-14/11/9
How institutions doubt 41legitimacy derived from their election pushes MEPs to assert their 
position by participating in policies of compromise.
3. The Council of Ministers avoids displaying its divisions
Council members often argue that efficient negotiations require 
the ability to discuss behind closed doors. The Council avoids 
displaying its divisions. Firstly, votes are published only when 
legislative acts are adopted. When the Council does not find an 
agreement, the voting positions of ministers are not published. 
Furthermore, public votes sometimes differ from positions taken 
behind closed doors. When ministers are not satisfied with an 
adopted act, they tend to join the majority (Novak 2013). For this 
reason, public votes do not accurately reflect the real amount of 
dissent and give an overly consensual image of the Council: as 
shown by Figure 2, the average rate of opposition to adopted legis-
lation is about 10%. 
Lastly, legislative proposals are mostly negotiated by diplomats 
and not by ministers. Diplomats are overall reluctant to voice disa-
greement, which facilitates the search for compromise but can be 
costly in terms of transparency. One should also note that the 
Figure 2. Voting behaviour in the Council in function of the voting rule (1995-2010)
In %
Source: Van Aken, 2012, p.42.
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negotiations (between national representatives and the Presidency 
or the Commission) facilitates the adoption of ambiguous legisla-
tive texts that allow national administrations to interpret and 
implement them in their preferred fashion. If voting positions 
were made public during the negotiation process, it would become 
more difficult to adopt deliberately ambiguous laws (cf. Piris 2005).
These different factors entail that political debates and divides 
within the Council are not well known by the public. Moreover, 
they prevent one from identifying the responsibility of the 
different actors in the decision-making process. Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the Council has adopted several transparency 
rules. However, the actors can avoid complying with these rules, 
for instance when they manage not to make public the position 
that they supported behind closed doors. Because their implemen-
tation is not controlled by an external actor, these rules poorly 
contribute to the improvement of the accountability of ministers.
Such opacity prevents journalists, national MEPs and citizens 
from being informed of the legislative debate. Once again, the fact 
that the Council has doubts over the legitimacy of the process 
fosters the tendency to hide conflicts – the high level of consensus 
being seen as a source of the legitimacy of law.
4. European institutions do not air their disagreements
The co-decision procedure now applicable in the majority of 
cases foresees the possibility for the Council and the Parliament to 
reach an agreement after several readings. In effect, bicameral 
systems have a ‘shuttle’ arrangement meant to progressively reduce 
divergences of opinion between institutions through negotiation, 
the revelation of the degree of their respective preferences, and 
quite simply, the desire to finish with disagreements. The system 
thus anticipates several readings. Yet, increasingly, the Council 
and the Parliament tend to agree after only one reading (Table 2). 
The increased occurrence of agreements reached on the first 
reading does not mean that the EU legislates too hastily since, as 
César Garcia Perez de Léon explains in his contribution to this 
issue, its average time spent on the adoption of legislative acts is 
comparatively greater than in national democracies. The Council 
How institutions doubt 43and the Parliament can take their time in order to reach an agree-
ment on the European Commission’s proposal; they tend, 
however, to do so in advance of the official decision-making 
system during formal or informal meetings and other ‘trilogues’ 
between institutional representatives (Costa et al. 2011). 
The prevalence of first-reading agreements is the product of the 
imperative to be legislatively productive (to agree as soon as 
possible, see Novak 2011, p. 51sq) combined with a practice of 
opacity (to hide conflict). This tendency evinces the will to demon-
strate the system’s efficacy – a proof all the more necessary, it 
seems, since each actor is unsure of the credit he or she gets. 
However, the prematurity of agreements presents a problem to the 
institutional structure as a whole (since the gradual unveiling of
Table 2. Agreements following the first reading during co-decision 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% 17 25 30 20 36 69 65 58 74 80 88 86 82 86
n 10 15 31 27 44 75 51 64 70 146 170 71 78 80
Note: 1999 = 1999-2000.
Source: CDSP and CEE, EU Legislative Output 1999-2010.
Figure 3. Duration of sessions in the lower chambers of various parliaments 
(European Parliament, national parliaments in the EU, American Congress), yearly 
averages for 2010-2012
Plenary hours by MPs
Source: Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon (OPAL).
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Selma Bendjaballah, Stéphanie Novak and Olivier Rozenberg44preferences is excluded) as well as to each of its components. The 
pluralist and deliberative European Parliament especially suffers 
from having to organise plenary sessions celebrating the validity of 
their compromises rather than tranquilly and forcefully acknowl-
edging the diversity of viewpoints. The sluggishness of the 
exchanges explains in part the fact that such little time is devoted 
to in-session debates, as Figure 3 indicates.    
5. National parliaments are offered collective participation 
procedures that are at best unrealistic, at worst dangerous 
Doubts concerning the democratic legitimacy of the EU have 
led to suggestions for new procedures of collective participation in 
national parliaments, beyond their individual European activities. 
Two modes of association are planned: interparliamentary confer-
ences and collective expression of opinions. Put to the test, these 
two methods seem to us at best unrealistic and at worst dangerous. 
Interparliamentary conferences, whether they assemble the 
members of European affairs committees, specialists of the CFSP 
or, from 2013 on, of the budget, encounter the difficulty of 
inducing their members to agree, a challenge complicated by the 
MP’s lack of authority to speak for his or her colleagues. As useful 
as they are for socialising or the exchange of good practices, these 
para-diplomatic meetings are not determinant; all the less so since 
the European Council’s anxiety to create such organisations some-
times overrules the need to make them effective, as is the case for 
the budget conference, whose number of participants is not even 
set (Kreilinger 2013). 
Another original solution: parliaments are invited since Lisbon 
to regulate compliance with the subsidiarity principle via Commis-
sion proposals. The so-called “early warning mechanism” proves, 
once again, quite ineffective as it imposes thresholds that are diffi-
cult to reach within several weeks and does not obligate the 
Commission to review its copy if the thresholds are attained. Since 
2009, assemblies have enacted an average of a little more than one 
opinion per year. Only two yellow cards were issued in this way, 
the Commission upholding its proposal in the second case. This 
procedure, an institutional gimmick, is nonetheless potentially 
dangerous for three reasons. First, its functioning is highly uncer-
How institutions doubt 45tain. Second, it implicitly places national parliaments in a position 
to block integration. Finally, it opens the way to unfortunate 
proposals that aim to accord red cards or individual opt-outs to the 
national parliaments. 
6. A few recommendations 
Agree to disagree in the European Parliament
MEPs must express their disagreements, at least at the start of 
the procedure. Special debates on floor could not only give birth to 
discordant voices, but also give them a better audience. 
Two kinds of debates could be considered:
1. “Orientation debates”, before committees look into the text. 
These debates already exist in many member states. 
According to this procedure, each group would present its 
formal position on the text. Therefore, the group as a whole, 
and not only the specialised members of the committee, 
would be involved. The conclusion of compromises would 
hence be more costly. It would be more difficult to conclude 
early agreements.
2. Special debates on minority reports, as it is the case for 
instance in the US Congress. MEPs could then submit a 
minority report divergent from the report of the responsible 
committee. Consensus-building would become harder.
Publicising political divides within the Council by providing 
national parliaments with an increased power to monitor the 
activities of the Council
In spite of an ambitious policy of transparency, diplomats and 
ministers have found ways to sidestep the transparency rules 
within the Council. The ECJ’s recent decision to compel the 
Council Secretariat not to black out states’ positions on the public 
minutes2 could paradoxically entail an impoverishment of the 
minutes. Rather than creating new transparency rules, it would be 
more efficient to institute an external control that would compel 
ministers to reveal their positions during the negotiation process. 
2. Case C-280/11P Council of the European Union v Access Info Europe [2013].
Selma Bendjaballah, Stéphanie Novak and Olivier Rozenberg46National parliaments, who control their governments and can vote 
for their dismissal (with the exception of Cyprus), could play such 
a role.
For this reason, it is necessary to provide them with the right to 
mandate their ministers – a right that already exists in a few 
member states. Previous experience shows that such reform would 
not lead to institute national parliaments as the actual decision-
makers. The Danish parliament often orally consents to mandates 
prepared by the government. German ministers have the possi-
bility of distancing themselves from their mandates when the 
negotiating process within the Council makes it necessary. 
However, if ministers’ voting positions depended upon the explicit 
approval of their MPs, it would become more difficult for ministers 
to play double games and to register a public vote different from 
the negotiating position adopted by their representatives behind 
closed doors. When a minister must comply with the opinion of 
her parliament, she is more constrained to account for her position 
behind closed doors.
The correlation between negative votes and abstentions within 
the Council on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the degree 
of lower houses’ formal competences in the field of European 
policy is about 0.28.3 It is slightly higher – 0.39 – when one 
considers the actual European activities of lower houses. In those 
member states in which parliaments are the most active in the field 
of European policies, ministers tend to approve of adopted laws 
less frequently (Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, p. 171). However, the 
low rate of negative votes (on average 1.2%) and abstention 
(1.5%)4 and the moderate level of the correlation show that minis-
ters receiving mandates from their national parliaments would not 
necessarily be obstructionist. Some of the countries with a 
powerful parliament in the field of European policy have a 
comparatively low level of opposition, as shown by the cases of 
Finland and Lithuania. 
3. Pearsons’s r for the period from 2010-2012, i.e. about 300 votes. The statistics do not 
include the UK because its opposition rate is much higher than other member states’. The data 
on votes are taken from www.votewatch.eu. The data on national parliaments are taken from: 
OPAL and (Auel et al., forthcoming).
4. Even in countries with powerful parliaments in the field of European policy (6.1% of 
negative votes or abstentions for Germany, 5 % for Denmark).
How institutions doubt 47In addition to the right to mandate their ministers, parliaments 
should systematically develop their capacity to control the legisla-
tive process before the meetings of the Council. Rather than 
furthering the tendency toward specialisation and bureaucratisa-
tion of parliamentary control on European activities, one should 
favour the core of political work: the oral exchange of points of 
view through the systematic public hearing of ministers before 
Council sessions. Parliaments’ competences, motivation and audi-
ence would increase if they organised these hearings within their 
standing committees rather than within their committees for EU 
activities. Lastly, if standing committees were organised along the 
sectoral lines of the Council, the control by parliaments would be 
all the more efficient. The diminution of the number of ministries 
in Germany and Italy might open the possibility of a greater 
homogeneity between the Council, the ministries and the parlia-
mentary committees. 
A Council presidency more independent from member states
In the Council, the current system of rotating presidency is 
both short-term and endogenous, which contributes to the opacity 
of the Council and to the generalisation of early agreements with 
the EP. Presidencies want to pass as many laws as possible during 
their semester. Governments know that they preside over the EU 
only for a few months and fear retaliation from their peers if they 
do not play the game of opacity. Their working method increases 
the asymmetry of information, for instance when they multiply 
bilateral exchanges. The rotating presidency has advantages, but 
the institution of a supranational presidency more independent 
from member states, such as the presidency of the European 
Council, would partly reduce the strategy of opacity and 
contribute to avoiding systematic early agreements in codecision.5
5. We are grateful to César Garcia Perez de Léon and Valentin Kreilinger for helpful 
comments.
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GRIDLOCK DYNAMICS IN THE EU 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
RESTORING EFFICIENCY AND INTER-INSTITUTIONAL 
SYMMETRY THROUGH THE REFORM OF CO-DECISION 
RULES OF DEBATE
Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon
Sciences Po, Centre d'études européennes 
The issue of the duration of the decision-making process has been a source 
of concern for practitioners and scholars of the EU for a long time. Indeed, while 
legislation is frequently adopted in the EU, the oft-lengthy negotiations 
required to pass significant legislation induce gridlock dynamics that put into 
question the efficiency of the legislative process. To speed up decision-making, 
the EU institutions increasingly resort to first-early agreements under co-deci-
sion. However, this practice has proved limited in curbing delay. Institutions are 
likely to negotiate early agreements in the shadow of the rules governing the 
time of debate for the entire co-decision procedure. This brief focuses on these 
rules to analyze the problem of legislative gridlock. The paper shows that legis-
lative paralysis predominantly occurs as a consequence of the strategic behavior 
that coalitions in the Council follow with a view to control the policy agenda. 
In addition, the brief shows that such strategic behavior considerably limits the 
capacity of the EP to exercise meaningful review of legislation. To improve effi-
ciency and restore inter-institutional balance, the paper recommends a number 
of reforms of the rules governing the use of time under co-decision.
The policy agenda of the European Union is increasingly chal-
lenged by the pressure to undertake important policy reforms. The 
current financial crisis has dramatically evidenced the need to 
establish a coherent internal market for financial services. New 
economic legislation will also be required to liberalize and coordi-
nate national policies in services and energy sectors. The EU Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon 50equally needs to address new social regulations to cope with the 
recurrent instability of the employment and reforms in the educa-
tion sector to promote competitiveness based on the use 
information-processing and communication technologies. 
Yet, in the face of these challenges the EU is hampered by legis-
lative gridlock. While the rate of adoption of legislation 
maintained a steady pace through the last decades, it has consist-
ently decreased since the signature of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Legislative paralysis, however, has been a constant in the history 
of the EU. The crux of the gridlock problem, in reality, does not 
rests as much on the volume of legislation as on the slowness of 
the legislative process. Figure 1 shows the duration of 1.400 legisla-
tive acts in the EU adopted by the Council and the EP between 
January 2002 and December 2008.1 The average length for the 
adoption of a bill is 442 days. To give a comparative perspective, 
contrast this performance with that of national legislatures. The 
average lifespan of bills in France and Ireland for the period 1982-
2002, and for a total of 1.300 bills, is of 75 days. These two legisla-
tures are characterized by weak institutional systems of legislative 
review. Yet, the EU does not fare well either when we consider 
strong legislatures. For Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands 
bills have an average lifespan of 105 days. In sum, the EU legisla-
tive process is conspicuously slow. More worryingly, it becomes 
increasingly slower for reformist non-technical bills that require 
agreements on a determined policy direction. In fact, controversial 
bills on new legislation may take 8 or 10 years to be adopted in the 
Legislative process.
How can we explain this paralysis? Traditional explanations of 
the duration of the EU legislative process have invariably point to 
the complexity of the decision-making process (Drüner 2008, 
König 2007, Golub 2007, Golub 2008, Golub and Steunenberg 
2007. On the one hand, the increase in the use of Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of the European Union 
(henceforth the Council), instead of unanimity, has tended to 
speed up legislation. On the other hand, however, the positive 
1. Legislative production of the European Union 2002-2008 [database], the Centre for Socio-
Political Data (CDSP) and the Centre for European Studies (CEE) of Sciences Po [producer], 
Centre for Socio-Political Data [distributor]. For more information see the OIE's website at http:/
/blogs.sciences-po.fr/recherche-observatory-european institutions.
Gridlock dynamics in the EU decision-making process 51effect of the decision rule on efficiency appears to be reversed by 
the increasing involvement of the EP in the co-decision procedure, 
now the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. The formal complexity of 
the EU inter-institutional decision-making has also been at the 
core of the political proposals aimed at increasing the efficiency EU 
polity. In this view, Lisbon lowered the Council quota of QMV by 
introducing a double-majority rule requiring 55 per cent of the 
votes of the member states and 60 percent of EU population. More 
strikingly, EU legislators have increasingly resorted to the informal 
practice of negotiating early agreements or trialogues in the first 
reading of the legislative process (Costa, Dehousse and Trakalová 
2012). And yet, these efforts have clearly failed in curbing delay 
and avoiding stalemate in the legislative process. Certainly, agree-
ments are now pervasively concluded in the first reading. In the 
last parliamentary terms, 72 and 77 per cent of the co-decision 
files, respectively, have been negotiated and adopted at this stage. 
However the total average duration of the process has not 
decreased accordingly.2
Figure 1. Average duration of bills in the EU
  Average of bills duration (Days)
Note: The shaded region reports the standard deviation of the average bill duration.
Source: Own elaboration from the database of the Observatory of European Institutions (see note 1).
2. “Conciliations and Co-decision, Statistics on concluded co-decision procedures (by 
signature date).” EP website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/ about/statistics\_en.htm. 
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Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon 52This brief shows that inter-institutional complexity has a 
limited effect on the gridlock. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, parliamentary involvement in the EU has, in fact, only a 
moderate influence on legislative delay. Instead, the predominant 
factor that explains legislative paralysis in the EU is the strategic 
behavior coalitions of governments in the Council follow with a 
view to control the policy agenda of the legislative process.
1. Co-decision rules of debate, strategic coalitions in  
the Council, and weakness of the EP
In reality, the expectation that informal early agreements 
would substitute the formal process in any consequential way 
contradicts elementary institutional strategic analysis. Simply put, 
as long as the formal rules governing the use of debating time in 
co-decision remain in place, legislators are likely to negotiate early 
deals in first stages of the procedure reasoning by backward induc-
tion, that is, anticipating the sequence of choices that would lead 
to the last stage of the procedure, even if this stage is never 
reached. A fortify, legislators are also likely to negotiate in the 
shadow of the formal balance of power mediating the last stage of 
the procedure.
The formal track of the co-decision procedure involves two 
stages or readings in which, upon a proposal of the Commission, 
the Council adopts a common position and the EP can introduce 
amendments to this position. If no agreement is reached in the 
second reading, a Conciliation Committee, comprising delegations 
of the 28 representatives of the Council and 28 representatives of 
the EP, is convened. The final decision requires the approval of a 
qualified majority of the Council delegation and a simple majority 
of the EP's. In the bicameral bargaining of the Conciliation stage, 
the mere difference on decision rules introduces a structural asym-
metry between the Council and the EP. Under the assumption that 
both institutions prefer an agreement than the failure of negotia-
tions (an assumption that should normally hold under the 
information-rich environment of the EU), the pivotal member of 
the Council will have a larger disagreement value than the pivotal 
member of the EP. As a consequence, the Council will be able so 
present a tighter compromise to the EP than the EP to the Council 
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considerably reinforced when the majority in the Council is cohe-
sive. Thus, if both institutions are in opposing sides of the political 
spectrum (and they are likely to be so if they get to Conciliation), a 
cohesive majority in the Council will increase the disagreement 
value of the pivotal member of the Council, hence forcing the EP to 
give further concessions (Garcia Perez de Leon 2011).
In this context, the rules governing the time of debate in co-
decision have a double effect. They increase the likelihood that the 
Council delays the legislative process, and they reinforce the asym-
metric balance of power that disfavors the EP. 
Consider first that the Treaty of Lisbon does not institute any 
procedural time limit in the first reading. Once the proposal of the 
Commission is received, the EP can deliberate on its first amend-
ments without any formal deadline. The Commission can modify 
its original proposal on the basis of the EP amendments. Concomi-
tantly, the Council can also consider the proposal of the 
Commission without any time restriction in the first reading. In 
case the Council does not accept the amended version of the EP, it 
should deliver a common position, which the Commission cannot 
revise further. Once a decision reaches a second reading, time 
limits are set for both institutions, and a legislative negotiation can 
only last as much as 8 months and 24 weeks if it reaches the final 
Conciliation, with some qualified extensions considered in case of 
no-agreement.
Although these procedural rules for the use of time of debate for 
the EP and the Council appear to be fairly similar, there is a funda-
mental difference that brings a crucial strategic component in the 
behavior of governments in the Council, and which substantially 
reinforces the structural asymmetry between the two chambers. To 
see this, consider that once the elections to the EP define a compo-
sition of parties in the EP legislature, this composition remains 
constant through the five years of the legislative term. Thus, 
although deliberations to decide on amendments on any given 
bill, and at any given stage of the decisional process, can take 
considerable time in the plenary, once the MEPs form a simple 
majority to vote on amendments, this majority will not change. 
Indeed, absent any evident policy gain from waiting, it would be in 
the interest of the assembly to speed up the collective decision. 
Cesar Garcia Perez de Leon 54Contrast this state of affairs with the situation in the Council. 
Each time there is a domestic election leading to a government 
turnover in one of the member states of the EU, there is a change 
in the composition of the Council. Elections across Europe are very 
common. They take place several times a year. This means that the 
life of a bill in the EU usually covers several changes in the ideolog-
ical composition of the Council. Constant changes in the 
ideological composition of the Council will create several sequen-
tial opportunities for governments to form majority coalitions 
with like-minded governments. As a consequence, governments 
will harbor incentives to control the timing of the agenda in order 
to obtain a coalitional deal close to their policy choice. Specifically, 
when a given preference composition of the Council allows 
governments to form an ideologically cohesive majority coalition, 
the opportunities of adopting an advantageous collective policy 
will give members of the coalition incentives to force a quick deci-
sion on the issue, so as to realize their payoffs immediately and 
save opportunity costs of leaving other issues of the agenda unad-
dressed. Conversely, when only a heterogeneous majority 
coalition with a large dispersion of preferences can form, the 
policy payoffs that members of the coalition may obtain from an 
immediate decision are diluted. Therefore, under conditions of 
preference heterogeneity, governments are likely to postpone the 
adoption of legislation and wait for better deals in the future. 
Given these strategic incentives in the Council and the lack of 
them in the EP, we can draw two clear implications: First, electoral 
compositions of the Council in which heterogeneous or disperse 
majority coalitions form are likely to induce significant delays in 
the passage of legislation. Second, electoral compositions 
prompting the formation of a cohesive coalition in the Council 
tend to accelerate the adoption of a collective position by the 
Council at any stage of the legislative process, but will also curtail 
the capacity of the EP to introduce significant amendments. 
The corroboration of these implications becomes clear when we 
examine the probability that bills are adopted in the EU legislative 
process during their lifespan, that is, their hazard rate.3 The Table 
shows how this probability is affected by coalitional heterogeneity 
in the Council, for the 108 different compositions of the Council 
configured between January 2002 and December 2008, and for 
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sion. We can observe first that coalition heterogeneity has a strong 
effect on legislative delay. Specifically, looking at the two first two 
covariates in the table, we can see that for the left-right dimension 
of conflict in the EU, a one-standard-deviation increase in coali-
tion heterogeneity is linked to an 80 per cent decrease in the 
likelihood of adopting any given piece of legislation at any given 
period. The effect for the EU-related dimension of conflict is even 
stronger, with a decrease of the hazard of about 90 percent. To 
isolate the effect of coalitional behavior, I also integrate covariates 
for the polarization of the Council, that is, the heterogeneity of the 
institution in the absence of any coalitional bargaining (“left-right 
polarization” and “EU polarization”, in the table). The lesser 
magnitude of the polarization effect confirms the prevalence of 
coalitional bargaining as a decisional mechanism in the Council. 
3. These results are derived from an article by Garcia Perez de Leon and Grossman, currently 
under review. The interested reader my contact the authors for more detailed information at 
cesar.garciaperezdeleon@sciences-po.fr.
Table. Duration model of legislative activity in the EU
coefficient (se) exp (coefficient)
Left-Rightcoalition majority -5.073  (1,205) 0.006
EU majority coalition -2.342  (0,281) 0.096
Left-Right polarization -1.141  (0,328) 0.320
Polarisation EU -0.574  (0,059) 0.563
Co-decision -0.501  (0,069) 0.606
Plus.readingsNombre de lectures -0.339  (0,087) 0.713
Backlog 2.068  (0,451) 7.907
Left-Rightcoalition majority*ln(t) 0.863  (0,328) 2.369
Left-Right polarization*ln(t) 0.163  (0,100) 1.177
Backlog*ln(t) -0.684  (0,135) 0.505
        Rsquare 0.044
        Likelih.ratio test 730.8
        Wald test 476.9
        logrank test 630.1
Source: Own elaboration from the database of the Observatory of European Institutions (see note 1).
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Figure 2 shows survival functions for minimum, medium and 
maximum levels of coalitional heterogeneity for all the composi-
tions of the Council considered. The vertical axis shows the 
proportion of bills that have not been adopted, while the hori-
zontal axis shows the time elapsed since the introduction of the 
bills, as measured by successive periods of compositions of the 
Council. It is immediately apparent from the figure that minimum 
levels of coalition heterogeneity (solid line) are associated with 
quick adoption of legislation. For maximum levels of heteroge-
neity (dashed line), the probability that a bill survives is much 
greater, hence increasing the duration of the legislative process. In 
fact, most of these bills last for almost all the length of the period 
considered, tending to be adopted after 60 consecutive composi-
tions of the Council or four years.
Consider next the effect of parliamentary involvement in Table. 
The use of co-decision decreases the hazard rate by close to 
40 percent. The comparison of this result with effect with the 
effects we find for coalitional bargaining shows that most of the 
legislative deliberation in the EU occurs in the Council, and 
confirms the asymmetric balance of power between the two legisla-
tive chambers. In particular, the estimated coefficients indicate a 
cumulative effect on delay of coalitional heterogeneity in the 
Council and the intervention of the EP. This suggests that parlia-
mentary influence in the EU is likely in issues that were already 
controversial in the Council negotiations and comes at the cost of 
Figure 2. Cumulative survival functions
                            Left-Right heterogeneity                        Pro-/anti-EU heterogeneity 
Source: Own elaboration from the database of the Observatory of European Institutions (see note 1).
Duration Duration
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weaker effect of parliamentary involvement on delay indicates that 
when a cohesive majority coalition forms in the Council, its 
members are likely to force the quick adoption of legislation, 
leaving the EP with little chance to introduce amendments. An 
additional covariate for inter-institutional complexity is the 
number of readings in co-decision. The magnitude of the effect of 
multiple readings is, as expected, not very strong. Reaching the 
second reading only decreases the probability of adoption by 
23 per cent. Arguably, the considerable workload of the legislative 
institutions also tends to reduce the efficiency of the decisional 
process over time. However, the effect of legislative backlog does 
not prove to be significant. 
Finally, we should further note that the capacity of ideological 
majority coalitions to delay the adoption of legislative bills wanes 
over time. The coefficient of the interaction of the covariate and 
the logarithmic function of time, ln(t), has a positive sign, 
suggesting that, as the negotiations last for several periods of 
bargaining, all governments in the Council become more 
concerned about opportunity costs and tend to speed up the adop-
tion of legislation.
2. Reforming co-decision's rules of debate
Gridlock in the EU legislative process appears greatly influenced 
by the strategic behavior of coalitions of governments in the 
Council. As a consequence of this behavior, delays in the adoption 
of legislation in the EU are frequent. In addition, the strategic use 
of time in the Council clearly reinforces the current structural 
asymmetry between the Council and the EP. EU constitutional 
designers and legislators should address extant institutional failures 
by reforming the co-decision rules of debate in a way that takes into 
account the formal institutional structure already in place:
— The EU should establish procedural time limits in the first 
reading of the co-decision procedure, both for the Council and 
the EP. This measure would help to prevent strategic 
behavior in the Council, while keeping a realistic framework 
for negotiations. Given the current institutional context of 
the EU, the Rotating Presidency period of six months would 
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tries holding the Rotating Presidency are mainly responsible 
to manage the co-decision files, this schedule would also 
give more coherence to the EU periodic legislative agenda.
— Discretion should be delegated to the Council President and 
the Commission President, acting conjointly, to establish an 
Urgency Procedure that restricts the timetable for legislative 
consideration of bills where expediency is required. Urgency 
bills would still be debated under open rule in the Council, 
so that there would be no restrictions as to who can amend 
the bill. The European Council has increasingly taken the 
role of addressing urgent matters. The proposed measure 
would translate this informal prerogative to the ordinary 
legislative process. 
— The rule of decision for the Council in the Conciliation Committee 
should be changed to Simple Majority. Note that this recom-
mendation is restricted to the stage of Conciliation. Its basic 
aim is to introduce symmetry of bargaining power in inter-
institutional relations without for this changing the basis of 
quantitative voting in the Council for the whole decisional 
process. 
— The chairmanship of the EP's delegation in the Consultation 
Committee should be fixed to one of the vice-presidents of the EP. 
This measure aims also at restoring inter-institutional 
symmetry. A permanent senior chair is expected to enhance 
the credibility of the EP delegation in Conciliation negotia-
tions in proposing positions that are likely to be backed by 
the assembly. Additionally, this measure is likely enhance 
the public visibility of the EP as a powerful body, helping to 
direct electoral competition in EP elections toward issues 
related to EU public policy.4
4. I am grateful to Emiliano Grossman for his generous help in the configuration of the paper, 
and to Olivier Rozenberg for his insightful comments on the definite version of the text. 
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THE DILUTION OF THE COMMUNITY 
METHOD AND THE DIVERSIFICATION 
OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL PRACTICES
Delphine Dero-Bugny
Université Paris Descartes
The strengthening of the European Council and the multiplication of inter-
national agreements between the Member States seems to be undermining the 
Community method. However, the diversification of intergovernmental prac-
tices within the European Union need not lead to calling the Community 
method into question. Intergovernmental methods are often used for only a 
temporary period, after which the areas concerned generally wind up inte-
grating the Community method. The Intergovernmental is thus not necessarily 
opposed to the Community. It may even strengthen the Community method. 
The development and diversification of intergovernmental methods does, 
however, reveal a need to bring the Community method up to date. This 
involves rethinking the role of the European Council and integrating emer-
gency procedures in order to be able to respond quickly in case of a crisis.
Since European integration got underway, the Community 
method has demonstrated its efficiency and its capacity to adapt to 
changes in the Community and subsequently in the European 
Union. The current context, which has in particular seen a 
stronger role for the European Council and its President as well as 
the conclusion of international agreements between the Member 
States outside the EU and within the EU, seems to be challenging 
this method, which appeared unable to provide a quick response to 
the problems posed by the current crisis.
There is a debate today about the need to replace this method 
with a new method that would accord more prominence to inter-Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
Delphine Dero-Bugny62governmental practices. In the context of a speech on 2 November 
2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel supported the introduc-
tion of a new method, the EU method, which would supersede the 
conventional opposition between Community method and inter-
governmental method. This new method would imply, Merkel 
said, “coordinated action in a spirit of solidarity, each of us in the 
area for which we are responsible (that is to say, the institutions 
and Member States) but all working towards the same goal.”1 
The advantages of the Community method and its importance 
for European integration argue instead, in our opinion, for consid-
eration of an updated Community method. Indeed, as will be 
shown, while the diversification of intergovernmental practices in 
recent years has helped to highlight certain limitations in the 
Community method, this should not lead to calling this method 
into question, given that the strengthening of intergovernmen-
talism seems to be closely related to the current context and does 
not necessarily reflect the Member states’ lack of confidence in the 
Community method.
1. Community method and intergovernmental method
The Community method was defined by the European 
Commission in its White Paper on European governance. 
According to the European Commission, “The Community 
method guarantees both the diversity and effectiveness of the 
Union. It ensures the fair treatment of all Member States from the 
largest to the smallest. It provides a means to arbitrate between 
different interests by passing them through two successive filters: 
the general interest at the level of the Commission; and demo-
cratic representation, European and national, at the level of the 
Council and European Parliament, together the Union’s legisla-
ture.”2 The Community method is thus characterized by a number 
1. Speech given on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the 
College of Europe in Bruges, 2 November 2010.
2. European Governance – A White Paper, /* COM/2001/0428 final */ [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
communication/pdf/comm-initiatives/2001-european-governance-white-paper-com2001_0428_en.pdf] 
On the Community method: R. Dehousse, The Community Method. Obstinate or Obsolete?, 
London, Palgrave Macmillan, June 2011; Séminaire sur la méthode communautaire organized by 
Notre Europe and the Bureau des conseillers de politique européenne (BEPA). Brussels, 28 
February 2012.
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Commission (representing the general European interest); the 
adoption of acts by the Council of the European Union, which 
usually decides by a qualified majority (representing the interests 
of the Member States), and by the Parliament (representing the 
interests of the citizens); and control exercised by the Court of 
Justice. This constitutes the common law method of European 
Union law,3 even though this has always coexisted with other 
procedures for adopting legislation within the Community and 
the European Union, which are sometimes also treated as the 
Community method, but understood here in a broad sense, 
insofar as they require the intervention of EU institutions but do 
not necessarily involve the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament and do not necessarily recognize a decisive 
role for the Commission.
The Community method has often been opposed to the inter-
governmental method, which is a decision-making process that is 
based on the sovereign will of the Member States and involves 
their achieving a consensus on issues of common interest. Unlike 
the Community method, the intergovernmental method aims to 
reconcile the interests of the Member States only and so does not 
require them to consider the consequences of their decisions for 
the general European interest. 
For a long time it was easy to make the distinction between the 
Community method and the intergovernmental method, since the 
Community method could be regarded as the method applicable 
under the Community treaties while the intergovernmental 
method was to be used only when acting outside these treaties. The 
Single European Act, which legally consecrated the existence of the 
European Council in the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular the Maastricht Treaty, 
which created a European Union based on pillars and provided for 
the implementation of an intergovernmental method for the 
second and third pillars, led to blurring the distinction between 
the two methods by integrating intergovernmental practices 
within the European Union. The construction of a European 
Union in pillars can thus be explained by the mistrust of the 
3. This is illustrated today by the ordinary legislative procedure.
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reflects the desire of the members not to subject certain sensitive 
matters to this method. 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty should have led to 
strengthening the Community method, as the Treaty provides for 
a merger of the pillars,4 which in principle implies a generalization 
of the Community method to all areas covered by the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union and by the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU). But the onset of the crisis has led instead to 
the growth and diversification of intergovernmental practices, 
which seems to call into question the Community method. 
2. The development and diversification of intergovernmental 
practices
The diversification of intergovernmental practices since the 
onset of the crisis has been reflected in two main ways. It was 
manifested first in the growing strength of institutions repre-
senting the Member States, and in particular the European Council 
and its President. It could then be seen in the multiplication of 
international agreements between the Member States on the basis 
of EU law or sometimes outside it.
The growing role of the European Council and its President: The 
European Council, as an initiating body, has long played an impor-
tant role in European construction. But the Lisbon Treaty, which 
established its institutional capacity and gave it a permanent Presi-
dent, together with the specific context of the euro crisis, have 
significantly strengthened the role of this institution to the detri-
ment of other institutions, particularly the European Commission. 
A certain number of decisions have been taken directly at the level 
of the Heads of States and Governments, and the European 
Council quickly emerged as the leading institution in resolving the 
European crisis.5 The importance taken on by the European 
Council seems to have relegated the European Commission to a 
secondary role and exposed a lack of confidence in it. Some of the 
4. In reality the merger is only partial, as the domain of foreign policy and common security 
are still governed according to an intergovernmental method.
5. See on this aspect P. de Schoutheete, “Conseil européen et méthode communautaire,” Policy 
Paper, no. 56, Notre Europe, July 2012.
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been transferred to the European Council.6 The role now held by 
the European Council has come to alter the function of the 
Commission with regard to initiatives. Today the Commission 
tends to follow the Council’s conclusions, as it passes along the 
latter’s formulations of legislative proposals.7 This perceived weak-
ening of the European Commission also seems to be corroborated 
by the importance acquired by the European Parliament which, 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, must now be 
considered as a genuine legislative and budgetary authority. The 
early conclusion of agreements between the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union also tends to weaken the 
prerogatives that the European Commission holds under its power 
of initiative.
Conclusion of international agreements between the Member States:
The present context also reveals a drift towards the multiplication 
of international agreements between the Member States, some-
times in lieu of laws that should have been adopted within the 
European Union using the Community method. 
The euro zone crisis that began in 2009 has led to the adoption 
of a number of very different types of legal acts that fall sometimes 
under the law of the European Union and at other times under 
international law. A number of agreements have thus been 
concluded by the Member States either based on European Union 
law or law lying outside the European Union.
The need to develop emergency financial solidarity mecha-
nisms led the Member States to act initially outside the framework 
of the Treaties on the European Union. On 9 May 2010, at a special 
summit in Brussels of the Heads of State and Government of the 
euro zone, the members created the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), which became operational on 4 August 2010, 
following the ratification of its statutes by all the euro zone coun-
tries. The spread of the crisis to new Member States quickly led the 
euro zone countries to reach another international agreement, but 
this time on the basis of the law of the European Union area. The 
6. J.-P Jacqué, “Le nouveau discours de la method”, Tribune, Notre Europe 2011.
7. P. de Schoutheete, “Conseil européen et méthode communautaire”, cited above, p. 8 and 
42.
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simplified revision procedure provided for in Article 48 paragraph 
6 of the TEU to amend Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), which provides that the Council 
may adopt specific measures with regard to Member States whose 
currency is the euro. They added a paragraph to this provision in 
virtue of which, “the Member States whose currency is the euro 
may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispen-
sable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole and 
stating that the granting of any required financial assistance under 
the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality”. On 
the basis of this provision, the 17 euro zone members then 
concluded the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mecha-
nism, which was signed on 2 February 2012 and entered into force 
on 27 September 2012. This mechanism has replaced the European 
Financial Stability Facility.
Another international treaty was concluded between the 
Member States of the European Union, but this time outside the 
EU framework, in an effort to strengthen economic governance. 
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union was signed on 2 March 2012 
between 25 Member States, the United Kingdom and the Czech 
Republic having refused to participate. 
A new intergovernmental agreement should be agreed in 2014 
on the Banking Union.8
The development of these international agreements concluded 
between the Member States within the EU framework or outside it 
reveals the limits of the Community method and more generally of 
the EU’s decision-making system. The creation of the European 
Financial Stability Facility outside the law of the European Union 
can thus be explained by the slowness of the European decision-
making process, which is not always able to respond to crisis situa-
tions. The conclusion of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance is justified, in turn, by the inability to use the mecha-
nisms set up by the treaties on the European Union. The Member 
States had originally wished to integrate the content of this agree-
8. This governmental agreement will concern the functioning of the single resolution fund.
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But the refusal of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic to 
participate prevented this, since it involved a revision of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, which under Article 48 
of the Treaty on the European Union requires the unanimous 
agreement of all the Member States.
While the growth in intergovernmental practices seen in recent 
years may raise concerns, it does not however seem to reflect the 
Member States’ distrust in the Community method, but rather 
points to the need to consider how to bring the Community 
method up to date.
3. Calling into question the Community method?
Contrary to what one might initially think, the proliferation of 
international agreements concluded between the Member States, 
and more generally the diversification of intergovernmental prac-
tices that has been observed in recent years, does not necessarily 
lead to calling the Community method into question. 
First, the use of intergovernmental methods is often temporary and 
the matters covered by these methods are generally intended subse-
quently to integrate the Community method. The construction of the 
European Union in pillars is a good illustration of this phenom-
enon. The areas initially contained in the third pillar, which 
originally focused on cooperation in the area of home affairs and 
justice, were progressively transferred into the Community pillar 
and are now integrated into the area of freedom, security and 
justice, which is governed by the Community method. Here the 
use of the intergovernmental method has ultimately allowed the 
application of the Community method. With the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Member States agreed to transfer their authority to the 
Union in the areas of home affairs and justice, but based on an 
intergovernmental method. Then they realized the need to apply 
the Community method to these matters. This awareness grew 
gradually. The Treaty of Amsterdam enacted a partial Communiti-
zation of the third pillar. It was not until the Treaty of Lisbon that 
the entire third pillar was transferred under the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union into the area of freedom, security 
and justice. The same observation can be made with regard to the 
Delphine Dero-Bugny68emergency financial solidarity mechanisms set up since 2010. The 
euro zone members initially took action outside the institutional 
framework of the European Union to set up the European Financial 
Stability Facility. But the spread of the crisis led them to deal with 
the problem within the European Union by establishing the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism, which shows that in the minds of the 
Member States the European Union mechanisms were more suit-
able. Under this same logic, the conclusion by the Member States 
of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance cannot 
be explained by a desire of the members to act outside the frame-
work of the European Union, but rather because it was impossible, 
due to the refusal of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic 
to participate in this project, to use the mechanisms provided by 
EU law, and in particular the revision procedure set out by 
Article 48 of the TEU, which presupposes the unanimity of the 
Member States. Furthermore, the content of this agreement is 
intended to be integrated into the legal framework of the European 
Union, as its Article 16 provides that, “Within five years, at most, 
of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an 
assessment of the experience with its implementation, the neces-
sary steps shall be taken, in accordance with the Treaty on the 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this 
Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.”
Second, the use of intergovernmental methods can lead to strength-
ening the Community method by consolidating the role of the EU’s 
institutions, which play a fundamental role within the framework 
of this method. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Govern-
ance and the Treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism thus contain a number of provisions that lead to 
strengthening the role of the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
The Intergovernmental should therefore not necessarily be 
opposed to the Community, and may even strengthen it. However, 
the growth and diversification of intergovernmental methods does 
reveal a need to revise this method.
Diversification of intergovernmental practices 694. For an updated Community method
From the time the Community method was established by the 
ECSC Treaty in 1951, it has demonstrated its ability to adapt to the 
evolution of European integration. It has survived the gradual 
strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament, the 
enlargement of the European Union and the establishment of a 
differentiation within the European Union. By giving institutional 
recognition to the European Council, by strengthening the role of 
the European Parliament as well as national parliaments, and by 
creating a citizens' initiative, the Lisbon Treaty has called for new 
changes in the Community method. The diversification of inter-
governmental methods in recent years has demonstrated that the 
Community method needs in particular to adapt to the European 
Council’s new role and to be able to deal with emergencies.
The stronger role played by the European Council and its Presi-
dent, which seems to be leading to relegating the Commission to a 
secondary role, is revealing a problem of confidence in the 
Commission and its President that needs to be addressed. But it 
also demonstrates the need to integrate this new institution, which 
is composed of Heads of State and Government, but also the Presi-
dent of the Commission, into the framework of an updated 
Community method. The importance acquired by the European 
Council in recent years seems to be closely related to the economic 
nature of the crisis, which has led to putting the Heads of State and 
Government and the institution representing them into the fore-
ground, as economic policy at the EU level is based primarily on 
the coordination of national policies. This poses the question of 
what role should be recognized for the European Council under 
the Community method once the crisis is over. The Lisbon Treaty 
regulates the role that the European Council should be required to 
play under the Community method since, under Article 15 of the 
Treaty on the European Union, the European Council “shall not 
exercise legislative functions.”
The handling of emergencies also needs to be integrated into 
the Community method. The example of the Treaty establishing 
the European Solidarity Mechanism shows the value of providing 
the European Union with accelerated procedures, since it was by 
implementing the simplified revision procedure set out in Article 
48 paragraph 6 of the Treaty on the European Union introduced by 
Delphine Dero-Bugny70the Lisbon Treaty that the euro zone was able to set up this mecha-
nism so quickly. 
The Community method thus needs to be maintained, but 
must once again adapt to the changing law of the European Union.
5. Conclusions
— The diversification of intergovernmental practices within 
the European Union does not necessarily lead to calling into 
question the Community method. The use of intergovern-
mental methods is often temporary and may, in some cases, 
lead to strengthening the Community method.
— This diversification does, however, reveal the need to update 
this method.
— The Community method has always shown its ability to 
adapt to the evolution of European integration. It must now 
adapt to the new role of the European Council and integrate 
the management of emergencies.
GOOD ADMINISTRATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
MOVING TOWARDS A CULTURE OF SERVICE 
FOR THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS
Imola Streho1
Sciences Po, École de droit, Centre d’études européennes
Paradoxically, trust in the European institutions is historically low at a time 
when the institutions are more open, transparent and keen to engage in discus-
sion with European citizens than ever before. The primary law of the EU now 
explicitly refers to good administration both in the founding Treaties and in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (1). The importance of the European 
Ombudsman is also growing in the institutional framework (2); the European 
Code of Good Administrative Behavior provides a framework on how the EU 
institutions and civil servants should carry out their missions to the highest 
standards (3) and a wide range of administrative assistance is now in place in 
the EU (4). Despite all these developments, the European Parliament should 
continue to actively support the European Ombudsman. The European Parlia-
ment should also consider the policy recommendations enclosed in the present 
paper as we believe they would help to foster the EU-wide concern over good 
administration and allow the EU to regain the trust of the European citizens 
when it comes to their relations with its institutions.
According to the Spring 2013 Eurobarometer, 60% of Euro-
peans do not trust the EU and its institutions. This figure has 
doubled over the past 6 years. The lack of trust is particularly 
worrying at a time when the European integration project is 
putting the European citizen at its centre. One could surely argue 
1. I would like to thank Alfred Cummins for his help with the English version of this paper.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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parallel should not undermine an independent consideration and 
treatment of the European Citizens’ perception of the EU 
institutions.
Trust in the European institutions is historically low at a time 
when the institutions are more open, transparent and keen to 
engage in discussion with European citizens than ever before. In 
recent years, the EU institutions have adopted internal guides for 
the attention of their civil servants, on how to carry out their tasks 
in full respect of good administration. As the European 
Ombudsman stressed, “good administration depends on creating 
and nourishing a culture of service to citizens. Mistakes are inevi-
table in any administration. But a culture of service makes it 
possible to acknowledge and put right mistakes when they occur.”2 
In order to achieve greater trust between the citizen and the 
European civil service, the European Ombudsman’s role and work 
must remain central. However, more steps must also be taken to 
support the Ombudsman and supplement this work. We will 
outline some new and concrete policy actions, which could regain 
the trust of the European citizens and improve their relations with 
the EU institutions.
1. Good administration in the EU
The European integration project is increasingly concerned with 
its people (both natural and legal). Indeed, since the Maastricht 
Treaty was signed in 1992, the European Citizen became central to 
the EU. A dynamic and positive vision of the future of the EU is 
based on greater integration towards political union among 
Member States. Such an evolution means enhanced relations and 
more frequent interactions between the European Citizens, compa-
nies, residents and the European institutions themselves. 
An important concern for all institutions (administration) is 
not only that their interlocutors are informed about their rights 
and possible actions but also that their relations respect the condi-
tions of good administration. First, it is worth recalling, in brief 
2. Declaration of the European Ombudsman, Nikiforos Diamandouros at the meeting with the 
College of Commissioners on 15 February 2011.
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scholars, there is a degree of uncertainty regarding the definition of 
good administration (Mendes, 2009).3 Good administration 
should connect different levels but is it a right, a principle, an 
objective or a standard (Mendes, 2009)?
Good administration can take different forms. For lawyers, the 
right to good administration is not to be confused with the principle
of good administration. The right to good administration is a set of 
requirements aiming to protect the citizen in its relations with the 
administration. The principle of good administration is a specific 
requirement for the administration “to consider with care and 
impartiality all components of a given case according to the case 
law of the ECJ” (Azoulai, Clément-Wilz, 2014). Good administra-
tion as such refers to an ethic or particular behavior for institutions 
and their civil servants to adopt (Chevalier, 2014).
Good administration in the EU derives from the duties 
bestowed upon the European institutions in their relations with 
the European citizens. Before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, 
good administration had been a concern for the European institu-
tions however each institution had its own way of dealing with it. 
Therefore a general and harmonious approach to good administra-
tion at EU level seemed like wishful thinking. 
The situation changed in 2009. As soon as the Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force, several references were included in primary EU 
law about the European administration in addition to good as well 
as maladministration. Article 226 TFEU mentions the possibility of 
setting up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged 
maladministration. The new article 298 TFEU, under section 2 on 
the “procedures for the adoption of acts and other provisions”, 
states that “in carrying out their missions, the institutions, the 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have support of an 
open, efficient and independent European administration”. 
Finally, a new title XXIV was put in the third part of the TFEU on 
administrative cooperation.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, proclaimed in 
2000, has been a legal source of the EU since 1 December 2009. 
3. CFI, 12 November 2008, Evropaïki Dynamiki v. Commission, T-59/05.
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mental right of the Union citizenship. The Charter is the first 
international agreement4 referring to good administration as a 
fundamental right (Soderman, 2005). According to article 41 of the 
Charter, the right to good administration should mean:
“…the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly 
and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union. This right includes: the right of every 
person to be heard….; the right of every person to have access to 
his or her file…; the obligation of the administration to give 
reasons for its decisions; every person has the right to have the 
Union make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its 
servants in the performance of their duties… and [linguistic 
rights].” The Charter also includes the right to “any citizen of the 
Union, and any natural or legal person residing in a Member State” 
to refer to the European Ombudsman a case of maladministration 
(article 43). 
We must be clear however, as other scholars have shown 
(Jacqué, 2011) that inclusion of good administration in EU 
primary law did not simply happen overnight with the Treaty of 
Lisbon. This has been a slow and progressive formalization to 
which the ECJ case law has contributed significantly. In addition, 
despite the progress made, this codification should not be consid-
ered as an end to itself. Good administration also has to be 
publicized, known to all persons and subsequently relied upon for 
interactions with the EU institutions.
A Special Eurobarometer5 shows that 72% of European citizens 
are not informed of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
In some countries, the citizens would know about the Charter but 
not about its content (see question 1 of the Special Eurobarometer).
An important and systematic communication has to be made 
on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Citizens’ rights and the 
4. Resolutions have been adopted by the Council of Europe but no agreement on good 
administration. Study n° 470/2008 Council of Europe, Commission of Venise, Assessment of 
« good governance » and « good administration », pt. 46.
5. Special Eurobarometer, done by TNS Opinion & Social on special request of the European 
Parliament and the European Ombusdsman, 7 July 2011, The Ombudsman synthesis on the 
European Ombudsman and Citizens’ Rights http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/
statistics.faces 
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Ombudsman rightly points out “only citizens well informed about 
their rights and about who to turn in case of a problem can effec-
tively exercise their rights.” Therefore, the Special Eurobarometer 
should act as an encouragement for the European Ombudsman to 
better inform the European citizens.
We strongly recommend the other institutions, bodies and 
agencies of the EU, especially the European Parliament and the 
Commission to echo the efforts of the European Ombudsman in 
communicating about the EU, its missions, the Citizens’ rights and 
also about good administration. It is also vital that the European 
citizens know about the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
and its content.
2. The European Ombudsman: The guardian of good 
administration 
The strongest and most active support for the formalization of 
good administration in EU primary law comes from the European 
Ombudsman. Among its missions, the European Ombudsman tries 
Figure 1. How informed do you feel you are about the Charter of Fudamental Rights 
of the Eu?
Source: Eurobarometer, 2011.
Total
“Not informed”
“Have never heard
of it” 
(SPONTANEOUS)
Total “Informed”
Don’t know
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of the EU referred to it. It encourages transparency and defends a 
culture of service within the administration. Overall, the 
Ombudsman tries to build greater trust between the citizens and 
the institutions of the EU by facilitating and mediating dialogue 
between them and by encouraging the institutions to follow the 
highest standards when carrying out their tasks (Streho, 2014).
The European Ombudsman is seen as an important interme-
diary between the citizens and the institutions of the EU. The 
office contributes to fostering the rights of the former while 
advancing the democratic functioning of the EU. The right to file a 
complaint to the European Ombudsman came as a supplement to 
the other forms of protection of citizens’ rights such as petition 
right,6 the right to send a complaint to the Commission or trigger 
judicial action (Perillo, 2005), or access to documents. The Euro-
pean Ombudsman is supposed to give a human face to the 
functioning of the European administration. Its existence is closely 
tied to the emergence of the notion of European citizenship 
(Streho, 2014).
The European Ombudsman has two main tasks within the EU7. 
Firstly, the office supervises and protects the citizens in their rela-
tions with the European administration and secondly, it promotes 
good administration within the latter. Some scholars point to the 
important role of the European Ombudsman in introducing moral 
considerations to the administration’s day-to-day activities 
(Azoulai, Clément-Wilz, 2014). 
Therefore, the European Ombudsman contributes very actively 
to establish good administration within the institutions, organs, 
agencies and bodies of the EU. The Ombudsman has regularly 
issued recommendations, critical opinions; own initiative inquiries, 
annual and special reports as well as the European Code of Good 
Administrative Behavior.8 The European Ombudsman has drafted 
6. Petition right was formalized in the European Parliament resolution as early as 1977 but the 
Petition Committee of the Parliament was set up only ten years later, in 1987 and the legal 
foundation was given in 1993 in the Maastricht treaty.  
7. As underlined by the CFI, 10 April 2002, Franck Lamberts v. European Ombudsman. T-209/
00, ECR. p. II-2203, point 77.
8. Resolution of the European Parliament 6 September 2001 approving the European Code of 
Good Administrative Behavior http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/fr/resources/code.faces/en/
3510/html.bookmark#/page/1 
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European Parliament as a special report.
A number of figures illustrate the quantitative importance of the 
European Ombudsman’s work. Since 1995, the Ombudsman has 
replied to 36 000 complaints and has carried out 3800 inquiries.9
The office received 2442 complaints in 2012, though only 740 were 
in its competence and it has closed 390 inquiries.10 It is worth 
noting that year after year, complaints originate mainly from Euro-
pean citizens (85%) and other complaints are sent by companies, 
federations, foundations, NGOs (15%) (Tsadiras, 2006).
Our recommendation for the European Parliament would be to 
continue to actively and explicitly encourage the work of the Euro-
pean Ombudsman and to make sure the office’s budget does not 
shrink. In our opinion, just like information and communication 
concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is especially 
important that European citizens are able to learn about the Euro-
pean Ombudsman and the position’s functions.11
3. Good administration embedded in the European Code  
for Good Administrative Behavior 
An original and ambitious idea of the European Ombudsman 
was the drafting of the European Code of Good Administrative 
Behavior in 1999. The Code aimed “to improve the standards of 
good administration and the relations between the European 
administration and the public” by codifying “the general princi-
ples” in the field and by reminding “the procedural and substantial 
rights and obligations of EU law” (Mendes, 2009). The European 
Parliament adopted the Code in 2001 and henceforth it became 
the cornerstone for implementing good administration. The Code 
helps the citizens to understand their rights and to invoke them. 
The Code also promotes public interest in an open, efficient and 
independent European administration and increases the citizens’ 
awareness as to the behavior they can expect from the European 
institutions (Streho, 2014).
9. Annual Report 2010.
10. Annual Report 2012.
11. Special Eurobarometer, 2011, cf. supra, question 4.
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European administrative law as it derives from the ECJ case law 
and the legislation of the Member States. The Code has 27 articles, 
which list the principles the institutions have to respect in relation 
to the public. Legitimacy, equal treatment, proportionality, no 
misuse of power, impartiality and independence as well as objec-
tivity, coherence, equity and courtesy are included in the Code. 
Lastly, the Code refers to the right to file a complaint to the Euro-
pean Ombudsman as stated in article 228 TFEU.12
The Code is not legally binding however. In front of the 
Convention drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Euro-
pean Ombudsman took the floor to defend the inclusion of good 
administration in the Charter. The Ombudsman also appealed for 
a legally binding and uniform code of good administration appli-
cable to all European institutions in their interactions with the 
public. In practice, the Code drafted by the Ombudsman and then 
adopted by the European Parliament was not given legal value. The 
institutions have since adopted their own codes but these are less 
exhaustive and ambitious in general compared to the Code of the 
Ombudsman (Mendes, 2009). Another consequence of the lack of 
legal value of the Code is the multiplication of such codes within 
the EU (Chevalier, 2014).
Our recommendation would be to encourage the Commission 
to draft a Regulation on the basis of article 298 of the TFEU and the 
content of the Code. In the past, the Commission has refused to 
present such a draft (Mendes, 2009). However, the Code would 
benefit greatly from being given legal value as it would apply 
equally to all institutions of the EU, enhance the coherence of 
European administrative behavior and ensure greater legal 
certainty in relations between the institutions and the public. An 
alternative solution would be to pursue the EU administrative 
procedural codification13 and finalize the project under the form of 
an EU Regulation with article 298 TFEU as its legal basis.
12. Article 26 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behavior.
13. European Parliament Resolution, 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the 
Commission on a Law of Administrative Procedure in the EU http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0004+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
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The previous recommendations are fundamental to the
continuation of efforts of the EU institutions, spanning several
decades, to respect good administration in their everyday work. In
addition to gaining wider trust among citizens it is important to
change their perception of the European administration.
The Special Eurobarometer highlights the challenge faced by
showing uncertainty among European citizens. Only around 10%
of respondants consider that the European administration is effi-
cient, transparent and that it comes across as service minded (see
question 2 of the Special Eurobarometer).
In our view, to improve this perception, European citizens have
to be better informed about the existence, the role of the institu-
tions, the European Ombudsman and also about the content of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. They should also be able
to locate their interlocutors and the administrative procedure they
need, without any difficulty. Indeed, an environment where the
actors are informed and relations are fluid, practical and efficient
will have a significant impact in the medium and long run on the
perception of the citizens of the European administration by
building solid and long lasting trust.
Figure 2. Based on what you know and using a scale from 1 to 10, how would you 
judge the performance of the EU administration in each of the following areas? ‘1’ means 
that the EU administration’s performance in a specific area is “not at all satisfactory” 
and ‘10’ means that its performance is “very satisfactory” 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2011.
Effectiveness of
the EU administration
Service mindedness of
the EU administration
Transparency of
the EU administration
Satisfactory
(7-10)
Don’t knowUnsatisfactory
(1-4)
Moderately
satisfactory
(5-6)
10% 31% 35% 24%
10% 30% 33% 27%
9% 25% 42% 24%
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advising citizens in the EU are numerous. In addition to the insti-
tutions and agencies, we have to mention the European 
Ombudsman, the European Network of National Ombudsman, 
and the Petition Committee of the European Parliament, the Data 
Protection Officer and the European Consumers Center. Each 
interlocutor operates its own website where the functions and the 
missions are presented.
A great number of websites and web portals exist already to 
inform and guide the citizens and companies. The general infor-
mation website of the EU, “Europe Direct”14 gives the option of 
information by phone or email about the functioning of the EU 
and helps the public to find specific interlocutors at the EU level. 
However, this website is not a tool to help to resolve any problem 
the public might encounter in the EU.
The SOLVIT15 network was launched by the European Commis-
sion in 2002 and is dedicated to solving problems brought to the 
attention of the network. The network’s motto is « solutions to 
problems with your EU rights” and its structure is composed of 
national centers,16 which receive the complaints of citizens or 
businesses for wrong application of EU law by a national adminis-
tration. Support is then provided within 10 weeks to ensure correct 
application of EU law. The SOLVIT network is not an information 
center but a concrete tool to help citizens and businesses facing a 
problem of EU law within a national administration. Therefore, 
some Member States link their national web portal to SOLVIT.17
As of today, the most comprehensive website is “Your Europe”18
however it is mainly for those European citizens and their families 
that decide to move within the EU. A similar web portal called “EU 
Go”19 helps citizens and businesses to get information on how to 
establish themselves or how to provide services in another Member 
State. The web portal is useful as it is one point of contact for infor-
14. http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm  
15. http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/index_en.htm 
16. The national SOLVIT centers are part of each national administration. http://ec.europa.eu/
solvit/contact/index_en.htm 
17. In France, for example, the website of the administration has a link to SOLVIT http://
vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/R35676.xhtml 
18. http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/index_en.htm 
19. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/eu-go/index_en.htm 
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official languages. The portal was put in place with the assistance 
of the national administrations of Member States in the framework 
of the transposition of the Services Directive.20
All of these web sites and portals are available from the official 
EU website “Europa”,21 however finding access to the above 
mentioned websites and web portals access is not always straight 
forward and user friendly. Since its creation, the official EU website 
has changed significantly. Although it now resembles the general 
website of a national administration, there is room for improve-
ment, since it could still be more user-friendly for the general 
public.
Our recommendation would be to collect all the relevant infor-
mation and help for the citizens and businesses found on the 
various web sites and portals of the EU and link it to a unique and 
user-friendly platform. Links for the administrative procedures, 
complaints and enquiries should also be included. This unique and 
general European administrative portal could be called “my Euro-
pean Public Service” and could either be a new EU homepage or be 
included in each of the existing general national administrative 
web portals of the Member States.22 The second option would 
enable the public to get used to navigating between national and 
European administrative procedures, helping to create what the 
authors call a European public space (Chevalier, 2014).
5. Conclusions et recommendations
All the recommendations contribute to reinforcing good 
administration in the EU one way or another. When combined, 
these could intensify the efforts of all EU actors to respect good 
administration, which would benefit all citizens, businesses and 
residents in the EU.
Good administration is of particular importance for those in 
direct contact with the EU institutions but as we have underlined, 
20. Directive 2006/123/EC ot the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 
on services in the Internal Market, OJ L376, p. 36–68.
21. http://europa.eu/index_fr.htm 
22. Like http://www.service-public.fr/; 
http://www.guichet.public.lu/home/fr/index.html; http://www.belgium.be/fr/ …
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integration project advances.
Therefore, it seems vital to consider the following recommenda-
tions to advance the cause of good administration in the EU and 
build wider trust among the institutions and the public:
1. Information and communication on the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the EU and in particular, the right to good 
administration.
2. Information about the role and function of the European 
Ombudsman and active support for the Ombudsman’s 
actions.
3. Formalization the European Code of Good Administrative 
Behavior in a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council to allow its uniform application to all institutions 
and civil servants. An alternative recommendation is to carry 
on with the EU administrative procedural codification and 
finalize the project under the form of an EU Regulation.
4. More efficient information and access to the European 
administrative procedures and rights for all citizens from a 
unique web portal “my European Public Service” which 
could either be in the form of a new EU homepage or be 
included in each of the existing general national administra-
tive web portals of the Member States.
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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE FACE 
OF THE CRISIS
Antoine Bailleux
Saint-Louis University, Lawyer, member of the Brussels Bar
 The economic, social and identity crisis that the European Union is 
currently experiencing has placed significant strain on the protection of funda-
mental rights. It is apparent that these rights have been marginalised on 
particularly burning issues such as: (1) the opt-out status of the United 
Kingdom, Poland and – potentially – the Czech Republic in relation to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights; (2) the deepening of economic coordination 
and governance; (3) the negotiation of free trade agreements with Canada and 
the United States; and (4) the negotiation of Protocol no. 15 amending the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Against this unfavourable back-
ground, it is incumbent upon the European Parliament to ensure that 
fundamental rights continue to serve as a compass and frame of reference for 
EU policies. 
The difficult period that the European Union is experiencing 
has placed a strain on the protection of fundamental rights. In a 
large number of member states the economic crisis has fostered the 
growth of political movements and parties with an authoritarian, 
nationalist or simply eurosceptic bent. These parties have for the 
most part not come to power, but they nonetheless indirectly 
influence the political agenda of their states and, in turn, the entire 
European Union.        
This context of identity tension is hardly conducive to the 
flourishing of fundamental rights, which are sometimes cited as 
the symbol of a legal-technocratic Europe that imposes its diktats 
on the popular will (or the presumed popular will). More generally, Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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ciency of public action in sensitive and pressing   areas such as the 
economy and security.         
This spirit of the time, inimical to fundamental rights, is 
expressed in a number of areas in the European Union’s legal 
system. In an inevitably partial and selective way, this contribu-
tion identifies four especially topical and wide-ranging areas that 
the European Parliament will be hard-pressed to ignore during the 
2014-2019 term: (1) the opt-out status of the United Kingdom, 
Poland and the Czech Republic in relation to the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights; (2) the deepening of economic coordination and 
governance; (3) the negotiation of free trade agreements with 
Canada and the United States; and (4) the signing of Protocol no. 
15 amending the European Convention on Human Rights.        
Each of these subjects is addressed in two steps: first a descrip-
tion, followed by an assessment and recommendations. The aim of 
this short contribution remains modest, however: the issues it 
highlights are already well known, its analysis of them is too quick, 
and some of the recommendations it offers will likely appear too 
vague or simplistic to be implemented. But the exercise will not be 
useless if it achieves at least one objective: convincing the repre-
sentatives of the European peoples that, in these turbulent times, 
fundamental rights must now more than ever serve as a compass 
for public action.         
1. The position of the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech 
Republic in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
1.1. Observations 
During the negotiation of the Lisbon treaty, Poland, the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic sought to opt out of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. These efforts have 
led, for the former two member states, to the ratification and entry 
into force of Protocol no. 30 on the application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the 
United Kingdom. According to article 1 of this Protocol no. 30, 
“[t]he Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the 
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tive provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United 
Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms 
and principles that it reaffirms.” In order to remove any ambiguity, 
it states“ (…) nothing in the Title IV of the Charter creates justi-
ciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in 
so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such 
rights in its national law.”1 
Annex I to the conclusions of the European Council of 29 and 
30 October 2009 includes a “protocol on the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights on the European Union to the 
Czech Republic”, which in its first article states that Protocol n° 30 
applies to the Czech Republic. This new Protocol, which in theory 
should have been ratified and entered into force at the same time 
as the Accession Treaty of Croatia, led to an uproar in the Czech 
senate2 and European Parliament.3 The prospects of ratification of 
this Protocol in the near future are therefore dim.   
In its N.S. ruling, the Court of Justice retained a narrow interpre-
tation of the “special privileges” that Poland and the United 
Kingdom have secured, holding that article 1, § 1, of Protocol n° 30 
“is not intended to exempt [these two states] from the duty to 
comply with the provisions of the Charter, or to prevent a court of 
one of those Member States from ensuring compliance with those 
provisions.”4 
In contrast, the Court has not yet ruled on the scope of the 
second paragraph of the 1st article of the said Protocol, that denies 
Title IV (“Solidarity”) of the Charter the status as a source of “justi-
ciable rights” except in so far as such rights are already provided for 
in national law.5 In its Association de Médiation Sociale ruling of 
1. O.J., 2007, C 306, p. 157.
2. See resolution n°330 of 6 October 2011 cited in European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 
2013 (n.3 below).
3. European Parliament Resolution of 22 May 2013 on the draft protocol on the application of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to the Czech Republic (article 48, § 3, 
of the Treaty on European Union) (00091/2011 – C7-0385/2011 – 2011/0817(NLE)).
4. C-411/10 and C-493/10 N. S., 21 December 2011, not yet published in European Court 
Reports, para. 120.
5. In a ruling of 15 September 2011 (C-155/10 Williams, not yet published in European Court 
Reports), the Court nevertheless did not hesitate to invoke the Charter to establish the right to 
an annual leave in a case on a preliminary ruling by the British Supreme Court. However, it also 
true that this right was already enshrined in secondary legislation.
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interpretation advanced by British and Polish authorities by 
stating that article 27, which recognises workers’ right to informa-
tion and consultation within the undertaking – a part of the 
“Solidarity” title – “by itself does not suffice to confer on individ-
uals a right which they may invoke as such” and can therefore not 
be invoked in a dispute between individuals for the purpose of 
dismissing a national measure contrary to that article.6  
1.2. Assessment and recommendations
It is unfortunate that, for the first time in the history of Euro-
pean integration, the “sacred union” of member states on 
fundamental rights has broken. The exemption sought by three 
states in relation to an axiological pillar of the European Union – 
fundamental rights – is extremely worrying symbolically, politi-
cally and legally.  
 The European Parliament may at first glance appear powerless 
in this situation, which relates to an act of primary law – a Protocol 
– signed and ratified by member states. However, it can use its 
powers to indirectly quash the negative consequences of this dislo-
cation of states’ shared commitment to fundamental rights.     
On the one hand, it must continue to strongly oppose the exten-
sion of the Protocol to the Czech Republic and to fight to prevent 
the British and Polish examples from “spreading like wildfire.” 
On the other hand (and most importantly), the Parliament 
must act in its capacity as EU co-legislator to ensure, through 
secondary law, respect for values that primary law seems unable to 
guarantee. Specifically, the Parliament should use its legislative 
powers7 to work for continuous improvement of the protection of 
rights covered in the “Solidarity” Title of the Charter.8 
It would certainly be a sensitive task, but this long-term legisla-
tive undertaking appears to be the only way to rebuild a united 
front of states supporting fundamental rights. With this in mind, 
the European Parliament is invited to seriously consider the stand-
6. C-176/12, not yet published in European Court Reports, points 47 to 51.
7. Which is in no way incompatible with the fact that the Charter does not expand the EU’s 
competences (art. 6, § 1er, al. 2, of the Treaty on European Union).
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reasons, to lower the level of protection of these rights (Hachez, 
2008: no. 55 ff.; Misonne, 2011: 356-359). In other words the 
Parliament should systematically refuse any legislative change that 
would unjustifiably or disproportionately undermine the fulfill-
ment of these fundamental rights.     
2. The deepening of economic coordination and governance 
2.1. Observations 
The sovereign debt crisis led EU member states to carry out 
major reforms aiming to strengthen economic governance in the 
European Union, and especially the eurozone. These reforms have 
largely followed the classical intergovernmental path, resulting in 
the conclusion and entry into force of the treaty establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (TSCG). Today they are largely anchored in the 
European Union’s secondary law through the well-known “six-
pack” and “two-pack.” 
Fundamental rights are only a small part of these reforms. In 
fact, the Court of Justice has recognised that the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights does not apply to the ESM because the latter does 
not formally come under the jurisdiction of EU law.9 
The role of fundamental rights in economic governance thus 
appears to be limited to two elements. First, this governance is to 
“take into account article 28 of the Charter” and “accordingly, 
does not affect the right to negotiate, conclude or enforce collec-
tive agreements or to take collective action in accordance with 
national law and practice.”10 
8. These rights include workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking 
(art. 27), the right of collective bargaining and action (art. 28), the right of access to placement 
services (art. 29), protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (art. 30), fair and just working 
conditions (art. 31), prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (art. 
32), protection of family and professional life (art. 33), the right to social security and social 
assistance (art. 34), the right to a high level of human health protection (art. 35), the right to 
access services of general economic interest (art. 36), and the right to a high level of 
environmental protection (art. 37) and consumer protection (art. 38). 
9. C-370/12 Pringle, 27 November 2012, not yet published in European Court Reports.
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board”11 to assess member state compliance with the right to an 
effective remedy as set out in Article 47 of the Charter. The score-
board originated from the conviction that access to effective, 
independent and predictable justice is likely to increase investor 
confidence and thereby promote economic growth.  
2.2. Assessment and recommendations
 While there was clearly a need to deepen economic govern-
ance, one can only deplore that it occurred with indifference to, or 
even to the detriment of, fundamental rights. References to the 
right to collective bargaining in some of the “two-pack” and “six-
pack” instruments should not delude us in this regard: the array of 
sanctions and rewards that the Commission and Council can use 
to enforce compliance with their recommendations threatens, in 
practice, to eliminate social partners’ room to maneuver. Mean-
while, the Commission’s scoreboard is questionable, to say the 
least, in the sense that it was created for the sole purpose of 
gauging a member state’s attractiveness for potential investors. 
Such an instrumental approach to fundamental rights seems very 
simplistic. 
This underutilisation of fundamental rights has not gone unno-
ticed. The Portuguese Constitutional Court has already struck 
down austerity measures imposed by European institutions for 
failing to respect social rights.12 In the same vein, the European 
Committee of Social Rights has ruled that certain measures adopted 
by Greek authorities under pressure from the Troïka (European 
Commission, ECB, IMF) violate the European Social Charter.13
10. See Regulation 1176/2011 of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances, O.J., 2011, L 306, p. 25-32, art. 1, § 3 and art. 6, § 3; Regulation n° 
472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the 
euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial 
stability, O.J., 2013, L 140, p. 1., art. 1, § 4, and art. 6, § 1; Regulation n° 473/2013 on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of 
excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, O.J., 2013, L 140, p. 11, art. a, § 2.
11. COM (2013) 160 final.
12. See Decision 187/2013 of 5 April 2013; Decision 862/2013 of 19 December 2013.
13. See GENOP-DEI and ADEDY v. Greece, claim. n° 65/2011 and n° 66/2011, decisions of 12 
May 2012; GENOP-DEI et ADEDY v. Grèce, claim n° 65-66/2011; IKA-ETAM, POPS, ISAP and 
POS-DEI v. Greece, claim n° 76-80/2012, decisions of 7 December 2012.
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and thereby feed the legitimacy and confidence crisis that 
currently bedevils the European Union.   
The European Parliament cannot stand idly by in the face of 
these challenges. It must use its powers – and especially those 
granted through the “economic dialogue”14 – to force the Commis-
sion and Council to jettison their one-dimensional approach to 
their assessment of member states’ economic situation.  
These states are held to fundamental rights obligations that 
they cannot – be it from a legal standpoint alone – sacrifice on the 
altar of economic governance. In a communication of 2 October 
2013, the Commission thankfully committed to developing the 
social dimension of economic and monetary union.15 It is up to 
the Parliament to ensure that this declaration of intent is realised 
and strengthened.  
3. Negotiation of free trade agreements with Canada  
and the United States 
3.1. Observations
The European Union has – quietly – negotiated a free trade 
agreement with Canada. To date the content of this agreement, 
whose details are still being finalised, has not been revealed to the 
general public. But it appears that this agreement will include 
provisions on investments that can be invoked before arbitration 
courts. In particular, businesses investing in the European Union 
or Canada would be able to obtain redress in the event of an “indi-
rect expropriation”, that is, a “substantial deprivation” of the 
attributes of property. Specifically, these clauses would also allow 
businesses to claim damages and interest for legislative changes 
infringing on their investments if these changes – driven, for 
example, by environmental, health or public safety concerns – 
appeared to be “manifestly excessive in light of their objective.”16 
14. See. art. 15 of Regulation n° 473/2013 quoted above and article 3, § 9, and 18 of Regulation 
n°472/2013 quoted above. 
15. COM(2013) 690 final.
16. This information comes from a Commission document entitled Investment Provisions in 
the EU-Canada free trade agreement (CETA), available at:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.  
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(the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)) will 
feature the same type of clause. The Trade Commissioner is aware 
of the concerns that these provisions raise in the European popula-
tion, and has decided to open a public consultation on this subject 
in March 2014.  
3.2.  Assessment and recommendations
The transatlantic free trade agreements have raised a number of 
public concerns, with some fearing that the removal of barriers to 
trade will lead to lower standards of protection for non-commer-
cial interests (health, environment, etc.) in force today in the 
European Union.   
It would behoove the Parliament to use its powers under article 
2018 of the TFEU to oppose any clause in these agreements that 
might lead to a step backwards in the protection of fundamental 
rights, and in particular those included in Title IV of the Charter, 
such as the right to a high level of protection for human health, 
consumers and the environment.  
Moreover, it is critical that the Parliament shed light on the 
content and reach of the investment clauses that are to be inserted 
into such agreements. In this connection it may be recalled that 
according to the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, “an economic 
operator cannot claim a right to property in a market share which 
he held at a given time, since such a market share constitutes only 
a momentary economic position, exposed to the risks of changing 
circumstances. Nor can the guarantees accorded by the right to 
property or by the general principle safeguarding the freedom to 
pursue a trade or profession be extended to protect mere commer-
cial interests or opportunities, the uncertainties of which are part 
of the very essence of economic activity.”17 
In other terms, neither property rights not the right to freedom 
of economic activity18 can justify the insertion of a clause aiming 
to safeguard businesses from unpredictable legislative develop-
ments that might harm their investments. Conversely, the 
17. C-120/06 and C-121/06 P FIAMM v. Council and Commission, 9 September 2008, Rec., 
p. I-6513, point 185, and jurisprudence quoted.
18. See aff. 133 to 136/85 Rau, 21 May 1987, Rec., p. 2289, pt. 19.  
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dissuade states from pursuing reforms needed to safeguard the 
protection of “non-commercial” fundamental rights related to 
health, security or the environment. Finally, such clauses are all 
the more dangerous because they would be subject to private arbi-
tration, under which they would likely take precedence over 
European standards to protect fundamental rights,    
4. The signing of Protocol no. 15 amending the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
4.1. Observations 
On 24 June 2013, states parties to the Council of Europe 
concluded Protocol no. 15 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This Protocol will come into force once all the states parties 
to the Convention have ratified it.     
This Protocol seems to be partly driven by a desire to limit the 
influence of the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence 
over national policies. First, its preamble enshrines the principle of 
subsidiarity and the doctrine of the “national margin of apprecia-
tion.” Moreover, this Protocol places a four-month time limit – 
instead of the current six months – on filing a petition from the 
date of the final domestic decision.           
On the basis of article 6, § 2, of the TEU, the European Union 
has negotiated an agreement to accede to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. This Protocol is currently under review by 
the Court of Justice.19 
4.2. Assessment and recommendations
It is worrisome that some states parties to the Council of Europe 
are trying, via Protocol no. 15, to constrain the European Court of 
Human Rights’ scope for action. As nationalist and authoritarian 
movements are gaining traction in the aftermath of the crisis, it is 
more important than ever to save democracy from itself by 
entrusting the keys to an independent guardian above the political 
19. Opinion 2/13, procedure currently pending before the Court. 
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subsidiarity principle are already used by the Strasbourg Court for 
the legitimate purpose of respecting the diversity and sovereignty 
of member states, these tools should not become a convenient 
shield for states trying to escape their international obligations.      
Once the European Union becomes party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights it will also have to make a decision 
over the ratification of Protocol no. 15. At this point it is difficult 
to judge whether European Parliamentary opposition to EU acces-
sion to the Protocol would be politically possible and strategically 
advisable. However, the European Parliament has another option 
that would allow it to partially offset a possible weakening of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ oversight.
This option is nothing new. Called for by the Parliament 
itself,20 and supported in the academic world (see Carrera, Guild, 
Hernanz, 2013), the solution would be to establish a system to 
monitor member state compliance with fundamental rights. This 
mechanism would allow for the continuous monitoring of each 
member state’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. It would 
be more efficient than the process referred to in article 7 of the TEU 
that provides for penalties against states which seriously and 
persistently breach EU values, but that is fraught with such serious 
consequences that it has never been used. At the same time, this 
mechanism could find a legal basis in this same article 7 of the 
TEU, as a preventative tool to anticipate and prevent the “clear risk 
of a serious breach” mentioned in article 7 of the TEU.  
The European Parliament should therefore pursue this course 
with the help of the Commission and the European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights, which seems to naturally be best 
equipped to guide the implementation of such a “scoreboard for 
fundamental rights”.    
20. See for example the European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of 
fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary, pts. 78-82.
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It is proposed that the European Parliament:
1. systematically refuse any legislative change that might 
unjustifiably or disproportionately lower the level of protec-
tion of the social rights and principles described in Title IV of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights;    
2. encourage the Commission and the Council to integrate the 
protection of fundamental social rights in their assessment 
of the economic situation of member states in the context of 
the new economic governance;
3. oppose any clause in transatlantic free trade agreements (EU-
Canada and EU-US) that either in terms of content (weak-
ened protection of human health, consumers and the 
environment), or of procedure (insertion of investment 
clauses that would paralyse member state action) would 
threaten the protection of fundamental rights; 
4. work towards the implementation of a “scoreboard” for 
fundamental rights that would continuously monitor each 
member state’s compliance with them. 
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REFORMING EUROPE TRANSFORMATION 
OF EU COMPETENCE IN THE FIELD 
OF ECONOMICS WITH THE ANTI-CRISIS 
MEASURES
Laure Clément-Wilz
University Versailles Saint-Quentin
The “anti-crisis measures” are undoubtedly strengthening the involvement 
of the EU and / or its institutions, even though a priori the area of  competence 
is still the same: fiscal discipline on the one hand, and the coordination of 
economic policy on the other. This set of instruments embraces national fiscal 
and economic policies, but also involves greater control exercised by EU insti-
tutions over the States, and in particular the euro zone countries. Two types of 
coordination are thus being merged, one based on flexible multilateral surveil-
lance between States overseen by the Council, and the other based on a more 
rigid supervision on the part of the Commission. The monitoring of broad 
economic policy guidelines by the Commission and the Council is more precise 
than in the past, especially with the new mechanism of quasi-automatic sanc-
tions for the euro zone countries; and the recommendations made with regard 
to the coordination of economic policy now have a mandatory character for the 
euro zone countries, under Article 136 of the TFEU concerning measures 
specific to the euro zone countries. The conditionality of financial assistance is 
adding a little more pressure on the States. There is a need both to strengthen 
democratization generally by reinforcing the role of the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments as well as to provide a clear legal basis for the new 
missions of the EU institutions.
1. The new “anti-crisis” measures  and EU competence:  
an introduction
1.1. The “anti-crisis” measures in the field of economics
The “anti-crisis” measures correspond to a large body of law 
adopted to fight the economic and financial crisis and limit the Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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of the Union (the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mech-
anism, hereinafter the ESM Treaty,1 and the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance, hereinafter the SCG Treaty2) and 
sometimes within it, through secondary legislation (“Six Pack”3
and “Two Pack”4) or new soft law instruments such as the Europe 
2020 strategy.5 These new measures are changing the exercise of 
the competence of the Union, its institutions and the States in the 
field of economic policy.
1.2. EU competence in the field of economic policy
The category of competence that covers economic policy does 
not appear to be so obvious, despite the typology of competences 
drawn up since the Lisbon Treaty. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the 
FEU Treaty or simply TFEU) provides that, “The Member States 
shall coordinate their economic and employment policies within 
arrangements…, which the Union shall have competence to 
1. Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 2 February 2012, signed by the 
17 Member States of the euro zone, entered into force on 27 September 2012.
2. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, 2 March 2012, signed by 25 Member 
States (the 27 Member States minus the United Kingdom and Czech Republic), entered into 
force on 1 January 2013. Also called the “Fiscal Pact”.
3. EU Parl. and Cons., Reg. 1175/2011, 16 Nov. 2011, amending Regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 
the Council on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies, OJEU L 306, 23 Nov. 2011, p.12 and EU Cons., Reg. 
1177/2011, 8 November 2011, modifying (EC) regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJEU L 306, 23 Nov. 2011, 
p.33; two regulations on macroeconomic surveillance (EU Parl. and Cons., Reg. 1176/2011, 
16 Nov. 2011, on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJEU L 306, 23 
Nov. 2011, p. 25 and EU Parl. and Cons., Reg. 1174/2011, 16 Nov. 2011, establishing 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJEU L 
306, 23 Nov. 2011, p. 8). Also, EU Parl. and Cons., Reg. 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement 
of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJEU L 306, 23 Nov. 2011, p. 1 and EU Cons., Dir. 
2011/85, 8 Nov. 2011, on requirements for budget frameworks of the Member States, OJEU L 
306, 23 Nov. 2011, p. 41).
4. EU Parl. and Cons., Reg. 472/2013, 21 May 2013, on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, p.1; EU 
Parl.-Cons., Reg. 473/2013, 21 May 2013, establishing common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficits of the Member 
States in the euro area, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, p. 11
5. Strategy approved by the European Council on 26 March 2010, upon a proposal by the 
Commission. This was a new strategy for growth and employment based on strengthened 
coordination of economic policy. See EU Cons., Recommendation 2010/410/EU, 13 July 2010, 
on broad economic policy guidelines of the Member States and of the Union, OJEU L 191, 23 
July 2010.
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shared competences (Article 4) nor among the so-called comple-
mentary competences (Article 6). It is found in a separate article, 
Article 5, TFEU, on economic policies, policies on employment and 
social policies, in which paragraph 1 states that, “The Member 
States shall coordinate their economic policies within the Union. 
To this end, the Council shall adopt measures, in particular broad 
guidelines for these policies.” 
The third part of the Treaty is devoted to economic policy and 
to economic policy coordination by the Member States, with the 
support of the Council, which develops broad guidelines of the 
economic policies (BGEPs) (Article 121, TFEU), which may be 
specific to the Eurogroup (Article 136, TFEU). There are also clauses 
on solidarity between Member States or the Union in the case of 
hardship or exceptional events (Article 122, TFEU) as well as provi-
sions on budgetary discipline, which are based on the prohibition 
on public financing (Articles 123-125 TFEU) and the control of 
excessive government deficits (Article 126, TFEU). The Stability 
and Growth Pact is ultimately a device for preventive multilateral 
surveillance6 combined with a sanctions procedure,7 so that the 
deficit does not exceed 3% of GDP and the debt 60% of GDP.
These arrangements do not much reflect the provisions of Arti-
cles 3 and 5 of the TFEU: the Union does not act solely in the 
framework of the BGEPs. Depending on the degree of involvement 
of the EU, this is a matter of national powers exercised as part of 
the Union, i.e. national competences framed by the Union, or of 
genuine complementary competences within the meaning of 
Article 6, TFEU. This is what was confirmed by the Court of Justice 
in the Pringle judgement.8
The way this coordination competence is exercised can cause its 
very nature to vary. The stronger the constraint of the Union, the 
6. Governed by EU Cons., Reg. 1466/97, 7 July 1997, on the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJEU L 209, 
2 August 1997 (amended by EU Cons., Reg. 1055/2005, 27 June 2005, OJEU L 174, 7 July 2005, 
p.1 then by Reg. 1175/2011, cited above).
7. Governed by EU Cons., Reg. 1467/97, aimed at speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJEU, L 209, 2 August 1997, amended by 
EU Cons., Reg. (EC) 1056/2005, 25 June 2005, OJEU L 174, 7 July 2005 then by Reg. 1177/2011, 
cited above. The entirety may be specific to the Eurogroup in virtue of Article 136 TFUE.
8. CJEU, 27 Nov. 2012, C-370/12, Pringle.
Laure Clément-Wilz102less we can speak of simple national competences coordinated 
within the Union. 
More specifically, the way competence is exercised has evolved 
with the anti-crisis measures, whether this is within the framework 
of monitoring the broad guidelines of the economic policies, the 
prevention and correction of economic imbalances, or the new 
system of sanctions on States and controls over them when they 
receive financial assistance. The institutions are playing a new role, 
and an appropriate legal framework is critical to provide a better 
legal basis for these actions.
2. Surveillance of the broad economic policy guidelines
The European Semester, part of the “Six Pack”,9 aims to ensure 
closer coordination of economic policy10 through “the formulation, 
and the surveillance of the implementation, of the broad guidelines 
of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union” 
and “the formulation, and the examination of the implementation, 
of the employment guidelines that must be taken into account by 
Member States”,11 proposed by the Commission and adopted by the 
European Council at the beginning of the year. Upon presentation 
of national stability or convergence programmes, but also reforms 
and measures to make use of the Europe 2020 Strategy (smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, in areas such as employment, 
research, innovation, energy and social inclusion), the Commission 
shall proceed with an evaluation in May-June. If necessary, the 
Commission issues country-specific recommendations. The Council 
then considers the recommendations and the European Council 
approves them. The Member States thus receive policy guidance 
prior to finalizing their draft budget for the following year.
9. The European Semester was born out of an informal decision of the Ecofin Council meeting 
of 6 September 2010, which was itself based on the conclusions of the European Council 
meeting of June 2010. It has been functioning since 2011, even before the legal rules governing 
its implementation had been adopted. It is now integrated into Regulation 1466/97, cited above 
(as amended by Regulation 1175/2011, cited above) in Article 2 bis, par. 2.
10. On the early presentation of these new instruments, see Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the European council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Reinforcing economic policy 
coordination, COM/2010/0250 final.
11. Reg. 1466/97, as amended by Reg. 1175/2011, cited above, Article 2 a. The Six Pack 
“establishes closer coordination and surveillance of the economic and budgetary policies 
conducted by the Member States and is intended to consolidate macroeconomic stability and 
the sustainability of public finances” (CJEU, 27 Nov. 2012, Pringle, cited above, pt 58).
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Annual Growth Survey, the Commission launched the fourth Euro-
pean Semester of economic policy coordination for the year 2014. 
It renewed the focus on five priorities: pursuing differentiated, 
growth-friendly fiscal consolidation; restoring normal lending to 
the economy; promoting growth and competitiveness for today 
and tomorrow; tackling unemployment and the social conse-
quences of the crisis; and modernizing the public administration.
In May 2013, based on the economic and social performance of 
each Member State, the Commission published the Communica-
tion “Moving Europe Beyond the Crisis”,12 along with the 
proposed recommendations for each Member State. In the general 
formulation of key points for action, the Commission discusses the 
five priorities to be followed by the States, listed above, and made 
specific recommendations for each of the priorities. With regard to 
pursuing differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, for 
example, it places particular emphasis on the need to reduce 
spending. It stressed that, “the structure of tax systems, and 
particularly the shifting of the tax base from labour to other 
sources, is an essential aspect of on-going reforms”. The Commis-
sion came out in favour of increases in the taxation of real estate 
and of “environmental taxes, for example by taxing sources of 
pollution and greenhouse gas emissions”. It recommended 
“increasing the minimum statutory retirement age in line with the 
increase in life expectancy, as well as phasing out early retirement 
schemes, in combination with efforts to sustain lifelong learning 
and the employment rate of older workers.” With regard to 
promoting competitiveness, the Commission recommended 
indexing wages to productivity.
This communication was accompanied by specific recommen-
dations for each State, which are sent for the Council’s approval. 
With regard to France, it stated for example that, “Many profes-
sional service providers still face restrictions as regards their legal 
form and shareholding structure (e.g. restrictions on capital owner-
ship for veterinarians and lawyers),”13 or that the market for 
notaries and taxis is too closed. It recommended among other 
12. COM (2013) 350 final.
13. COM(2013) 360 final.
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manner no later than 2020, for example by adapting indexation 
rules, further increasing the statutory retirement age and full-
pension contribution period and reviewing special schemes, while 
avoiding an increase in employers' social contributions,” as well as 
“to increase the cost-effectiveness of healthcare expenditure, 
including in the areas of pharmaceutical spending”, and finally to 
“ensure that developments in the minimum wage are supportive of 
competitiveness and job creation, taking into account the existence 
of wage support schemes and social contribution exemptions.”
This increased pressure on the States must be accompanied by a 
strengthening of democratic control.
Recommendations
— To strengthen democratic control of the whole procedure by 
greater immediate involvement of the European Parliament and 
national parliaments through new practices. 
— To strive to give greater legitimacy to the action of the Council and 
the Commission in the context of their new missions, if need be by 
amending the treaties.
3. The new system of sanctions affecting the euro zone 
members
Since the adoption of the “Six Pack” in 2011, the focus has been 
on debt reduction.14 Regulation 1176/2011 has a prevention 
component that establishes a mechanism for the control of exces-
sive macroeconomic imbalances, based on an alert mechanism to 
“facilitate the early detection and monitoring of imbalances.”15
14. Dir. 2011/85, cited above, Whereas 18. Reg. 1466/97 as amended (by Reg. 1175/2011), cited 
above, Article 5(1) al. 2 and Whereas 18; see also the SCG Treaty, Articles 4 and 6.
15. Reg. 1176/2011, cited above, Article 3. The point is “to supplement the multilateral 
surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 121 TFEU with specific rules 
for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances, as well as the prevention and correction of 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances” (Ibid, Whereas 9). This regulation provides for an early 
alert mechanism. In addition, if the Commission considers that there are excessive imbalances 
in a Member State, it recommends that the State develops a corrective action plan and sets 
deadlines for the new measures. This recommendation is adopted by the Council. The 
Commission ensures throughout the year that the Member State actually proceeds to correct the 
noted imbalances (see Commission, Memo/13/318, 10 April 2013).
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penalties: an interest-bearing deposit and then a fine.16 
The preventive (multilateral surveillance with regards to the 
coordination of economic policy17) and corrective components 
(the procedure to avoid excessive deficits of the Member States18) 
of the Stability and Growth Pact are enhanced by an appropriate 
system of penalties provided for the euro zone members in Regula-
tion 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the euro area.19
As for the preventive arm, a new penalty was created, the 
interest-bearing deposit, which is applied when the Member State 
has not taken adequate steps to respond to the Council recommen-
dations.20 This is a quasi-automatic sanction, since the penalty 
recommended by the Commission is deemed adopted unless the 
Council opposes it by a qualified majority vote.21 
These new penalties are extended in the corrective component 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, with the establishment of non-
interest-bearing deposits, prior to the imposition of fines.22 Hence-
forth, the Council adopts the Commission’s decision only by a 
reverse qualified majority, and no longer by a reverse majority. 23
This “Copernican revolution”24 means that the penalties now have 
a semi-automatic character.
Alongside this are the new rules set out by the Two-Pack, which 
has been in force since 30 May 201325 and applies only to the 
16. Reg. 1174/2011, cited above, Article 2.
17. Reg. 1466/97, cited above.
18. Reg. 1467/97, cited above.
19. Reg. 1173/2011, cited above..
20. Reg. 1173/2011, Article 4.
21. Reg. 1173/2011, cited above, Art. 4, paragraphs 1 and 2.
22. Reg. 1173/2011, cited above, Art. 5 and 6.
23. Reg. 1466/97 amended, cited above. Article 6, paragraph 2, al. 5; Reg. 1173/2011, cited 
above, Art. 6; Reg. 1174/2011, cited above, Article 3, paragraph 3; SCG Treaty, Article 3, 
paragraph 3.
24. N. de Sadeleer, “The new architecture of the European Economic Governance: A Leviathan 
or a Flat-Footed Colossus?”, Maastricht Journal of Comparative and EU Law, 2012, pp. 354-383.
25. EU Parl.-Cons., Reg. 472/2013, 21 May 2013, on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, p. 1 and 
EU Parl.-Cons., Reg.  473/2013, 21 May 2013, establishing common provisions for monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficits of the 
Member States in the euro area, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, p. 11.
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submit a three-year budget plan in April of each year, and then in 
October a budget plan for the following year. In other words, the 
States’ budget bills must be submitted to the Commission, which 
will examine them and issue an opinion on them by November 
30th at the latest.27 
In the context of measures specific to the euro zone countries 
that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure, the Two-Pack 
“sets out provisions for enhanced monitoring of budgetary policies 
in the euro area and for ensuring that national budgets are 
consistent with the economic policy guidance issued in the 
context of the SGP and the European Semester for economic policy 
coordination…”.28 It provides for the euro zone States to present 
an economic partnership programme.29 This decision is taken by 
the Council, which rules on a qualified majority on a proposal by 
the Commission. These programmes are subject to a quarterly 
inspection and to strict conditions in case of financial assistance.
Recommendation
— To clarify the legal basis of these new penalties associated with the 
broad economic guidelines.
4. Controls on States receiving financial assistance
The controls are particularly tough on States receiving financial 
assistance: 
As part of the Two-Pack , the macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes30 drawn up by the Member States experiencing diffi-
culties that could have “serious adverse effects” on the rest of the 
26. Cf. F. Allemand and F. Martucci, “La nouvelle gouvernance de l’Union économique et 
monétaire”, CDE, 2012, p. 12 and 409.
27. Reg. 473/2013, cited above, Art. 7.
28. Reg. 473/2013, 21 May 2013, establishing common provisions for monitoring and assessing 
draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficits of the Member States in 
the euro area, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, p. 11, Art. 1. 
29. Reg. 473/2013, 21 May 2013, establishing common provisions for monitoring and assessing 
draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficits of the Member States in 
the euro area, OJEU L 140, 27 May 2013, p. 11,  Art. 9.
30. Reg. 472/2013, cited above, Art. 3 (“enhanced surveillance”).
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meet strict conditions if they receive financial assistance.31
Likewise, the ESM Treaty conditions the benefit of financing on 
signing the SCG Treaty.32 Furthermore, “the ESM may provide 
stability support to an ESM Member subject to strict condition-
ality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen. 
Such conditionality may range from a macro-economic adjust-
ment programme to continuous respect of pre-established 
eligibility conditions.”33 The ESM makes coordination at the Euro-
pean Union level more effective. It “shall thus constitute an 
impressive means for strengthening control by the Union and the 
euro zone Member States over a State’s economic policy.”34 
Recommendation
— To strengthen democratic control of this entire procedure by 
greater immediate involvement of the European Parliament and the 
national parliaments through new practices.
5. The new role of EU institutions in economic matters
The stronger control exercised over the States is necessarily 
being accompanied by a greater role for EU institutions, in 
particular the Commission and the Council. 
Under the ESM Treaty, once the ESM has been activated by a 
decision of the Board of Governors, the Commission is given a 
mandate by the Board to negotiate, in liaison with the IMF and the 
European Central Bank, a macroeconomic adjustment programme 
with the State concerned, which is concretized in a memorandum 
31. Reg. 472/2013, cited above, Art. 7. The regulation insists on “full consistency between the 
Union multilateral  surveillance framework established by the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and the possible policy conditions attached to financial assistance” (Ibid., 
Whereas 3).
32. “[T]he granting of financial assistance in the framework of new programmes under the ESM 
will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification of the TSCG by the ESM Member 
concerned and, upon expiration of the transposition period referred to in Article 3(2) TSCG on 
compliance with the requirements of that article.” (ESM Treaty, Whereas 5).
33. ESM Treaty, cited above, Art. 12.
34. F. Martucci, “La solidarité intéressée dans la zone euro : les mécanismes de stabilité”, Etudes 
européennes, 3 Aug. 2012, p. 1-20 (available at www.etudes-européennes.eu), 17.
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ensuring that the State fulfils the conditions set out in the 
programme. In this respect, the Court of Justice held that, “the 
Member States are entitled, in areas which do not fall under the 
exclusive competence of the Union, to entrust tasks to the institu-
tions, outside the framework of the Union, … provided that those 
tasks do not alter the essential character of the powers conferred on 
those institutions.”35 This thus involves new missions, but not 
new allocated authority in the sense of the competences given to 
the Commission, which can already take similar action under the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
As for the Court of Justice, it has also seen its powers strength-
ened through two international treaties. The SCG Treaty provides 
that a Contracting Party can apply to the Court of Justice if it 
believes that another Party has not respected their obligations 
under the Treaty, in particular the transposition of the “golden 
rule” into a constitutional or equivalent text.36 In case of failure to 
comply with the Court’s decision, a Contracting Party may bring 
an action for this failure [“manquement sur manquement”], which 
results in the payment of a fine or a lump sum.37 It is also compe-
tent to consider any claims regarding decisions of the Board of 
Governors, the executive body of the ESM.38 
Recommendation
— To work to give greater legitimacy to the action of the Council and 
the Commission in the framework of their new missions, through new 
practices, and, where necessary, by amending the treaties.
6. Conclusion
The “anti-crisis” measures are undeniably strengthening the 
role of the Union and/or its institutions, whereas a priori the area of 
competence remains the same: fiscal discipline (Six Pack, Two 
35. CJEU, 27 Nov. 2012, Pringle, cited above, pt 158. 
36. SCG Treaty, cited above, Art. 8, par. 1.
37. SCG Treaty, cited above, Art. 8, par. 2.
38. ESM Treaty, cited above, Art. 37, par. 3.
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dination of economic policy on the other (Europe 2020 Strategy, 
European Semester, Six Pack).
The recent adoption of these various instruments reflects a new 
approach to economic issues: embracing both budget policy and 
national economic policy, it also involves greater control over the 
States, in particular the euro zone countries, by EU institutions. A 
comprehensive approach is now being taken that simultaneously 
covers excessive deficits, debt issues, macroeconomic imbalances 
and the lack of competitiveness.39 
Europe’s more comprehensive approach to economic and fiscal 
policy is leading to a merger of two types of coordination: one 
based on a system of flexible multilateral surveillance between 
States, headed by the Council, and another based on stricter 
surveillance on the part of the Commission. 
The surveillance of broad economic policy guidelines by the 
Commission and the Council is more precise than in the past.
With the new quasi-automatic mechanism of sanctions for the 
euro zone countries, the recommendations taken under Article 
121, paragraph 4, TFEU (coordination of economic policy) are 
acquiring a mandatory character for the euro zone countries 
through the application of Article 136, TFEU (measures specific to 
the euro zone countries).
The conditionality of financial assistance is changing the nature 
of coordination between the EU Member States, i.e. the coordina-
tion ensured by the European Union in the field of economics.
EU institutions, including the Commission and the Court of 
Justice, are gaining power in a domain that previously tended to be 
left to the good political auspices of each State.
39. J.V. Louis, “La nouvelle ‘gouvernance’ économique de l’espace euro”, in Mélanges en 
l’honneur du Professeur Joël Molinier, LGDJ, 2012, pp. 405-427, 411.
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— To strengthen democratic control over the entire process by greater 
involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
— To clarify the legal basis for the new penalties associated with the 
broad economic guidelines.
— To work to give greater legitimacy to the action of the Council and 
the Commission in the framework of their new missions, through new 
practices, and where necessary by amending the treaties.
THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
CHANGE IN THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT 
Frédéric Allemand
Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe, Luxemburg 
Sciences Po and HEC
Francesco Martucci
Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas University 
The Treaty of Lisbon is often referred to as “the treaty of the parliaments”. 
But the Economic and Monetary Union reforms implemented in response to 
the financial and sovereign debt crises have further diminished the role of the 
European and national parliaments in the legislative process. In return, 
however, the parliaments have been given greater powers in the area of 
accountability. Strengthening the democratic principle within EMU requires a 
greater degree of involvement by the parliaments. This means avoiding the use 
of intergovernmental agreements, organising a “euro area. committee within 
the European Parliament and holding an annual socio-economic convention to 
establish the broad guidelines of EMU policies.
1. From the “treaty of parliaments” to the crisis  
of parliaments 
On December 1st, 2009, Bundestag president Norbert Lammert 
presented his vision of Europe at the prestigious Humboldt Univer-
sity in Berlin, focusing on the Lisbon Treaty, which had entered 
into force that day. He claimed the treaty heralded a new era for 
European democracy and citizenship: it was the “treaty of parlia-
ments” (Lammert, 2009). However, this assessment did not take 
into account the brewing crisis: several weeks before, Greek author-
ities had revealed a major statistical manipulation of their public Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
Frédéric Allemand and Francesco Martucci112accounts. In the spring of 2010 the Euro-zone was engulfed in a 
sovereign debt crisis. 
Markets do not operate on the same timetable as democracy. 
The crisis merited an increased and effective involvement of parlia-
ments to help manage and resolve the crisis. The reality was very 
different. The urgency of the situation necessitated quick and tech-
nical action that did not lend itself to parliamentary debate. The 
crisis accentuated the polarization in Euro-zone governance. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) and national central banks of the 
Euro-zone the (Eurosystem) “govern” the euro, while the Ecofin 
Council and the ECB determine the euro’s interest rate. The Euro-
pean Council, Ecofin Council, Eocfin’s Euro-zone committee, Euro-
zone summits, Eurogroup, Germany, the Franco-German partner-
ship etc., govern the economic Union. While parliaments are not 
excluded from crisis management, they are limited to an observer’s 
role rather than being a player (Poptcheva, 2012). Granted, the 
European Parliament, together with the Council, adopted six of the 
eight texts reforming and strengthening the Stability and Growth 
Pact.1 However, under pressure from the markets and successive 
Council presidencies, legislative procedures were closed at the end 
of the first reading, making way for the kind of informal agree-
ments that are often denounced for their opacity and the power 
they grant to the Council in relation to the Parliament (Costa 
et ali., 2011). The European Parliament was also not able to secure 
its involvement in the development of financial assistance provi-
sions. At the national level, the new mechanisms for coordinating 
economic policies and budgetary surveillance introduced by the 
Six-Pack and the Two-Pack strengthened the role of government vis-
à-vis parliament, whose budgetary function in particular was weak-
ened. The relegation of parliament was even more pronounced for 
countries receiving financial assistance; their parliaments were in 
effect required to “ratify” programs negotiated between their 
finance ministries and international lenders without being able, in 
practice, to exercise their constitutionally recognized powers. 
1. The Six-Pack, a legislative package including five regulations – adopted by the Council alone 
– and a directive (OJEU L 306 of 23 November 2011) and the Two-Pack, which includes two 
regulations (OJEU L 140 of 27 May 2013).
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worrisome. National legitimacy has been deprived of instruments, 
while European instruments lack legitimacy (Scharpf, 2011; 
Fitoussi, 2012). What role should parliaments be given then? 
Parliaments in the plural since in the two-level constitutional 
system, both the European Parliament and national parliaments 
assume the parliamentary role (article 12 TEU, Protocol n° 1).
2. The democratic principle of European economic 
governance 
Technicality, efficiency, confidentiality and independence are 
the principles known to shape the definition and practice of the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy in the Euro-zone. The economic 
Union has the peculiarity of determining how member states 
conduct their economic policies. States must treat their policies as 
an issue of common interest and coordinate them within the 
Council in line with the coordination and surveillance regime 
spelled out in the treaties (art. 121 and 126 TFEU) and secondary 
law (Stability and Growth Pact, Six-Pack and Two-Pack). These 
features were invoked during the negotiation of the Maastricht 
treaty (1991) to diminish the European Parliament’s role, going 
against the trend in other political areas of the European Commu-
nity (Community pillar). The three constitutional revisions made 
since then have only introduced marginal improvements. The 
European Parliament is only co-legislator in three of the twelve 
legislative procedures included in EMU (articles 121 § 6, 129 § 3 
and 133 TFEU). For the remainder, that is, the adoption of the 
most sensitive issues, the European Parliament is consulted, and in 
some instances only informed. This parliamentary relegation is 
questionable on both political and legal grounds.
The European Union is founded on the value of democracy 
(article 2 TEU). Its functioning is founded on representative 
democracy based on a two-level system: citizens are directly repre-
sented at the Union level in the European Parliament; member 
states are represented in the European Council by their heads of 
state or government and in the Council by their governments, 
themselves democratically accountable either to their national 
parliaments or to their citizens (article 10 TUE).
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democratic principle that the people should take part in the exer-
cise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly” (ECJ, 1980, pt. 22). The democratic principle also 
implies that the power to adopt an EU measure that can alter the 
non-essential elements of an EU legislative act must be exercised 
by a European institution that is democratically accountable (ECJ, 
2013, pt. 85). In an assessment of the United Kingdom’s imple-
mentation of Community law measures on European elections, 
the European Court of Human Rights opined on the existence of a 
“truly democratic political regime” in the EU (ECHR, pt. 48), which 
it has recognized to be sui generis in nature. As the part of the EU 
structure that best reflects efforts to ensure a “truly democratic 
political regime,” the European Parliament has a twofold responsi-
bility. It is an integral part of the EU’s legislative process; and it is 
the principal instrument of democratic control and political 
responsibility in the European Union’s system.
EU economic and monetary policy is subject to the democratic 
principle, given that it is fully integrated in the EU legal system. 
The democratic principle is all the more necessary since economic 
governance is characterized by its institutional complexity and by 
the major economic, social and financial impacts of measures 
taken in this area on the eighteen Euro-zone member states, their 
economic operators and their 330 million European citizens. No 
supposedly democratic regime would survive long if representa-
tives of the citizens were not involved in the adoption and 
oversight of public policy (Van Rompuy, 2012). In October 2012, 
the European Council stated that, “strong mechanisms for demo-
cratic legitimacy and accountability are necessary” (European 
Council, 2012; Ministers of foreign affairs, 2012). This will be no 
easy task and nothing indicates that the task is even at the top of 
the political agenda, but there is a distinction here between the 
means of expressing the democratic principle. The principle is not 
limited to the participation of representatives elected by the people 
in legislative processes. Representative institutions are intended 
more to submit governing bodies to the judgment of the governed. 
Accountability is also a democratic element of the representative 
link (Manin, 1995: 301). It is in this second area that developments 
will probably be most noteworthy.   
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The relegation is twofold, affecting both the European Parlia-
ment and national parliaments. It is not likely to change.  
3.1. The relegation of the European Parliament
In EMU, member states exercise their economic and budgetary 
policy powers within the EU coordination and surveillance frame-
work. This coordination is above all a state matter; the European 
Parliament has limited involvement. The latter is informed after 
the fact of the Council’s recommendation for the broad guidelines 
of the economic policies and the results of multilateral surveillance 
(article 121 § 2, §5, TFEU). It is consulted (simple opinion) on the 
provisions adopted by the Council to replace the protocol on the 
excessive deficit procedure (art. 126 § 14 TFEU). The treaties’ weak-
ening of the legislative function is compounded when member 
states act in concert to keep the European Parliament at arm’s 
length by using instruments outside the EU framework, be it inter-
national public law treaties or soft law. Negotiations of the 
European stability mechanism and the Euro Plus Pact are a case in 
point. The Parliament was only able to secure the right to send no 
more than four observers (including one substitute) to the inter-
governmental conference on the treaty on stability, coordination 
and governance (TSCG) and to present its position at the special 
February 18 ministerial meeting on the intergovernmental agree-
ment creating a Single resolution fund.  
When they are involved, European parliamentarians’ influence 
on legislative or intergovernmental works is a real democratic gain 
in both form and content. Among other improvements, the Euro-
pean Parliament introduced in the Six-Pack the principle of a 
public debate with the Commission, the Council President, the 
European Council president, the Eurogroup president and relevant 
member states on sanctions taken in the context of budgetary and 
macroeconomic surveillance (economic dialog). The TSCG also 
includes several of the Parliament’s recommendations, including 
the treaty’s compatibility with EU law or the cooperation between 
the European and national parliaments (Fasone, 2012).
Maintaining significant democratic legitimacy in economic 
governance reforms assumes that the reforms are first and foremost 
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nity method. The conclusion of agreements among member states 
is only permissible if there is no legal basis for EU competence; it is 
then imperative that the European Parliament – as well as the 
Commission and if necessary the European Central Bank – assist in 
the negotiations as observers. The Council’s decision to establish a 
single resolution on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement is 
highly questionable from this perspective. Furthermore, the TSCG’s 
content should be implemented as quickly as possible, rather than 
be delayed by the maximum term of 5 years stipulated in its article 
16. Its substantive obligations are already essentially set out in the 
Two-Pack, which came into force in May 2013. This reintegration 
will allow the European Parliament to fully exercise its oversight 
and information powers, which it derives from EU law.
In this context, how can parliamentary participation in the 
legislative process be strengthened?
The Lisbon treaty offers the option of using a special legislative 
procedure instead of the ordinary legislative procedure (art. 48 § 7 
TEU). In the area of EMU, this bridging clause affects nine provi-
sions, including aforementioned articles 121 §2 and §5, and 126, as 
well as articles 125 § 2 (specify definitions for the application of the 
prohibited referred to in articles 123 to 125 TFEU), 127 § 6 (confer 
specific tasks upon the ECB concerning policies on prudential 
supervision), 128 § 2 (measures to harmonize the denominations 
and technical specifications of all euro coins intended for circula-
tion), 129 § 4 (review provisions of the Statute of the ESCB), 132 § 3 
(ECB’s power to impose financial penalties) and 134 § 3 (status of 
the economic and financial committee). However, it is unlikely the 
bridging clause will be implemented, given the numerous safe-
guards. The substitution of the procedures requires a unanimous 
decision from the European Council. Before making this decision, 
the European Council must inform national parliaments, which in 
turn have six months from the date of the transmission to oppose 
the initiative. The opposition of a single parliament can prevent 
the measure’s adoption.     
Regarding a revision of the treaties on the basis of article 48 § 6 
TEU (simplified revision procedure for part three of the TFEU), or 
even article 48 § 2 TUE (ordinary revision procedure), the past 
twenty years have demonstrated that this would be a sensitive and 
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just included member states in the Euro-zone (Goulard, 2014) 
would be permitted so long as this agreement did not ignore the 
competences of the Union, so long as it helped achieve the objec-
tives of Community treaties, and if possible, so long as it respected 
the Community’s institutional framework. Such strengthening of 
the Euro-zone’s economic governance would in a way complete 
reforms adopted since 2010 by widening the gap between two 
systems of governance – one general and the other reserved for 
member states using the euro. Incidentally, this raises the question 
of the European Parliament’s unitary dimension in a differentiated 
monetary Union. In other words, should there be a Euro-zone 
Parliament? In the aftermath of the crisis, the EU legislator fully 
deployed the potentialities of article 136 TFEU, which can serve as 
a basis to adopt provisions specific to the Euro-zone in order to 
strengthen the coordination of economic policies and budgetary 
discipline. Obviously, in the Council only the representatives of 
these states can vote for the measures affecting them. Eurogroup 
meetings are recognized by the Lisbon Treaty and have a stable 
presidency. And the TSCG has formalized the meetings of heads of 
state or government of the Euro-zone. Is this configuration trans-
ferable to the European Parliament? If the idea of a Euro-zone 
budget were to be proposed, its submission to a vote only by Euro-
zone representatives seems to make sense (von Bogdandy et ali., 
2013). However, what may seem obvious is relative: such a 
perspective flies in the face of the principles of unity in the 
representation of citizens and of unity in the institutional frame-
work, as well the status of European citizens,2 and should therefore 
be rejected.
However, nothing precludes that some accommodation be 
reached in the Parliament to allow European MEPs from Euro-zone 
member states to tackle issues of common concern together. The 
commission on “economic and monetary affairs” (ECON) could 
create a subcommittee including Euro-zone members3 (Piris, 
2012). During parliamentary debates on the assignment of ECB 
tasks regarding prudential supervision, it was proposed that the 
2. Among other rights, citizenship grants each citizen the right the right to be a voter in a 
member state other than the one of which s/he is a national. How to treat the Danish member 
elected in Germany ?
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          Parliament create a permanent committee including members 
from states that are part of the Euro-zone: this committee's role 
would involve a hearing with the president of the ECB's surveil-
lance committee and an examination of issues linked to the 
execution of surveillance tasks.4 A similar system could replace the 
one the Commission outlined in its legislative proposal estab-
lishing a single resolution mechanism: a committee including a 
reduced number of MEPs from the relevant parliamentary commis-
sion and selected by their colleagues to hold confidential 
discussions with the executive director of the single resolution 
council.5 In a complementary manner, just like the “Baltic Europe” 
intergroup that brings together MEPs from states surrounding the 
Baltic Sea, a “Euro-zone” group could be created at the parliamen-
tary level, or just in a few parliamentary commissions (“economic 
and monetary affairs”, “internal market” and “employment and 
social affairs).6 Legislative reports or initiatives focusing on the 
Euro-zone should also, in principle, be assigned to MEPs from a 
member state using the single currency... This rule is already unof-
ficially followed in practice. For subjects that are likely to affect 
member states that are not part of the Euro-zone (competitiveness, 
for example), a co-rapporteur would be designated. A complemen-
tary logic would dictate that only the parliaments of Euro-zone 
member states should be able to monitor compliance with subsidi-
arity as stipulated in article 5 § 3 TEU and the protocol n° 2 for 
legislative measures based on article 136 TFEU. The parliaments of 
non-Eurozone member states currently have enough votes to 
request a review of a Euro-zone measure.7
3. Art. 190 of the European Parliament's rules of procedure. However, art. 186 of the rules of 
procedure require that its composition reflect “to the greatest extent possible the composition of 
the European Parliament.” The notion of “to the greatest extent possible” should be interpreted 
loosely.
4. European Parliament, commission for economic and monetary affairs, amendment n°888 
of Werner Langen to article 21 § 3 of draft regulation COM(2012)0511 (draft report of Marianne     
Thyssen), 30 October 2012, C7-0314/2012.
5. Art. 41 of the regulation proposed by the Parliament and the Council COM(2013) 250 final, 
10 July 2013. The provision remained unchanged in the political agreement reached in the 
Council on 18 December 2013.
6. Art. 32 of the European Parliament's rules of procedure.
7. Each Parliament has two votes. The Parliaments of member states outside of the Eurozone 
have a total of twenty votes. The threshold required to trigger a review process for a legislative 
proposal presented by the Commission is one third of the total number of votes, that is, sixteen. 
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Parliament's legislative role must also be based on an improvement 
of its ability to negotiate with the Council. At the technical level, 
the ECON Commission should solicit external and multidiscipli-
nary expertise on economic governance on a more regular basis, 
for instance through the systematic organisation of expert panels 
before any debate on a major legislative topic or proposal. A 
committee of MEPs elected by their colleagues for their recognized 
knowledge of monetary, economic or banking issues could be 
established within this commission for a term (or half a term), for 
the purpose of accompanying rapporteurs in their duties. With 
respect to procedure, the European Parliament should only enter 
informal negotiations with the Council on the basis of a clear 
mandate adopted by a commission with substantive expertise (a 
priori the ECON commission).
3.2. The relegation of national parliaments
In the aftermath of the crises, budgetary discipline was 
strengthened by the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack. While budgetary 
issues remain a national competence, the pressure placed by EU 
institutions (Commission, Council), bodies (Economic and finan-
cial committee) and groups (Eurogroup) grows the more the 
sustainability of a state's public finances becomes questionable. 
The noose tightens as the threat of default rises.
The Six-Pack has maintained this pressure within the framework 
established by articles 121 and 126 of TFEU, that is, essentially in 
the form of recommendations and, for the Euro-zone, decisions of 
formal notice and sanctions. The Two-Pack goes a step further: the 
two regulations of 21 May 2013 (n° 472/2013 et n° 473/2013) of 
the European Parliament and the Council were also adopted on the 
basis of article 136 TFEU – a provision allowing the Union to 
enforce budgetary discipline over Eurozone states alone. Thus the 
Union has strengthened its budgetary grip and has a tighter hold 
over member states and their authorities responsible for the budg-
etary procedure (Allemand and Martucci, 2012).
The EU framework is above all procedural: the Six-Pack directive 
sets a “common budgetary framework” and the Two-Pack provides 
for “common budgetary rules”. The framework is also substantive: 
the TSCG and the Two-Pack call for introducing “numerical budg-
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more or less tight for member states depending on the powers that 
the Council and the Commission have over them. A state receiving 
financial assistance is subject to heightened surveillance that 
reduces the state's leeway, since the Union approves the macroeco-
nomic adjustment programme on which the financial assistance is 
contingent. This is far removed from Maastricht's original philos-
ophy, based on the idea that “the pooling of the monetary 
instrument implies that states are left with the other instruments 
of political economy” (Conseil d’analyse économique, 2000). 
No wonder the Bundesverfassungsgericht now actively partici-
pates in the legal debate over EMU. The German constitutional 
court considers that the weakening of national parliaments' budg-
etary powers to the benefit of the Union runs afoul democratic 
principles (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2011, 126). The European 
Parliament's involvement is not deemed sufficient compensation in 
terms of democratic legitimacy. Unlike national parliaments, “the 
European Parliament is not a representative body of a sovereign 
European people” (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2009), according to 
the German constitutional court. In a two-level constitutional 
system, this can be interpreted as calling for a greater role for 
national parliaments, as constitutionally recognised by the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
4. The promotion of parliament in accountability 
The monetary Union includes parliamentary oversight that 
respects the independence of the ECB and NCBs in the Eurosystem. 
Indeed, the accountability mechanism should not be seen as 
implying that parliamentary assemblies can give “instructions” to 
the Eurosystem, as article 139 TFEU categorically prohibits. 
However, this mechanism is compatible with guidance of the deci-
sion-making process to infuse it with democratic legitimacy.
 First, the European Parliament is consulted in the procedure to 
appoint members of the ECB's executive board (articles 283, para-
graphe 2, second line, TFEU and 12.2, of the statutes). While its 
opinion is not binding, its effects are not negligible given that the 
candidates must appear before the Parliament's ECON commis-
sion. At the national level, under primary law, states determine the 
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their central banks; in practice, these nominations are made by 
executive powers (head of state or government) 75% of the time, 
and by parliaments only 11% of the time (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2009).
Next, the European Parliament cannot challenge the responsi-
bility of ECB members in the same way it can with respect to the 
Commission. It can only push the ECB on its duty to be account-
able under article 284 § 3 TFUE. Thus, the ECB presents the 
European Parliament with an annual report that the latter can crit-
ically discuss. In 2005, MEPs rejected the ECB's annual report 
(Parliament 2005) without eliciting any reaction whatsoever from 
the ECB, as the Parliament's rejection was not binding. On the 
basis of article 284, paragraph 3, line 2, TFEU, the ECB and the 
European Parliament set up a “monetary dialog” consisting of 
trimestrial appearances of the President or a member of the execu-
tive board in front of the ECON commission. These appearances 
are taken very seriously! This an opportunity for executive board 
members to explain monetary policy, and for MEPS to criticize it.
In most members states, national central banks must also be 
accountable to parliamentary bodies at various intervals of time 
(BIS, 2009). More innovative still are provisions stipulating that the 
ECB and Single Resolution Council (SRU) submit their report to the 
national parliaments of member states participating in the Banking 
Union. These parliaments can request that the ECB and SRU 
provide written responses to any observation or question they 
submit about prudential supervision missions. They also have the 
ability to invite the president or a member of the ECB's surveillance 
council to exchange views on the surveillance of the state's credit 
institutions in the presence of a member of the relevant national 
authority. The same is applicable to SRU's executive director.
In the wake of the crisis, parliaments increased their oversight 
of government – especially since their legislative involvement was 
constrained. The European Parliament established a special 
commission on the financial, economic and social crisis in 2009. 
At the national level, 109 plenary debates and 180 commission 
debates were organised across all the parliaments of the 27 member 
states between March 2011 and March 2012 (Hefftler et ali., 2013).
Frédéric Allemand and Francesco Martucci122This development should be furthered and strengthened. A 
framework agreement between the European Parliament on the 
one hand and the Council and European Council on the other 
should specify the practical details of how to exercise democratic 
responsibility in implementing the coordination and surveillance 
of economic policies. The agreement would also cover the relations 
between the Parliament and Eurogroup and the Euro-zone summit. 
Since the accountability is related to activities and subjects that are 
specific to the Euro-zone, this once again raises the question of 
whether a Euro-zone Parliament is needed. The aforementioned 
practical solutions would be able to address this issue.
5.  Inter-parliamentary cooperation
The Lisbon Treaty recognizes that national parliaments actively 
contribute to the proper functioning of the Union. It invites the 
European and national parliaments to strengthen their coopera-
tion (art. 12, f) TEU; protocole n°1 on the role of national 
parliaments in the Union, annexed to the treaties). The conference 
of specialised parliamentary committees (COSAC) is the designated 
forum for this cooperation. Meanwhile, the TSCG provides for the 
parliaments to create a conference bringing together the represent-
atives of relevant commissions from the various parliaments to 
debate budgetary policies and other issues it covers (art. 13 TSCG). 
Thus, an inter-parliamentary Conference on economic and finan-
cial governance met for the first time in Vilnius on 16 and 
17 October 2013. Its remit went beyond the TSCG framework to 
also include he implementation of the European Semester: this 
conference replaces the European parliamentary week organised by 
the European Parliament in January 2013 and January 2014. The 
conference includes representatives of the European Parliament's 
ECON commission and all member state parliaments. Yet article 13 
of the TSCG limits parliamentary cooperation to the parliaments 
of participating member states. This contradiction is worth lifting.
Finally, we believe the materialisation of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation requires “unifying moments”. These could come in 
the form of a Union Convention that, like the Convention on the 
future of Europe, would bring together representatives of the Euro-
pean Parliament, national parliaments and perhaps socio-
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years following the European elections. It would seek to provide 
the broad strategic guidelines of political, economic, social, envi-
ronmental and energy policies in the Union over the legislature's 
term.8 This convention would not be intended to supplant the 
European Parliament: it would be devoid of any legislative or 
constitutional power. Its authority would stem from the relevance 
of its proposals and the multiple political legitimacies that would 
participate in this endeavor. Like the Convention on fundamental 
rights or the Convention on the future of Europe, this body would 
not require any change to the treaties to be implemented. 
Community institutions could politically commit to take into 
account the conclusions adopted by the Convention in defining 
EU policies.
6. Principal recommendations
— Avoid using inter-state agreements to complete Euro-zone 
governance, or at the very least grant the European Parlia-
ment observer status during the negotiations; 
— Integrate the content of the treaty on stability, coordination 
and governance into EU law before the 5-year term stipu-
lated in its article 16; 
— Articulate the content of the treaty on stability, coordination 
and governance with current EU law in force. 
— At this time, focus on strengthening the European Parlia-
ment's legislative role through practical arrangements rather 
than through a revision of the treaties;
— Within the European Parliament's ECON commission, 
organise a committee or subcommittee composed of MEPs 
from Eurozone member states to (i) prepare and discuss legis-
lative and non-legislative texts on the Eurozone; and (ii) 
oversee EU activities that exclusively focus on the Eurozone;
— Strengthen the European Parliament's external technical 
expertise on economic governance by systematically organ-
8. This corresponds to a moment of renewal for European economic strategy or its mid-term 
assessment. A tri-annual period could also be considered, following the timeline for the 
adoption of integrated guidelines.
Frédéric Allemand and Francesco Martucci124ising expert hearings before any major debate on the 
Eurozone;
— Adopt a framework agreement between the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Council, the Eurogroup 
and the Euro-zone summit to detail the practical ways of 
exercising democratic responsibility in EMU; 
— Organise an EU socio-economic Convention every five years 
to define the EU’s broad strategic guidelines.
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IN SEARCH OF A BETTER GOVERNANCE 
IN THE EURO AREA
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
OFCE-Sciences Po
The 2007 crisis highlighted the drawbacks of the euro area framework which 
were already there from the launch of the single currency. There cannot be a 
single currency between countries with different economic situations and inde-
pendent economic policies. Euro area governance (no public debts guarantee by 
the ECB, arbitrary rules focusing on public finances only), was not satisfactory. 
EU institutions tried to impose a strategy (domestic policies constraints, public 
deficits cuts, liberal structural reforms) which failed. Before the crisis, imbal-
ances had risen between Northern Member States (MS) and Southern MS, and 
became unsustainable with the crisis. 
The Fiscal pact strengthened rules lacking economic rationale. Blind 
austerity policies led the euro area to fall in depression and undermined euro 
area cohesion. The procedures implemented strengthen economic policy 
surveillance between MS, without organising real domestic economic policy 
coordination. They allow for limited solidarity, at a very high price. Fiscal feder-
alism projects cannot offset the loss of independence for domestic economic 
policies. 
MS Public debts should become safe assets again, thanks to the ECB’s guar-
antee. This requires implementing real economic coordination, which should 
target growth, full-employment and orderly reduction in imbalances between 
MS. Europe should reaffirm its specificity: a social model, a will to prepare for 
ecological transition. These are prerequisites for Europe to make progress. 
1. A framework with original drawbacks
The rise in imbalances between MS from 1999 to 2007, and the 
2007 crisis highlighted the drawbacks of the euro area framework. 
EU institutions and MS have been unable to implement a common Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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ordination. The single currency suffers from six original sins:
— According to economic theory, there cannot be a single 
currency between countries with different economic situations 
and independent economic policies. The single currency entails 
introducing precise, well-defined and binding constraints, soli-
darity mechanisms or economic policy coordination. How to 
prevent otherwise the emergence and persistence of imbalances 
between some countries running large external deficits and some 
others running large surpluses? 
— These mechanisms cannot consist in rigid numerical rules, 
lacking economic rationale, and enshrined in a Treaty. These 
mechanisms should be both soft (economic policies should be 
agreed between countries accounting for current domestic 
economic contexts) and binding (everyone must comply with 
decisions agreed in common). But how may governments with 
necessarily different interests and analyses agree on economic 
policy strategies? How to convince a country to modify its 
economic policy in order to meet common rules?
— There cannot be unconditional solidarity between countries 
with different and autonomous policies. For example, Northern 
countries may refuse to support Southern countries, blaming them 
for not having undertaken the necessary structural reforms, for 
having let imbalances grow and for being unable to meet their 
commitments. On the other hand, such solidarity is a prerequisite 
for the single currency to be guaranteed. 
— According to the EU Constitution, the ECB is not entitled to 
finance directly governments (Article 123); financial solidarity 
between MS is forbidden (Article 125). Thus, each MS must borrow 
on financial markets without any guaranteed support from a 
central bank acting as a “lender of last resort”. This raises the risk 
that some MS may not be able to fulfil their commitments and 
may default. MS public debt is no longer a safe asset. Contrary to 
the US, the UK or Japan, euro area countries have lost monetary 
sovereignty. Financial markets started to realise this from mid-
2009. After the Greek default, they requested excessive interest 
rates to countries in difficulty, which increased further the difficul-
ties of the latter.
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and they do not control anymore their interest rates unlike Anglo-
Saxon countries or Japan. But financial markets have no macroeco-
nomic expertise, they are – and know that they are – self-fulfilling. 
However, Northern countries refuse a collective guarantee of MS 
public debts. They consider the discipline imposed by financial 
markets to be necessary. But disparity among interest rates is arbi-
trary and costly. In the long term, for instance, a country like Italy, 
with a 2 percentage points interest rates spread with France, would 
pay financial markets a premium of around 2.5% of GDP as a guar-
antee to an alleged default risk. The single currency notion 
disappears: a Spanish company does not borrow at the same 
interest rate as a German company.
— The Commission, the high EU and domestic administrations 
are currently dominated by a federal, liberal and technocratic 
ideology. According to this ideology, Europe should deprive demo-
cratic countries (subject to demagogic temptations) from their 
powers to move towards a liberal model: tax cuts, social and public 
spending cuts, structural reforms, market deregulation. 
Before the crisis, imbalances rose between two groups of euro 
area countries implementing two instable macroeconomic strate-
gies: Northern countries (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Finland) 
were basing weak growth on competitiveness gains and huge 
external surpluses while strong growth in southern countries 
(Spain, Greece, Ireland) was driven by negative real interest rates 
below GDP growth, and was accompanied by housing bubbles and 
large current account deficits (see Deroose et al., 2004, Mathieu 
and Sterdyniak, 2007). In 2007, the Netherlands and Germany ran 
current accounts surpluses larger than 8% of GDP, Portugal, Spain 
and Greece were running current account deficits larger than 8% of 
GDP. The economic policy framework introduced by the Maas-
tricht Treaty, based on the single control of public deficits was 
unable to prevent the widening of these imbalances which became 
unsustainable under the effect of the crisis. The Commission 
pursued in vain countries in depression and not fulfilling the 3% 
of GDP limit for the government deficit (especially France and 
Germany in 2003-2006) without seeing that the danger was 
coming from countries with rapid growth, which were bringing 
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private or external indebtedness. 
The 2007-2009 crisis was a banking and financial crisis, caused 
by hazardous innovations, in a context of uncontrolled financial 
globalisation and liberalisation, of rising amounts of capital 
looking for liquid and high returns. Financial markets were greedy, 
blind, and instable. Financial globalisation allowed for a rise in 
imbalances which finally burst (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2009).
The crisis is not due to the rise in government debts and defi-
cits. In 2007, the euro area deficit was amounting 0.6% of GDP 
only. However the crisis generated an unprecedented deterioration 
of public finances, due to the need to rescue banks, to stabilise 
output, and even more because of lower tax revenues resulting 
from lower output. Public finance deterioration was smaller for the 
euro area as a whole, where the deficit reached 6.2% of GDP in 
2010, against 8.3% in Japan, 10% in the UK and 12.2% in the US. 
From 2007 to 2013 the debt-to-GDP ratio rose by 27 percentage 
points in the euro area, by 40 percentage points in the US, 51 in 
the UK, and 60 in Japan.
The euro area was unable to implement a coherent strategy to 
recover the 10 percentage points of output lost because of the crisis. 
Even worse, financial markets bet on the failure and euro area exit 
of several MS. Three countries were placed under the Troika’s 
supervision (Greece, Portugal, Ireland). Two other countries (Spain, 
Italy) suffered from excessively high interest rates. The financial 
crisis developed into a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. 
The EU authorities and the MS did not respond sufficiently 
rapidly and strongly. They denied to guarantee public debts; they 
implemented limited solidarity only, and under strict condition-
ality. Under the Commission’s pressure, financial markets’ and 
rating agencies’ fears, MS had no choice but implement restrictive 
policies, which in times of austerity undermines their output 
growth and their social model.
At the euro area level, fiscal consolidation measures amounted 
to 1.7% of GDP in 2011, 2.0% in 2012 and 1.1% in 2013. Under the 
Troika’s pressure, Southern MS implemented even more drastic 
fiscal plans. This strategy brought the nascent recovery to an end 
(at the end of 2010, euro area GDP was 2.2% higher than at the end 
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fiscal contraction policies had a negative impact of around 8.0% of 
GDP for the euro area, but 16% for Spain and Portugal, 30% for 
Greece. Public debts-to-GDP ratios hardly declined due to the 
output fall.
In 2011-2013, global demand remained too weak in the euro 
area. Northern countries, with rooms for manoeuvre should have 
implemented expansionary policies to offset restrictive policies 
run in Southern countries. European investment programmes to 
help the industry to reorient current activities and develop innova-
tive and green sectors should have been launched. Fiscal policy 
should not have been restrictive at the euro area level as long as the 
euro area economy was not moving sufficiently rapidly towards 
full-employment.
Can fiscal exit strategies ignore the causes of the crisis? The 
crisis is due to growth strategies based on downwards pressure on 
wages and social benefits. The fall in demand was offset by compet-
itiveness gains in neo-mercantilist countries, by rising financial 
and real estate bubbles and households borrowing in Anglo-Saxon 
and Southern Europe countries. The failure of these two strategies 
has forced to use public deficits to support growth. Reducing 
public deficits requires the implementation of another growth 
strategy based on wages and social incomes distribution, on a new 
industrial policy geared towards an environmentally sustainable 
economy. Before the crisis, public finances also suffered from tax 
evasion and tax competition. Restoring public finances requires to 
combat tax evasion and tax havens, to raise taxes on multinational 
companies, on higher incomes and wealth.
2. Some federalism? 
2.1. The fiscal Treaty
Even though the rise in deficits is a consequence and not the 
cause of the crisis, the Commission persists in saying that the crisis 
is due to fiscal indiscipline. The fiscal Treaty adopted on 2 March 
2012 is supposed to eradicate this.  
This Pact requests MS to bring their structural government 
deficit below 0.5% of GDP, according a time frame proposed by the 
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structural balances is more than problematic, especially in the event 
of strong macroeconomic shocks. The Commission’s estimates will 
have to be used, but these estimates are always revised, are always 
close to observed output, since the Commission considers that falls 
in productivity growth and capital stock in recessions are structural: 
thus, the under-estimation of the cyclical part of the deficit will 
require to implement counter-cyclical policies. 
The structural deficit target can be lowered to 1% if debt stands 
below 60% of GDP. A country with GDP growing by 1.75% per year 
and inflation rising by 1.75% per year sees in theory its debt coming 
down to 28.6% of GDP. But nothing guarantees that the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium may be ensured with a priori set values. 
According to article 5, a country under an EDP will have to 
submit its budget and its structural reform programmes for 
approval to the Commission and the Council who will also exert 
surveillance on their implementation. This article is a new weapon 
to impose liberal reforms to MS populations. According to article 7, 
the Commission’s proposals will be automatically adopted unless 
there is a qualified majority against them, the country concerned 
not voting. Thus, in practice, the Commission will always have the 
last word. 
The Pact forbids discretionary fiscal policies, although the latter 
are needed to reach a satisfactory macroeconomic stabilisation. 
According to the Treaty, each country should take fiscal consolida-
tion measures without accounting for the cyclical conditions and 
policies in other countries. Despite the 2008-2013 experience, the 
Treaty maintains the implicit assumption according to which 
restrictive fiscal policies have no impact on output. No real 
economic policy coordination is considered, i.e. an economic 
strategy using monetary policy, fiscal, taxation, social and wage 
policies, to bring MS closer to full employment and to reduce 
imbalances between MS.    
2.2. Improving economic policy coordination
In 2011 a first ‘European semester’ was introduced, during 
which MS present their fiscal plans and structural programmes to 
the Commission and the European Council, who both give their 
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semester of the year. Such a process could be useful if the objective 
was to define an agreed economic strategy, but, in fact, this 
semester increases the pressure on each MS to implement austerity 
measures and liberal reforms. No agreed plans to reduce imbal-
ances between MS or to support growth have been implemented in 
2012, 2013 or 2014.
The Six-Pack allow the Commission to exert surveillance on the 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in each country by 
following a scoreboard of relevant variables (competitiveness, 
external current account, public and private debts). A Macroeco-
nomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) has been introduced. So far the 
Commission does not recommend coordinated strategies to 
support growth or to reduce imbalances, but only signals each 
country what their problems are. 
2.3.  Some very conditional financial solidarity
The European Stability mechanism (ESM) launched in October 
2012 introduces some degree of financial solidarity between the 
MS, but this solidarity is limited and has a very high price. Coun-
tries may benefit from the ESM if they have adopted the Fiscal pact 
and have fulfilled it. The ESM support will be conditional: a country 
needs to commit to fulfil a drastic fiscal adjustment programme 
imposed by the Troika, and will therefore lose all domestic fiscal 
autonomy and have to accept a long austerity period. The Greek 
example shows that this type of plan is not the way out of the crisis. 
The solidarity which is being implemented does not consist in 
donations but in loans. The ESM debt will be considered prior to 
private ones. Public bond issuance should involve a collective 
action clause, i.e. in case of default, stated by the Commission and 
the IMF, the country will be entitled to agree with creditors on a 
change in payment conditions, the agreement applying to all credi-
tors if a majority agrees. Euro area government debts will become 
speculative as was the case for developing economies; the interest 
rate on public bonds will rise, be more volatile and less easy to 
control. Why build the euro area to reach such a situation? 
On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a purchasing bonds 
programme on the secondary markets, for short-term bonds (1-
3 years), the so-called OMT (outright monetary transactions). In 
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on default risks in the concerned countries, on the risks of a euro 
area break-up. The ECB broke the spiral of self-fulfilling expecta-
tions and finally did not have to intervene. Lower interest rates can 
help to boost activity. Conversely, the ECB imposes its views on 
the economic strategy to be implemented, requests product and 
labour markets structural reforms, the full commitment to govern-
ment balance targets despite the recession. Although the OMT was 
not used in practice, the simple fact that it exists was sufficient to 
reduce substantially interest rates spreads. In February 2014, the 
Karlsruhe Constitutional Court refereed the case of the OMT before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, judging that it was not 
conform to the German constitution, which could oblige Germany 
to finance spending not being voted by the German Parliament. 
The euro area remains under the threat of financial markets defi-
ance, following elections results or the appearance of economic, 
fiscal or banking imbalances. This is a house of cards rather than a 
solid edifice.  
2.4. Towards a deep and genuine economic and monetary union? 
In November 2012, the Commission suggested major steps 
towards federalism (European Commission, 2012):
— ‘All major economic and fiscal policy choices by a MS should 
be subject to deeper coordination, endorsement and surveil-
lance process at the EU level’. The possibility of different 
economic or social strategies is forgotten or prohibited.
— The needs for strengthened fiscal discipline and for ex ante
fiscal coordination are asserted. But, after the fiscal pact, 
what remains to be coordinated since all fiscal policies have 
to be run in autopilot mode?
— The EMU could be entitled to use a “convergence and 
competitiveness instrument”, within the balanced budget 
framework. A country could sign an agreement with the 
Commission, according to which it would implement struc-
tural reforms and would therefore get a financial reward 
from other MS. Can we imagine that a country would get 
subsidies in order to abolish its minimum wage, or its public 
pensions system? 
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duced to amortise public debts, with strict conditionality, 
based on the German proposal (see Doluca et al., 2012): each 
country would have to commit to reimburse each year a 
share of the public debt above 60% of GDP, so as to bring 
public debt below 60% of GDP in 25 years. In counterpart of 
this commitment, the share of the debt above 60% of GDP 
would be commonly guaranteed. But this project requires to 
implement even more fiscal contraction, and does not 
consider the impacts on output, debt, and deficits. It 
assumes that fiscal policy may be run in an automatic mode, 
and be entirely devoted to the debt reducing objective. 
— The proposal to issue euro-bonds guaranteed by all MS or by 
the ECB has not been considered. Germany refuses to make 
unlimited and unconditional commitments to support other 
MS. But how to strengthen the euro area without such 
commitments?
Three questions remain: 
1. Should EU institutions’ powers be strengthened, as long as 
there is no guarantee that EU institutions could work more 
democratically, as long as the EU does not implement a 
growth strategy, as long as it remains focused on absurd 
public finance criteria, liberal structural reforms, and public 
expenditure cuts? 
2. Can we imagine all major economic and social decisions 
being made at the EU level, by the Commission or the 
Council without accounting for national votes and debates? 
3. Can we image a federal power able to account for domestic 
specificities in a Europe made of heterogeneous countries? 
Can we imagine a single policy implemented in different 
countries? Or different policies implemented through a 
central process? 
Some consider that the euro area could introduce short-term 
stabilisation mechanisms managed by the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2013), but this is an illusion with the 
Commission underestimating output gaps and forbidding discre-
tionary policies. Some suggest the unification of unemployment 
insurance systems, but national systems are often managed by 
social partners and are currently very diverse. The unification of 
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country having made efforts to reduce its unemployment rate will 
refuse to pay for high unemployment rates countries, and will 
blame the latter for not having undertaken the necessary reforms. 
Some (like Enderlein et al., 2013) propose to base transfers between 
MS on output gap differentials, but they forget that output gaps are 
a vague concept, with a questionable and variable over time meas-
urement. MS do not need fiscal federalism, but they need to 
recover the ability to run stabilisation fiscal policies. 
Requesting that each country reaches a macroeconomic equilib-
rium with budgetary positions in balance implies that private 
sector savings have a counterpart in an external surplus (the 
German model). This requires that the rest of the world agrees to 
absorb European surpluses, and also that Southern MS increase 
their competitiveness. This implies a long stagnation period 
followed by an investment rebound. This scenario is unlikely if 
wage cuts depress output so much that profits do not improve, and 
investment remains depressed due to weak domestic demand. 
Austerity policies are more likely to depress permanently economic 
and social dynamism in those countries.
3. A new economic policy framework? 
The euro area needs to choose between two frameworks: relying 
on markets to implement fiscal discipline or introducing measures 
to re-establish the unity of public debts. The first option has several 
drawbacks: maintaining interest rates spreads in Europe for an 
undefined time period, undermining the impact of fiscal policies 
and letting financial markets play an excessive role. The second 
option requires an issue to be settled first: according to which 
criteria and up to which level can a MS public debt be guaranteed 
by its partners? Several projects have not entirely made a choice 
between the two frameworks (see Gros and Mayer, 2010, Palley, 
2011, De Grauwe, 2012, Schulmeister, 2013). 
The simplest solution would consist in introducing a European 
debt agency (EDA), in charge of issuing a common debt for all euro 
area countries. This debt would be considered as safe by financial 
markets; it would be very liquid and could be issued at very low 
interest rates. But the EDA council would supervise domestic fiscal 
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which would then have to issue bonds on markets. The EDA would 
strengthen the Stability Pact problems. What would be its assess-
ment criteria? What would be the democratic and economic 
legitimacy of its Council? How would the EDA decide that a 
country runs an excessive deficit, if the country considers that such 
a deficit is necessary to support activity (like in Germany and 
France in 2002-2005) or to rescue banks? Would it implement rigid 
rules (a country would be entitled to loans from the EDA up to 60% 
of its GDP) or softer ones? The EDA would benefit neither virtuous 
countries (which have no difficulty to get financing) nor countries 
in difficulty, which the EDA would refuse to finance and which 
would have to sue domestic bonds, without any European guar-
antee, without any potential financing from the ECB, in other 
words risky assets, bearing a high interest rate. These countries 
would be dependent on financial markets. The EDA makes sense 
only if it can finance all public debts, but then what should be 
done against lax countries? 
Delpla and von Weisäcker (2010) have suggested the introduc-
tion of a ‘blue debt, collectively issued and guaranteed, with a 
ceiling at 60% of GDP’. Each MS would also be allowed to issue a 
red debt under its own responsibility, and hence at a high interest 
rate. This would be a strong disincentive to issue public debt above 
60% of GDP. This proposal is almost similar to the EDA proposal 
and raises the same problems. The 60% level is arbitrary, and 
account neither for economic stabilisation needs, nor for the desire 
from financial institutions to own government debt. The 60% level 
is currently breached by 10 of the 12 original euro area MS (except 
Luxembourg and Finland). The gap between blue and red debts 
would allow financial markets to speculate in permanence. 
3.1. The single currency’s contradictions 
The system which worked until 1999 lied on unity between the 
government, the central bank and commercial banks. The central 
bank is the lender of last resort for the government and banks. The 
government can issue unlimited public debt. This debt is consid-
ered as safe and hence benefits from as low as possible market 
interest rates. Of course this unity was undermined by the central 
bank independence, which could have generated conflicts 
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specific spending) and the central bank (caring about maintaining 
low inflation). These conflicts could have led public finances to 
become unsustainable (see, for instance, Sterdyniak et al., 1994). 
But such situations did not occur before 2007. They did never 
question government solvency. 
The introduction of the euro area led to a particularly difficult 
situation. On the one hand, countries need to run more active fiscal 
policies because they have lost control over their interest rates and 
exchange rates. It can also be added that, since 1973, the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium has been requiring a certain level of public 
deficit and debt. Each country needs to run some equilibrium 
government deficits. The 2007 crisis strengthened this need. On the 
other hand, due to the single currency, current imbalances in one 
country affect the other countries of the area: excessive deficits (and 
surpluses) should be avoided. But how should they be defined? 
Last, the financial markets’ weight makes it necessary for public 
debts to become safe assets again, while at the same time Northern 
countries deny to give unlimited guarantee to their partners.
Therefore the procedures implemented since 2010 should be 
reviewed and their aims should be modified, which implies institu-
tional changes. Euro area countries should be able again to issue 
safe sovereign debt, at an interest rate controlled by the ECB. They 
should be able to run a public deficit in line with their macroeco-
nomic stabilisation needs. Public debt mutual guarantee must be 
entire for countries accepting to submit their economic policies to 
a coordination process. 
A coordination process needs to be organised between MS. 
Coordination should target GDP growth and full employment; it 
should account for all economic variables; countries should follow 
an economic policy strategy allowing to meet the inflation target 
(at least to remain within a target of around 2%), to meet an objec-
tive in terms of wage developments (in the medium-run real wages 
should grow in line with labour productivity), in the short-run 
adjustment processes should be implemented by countries where 
wages have risen too rapidly or too slowly; increases or cuts in 
social contributions may be used to facilitate the adjustment 
process; countries should announce and negotiate their current 
account balance targets; countries with high external surpluses 
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in Southern economies. The process should reach a unanimous 
agreement on a coordinated but differentiated strategy. Public defi-
cits resulting from this process should be financed through debt 
issuance guaranteed by all euro area countries and by the ECB. The 
Treaty needs to maintain an effective process in the event where 
no agreement is reached. In that case, the new debt issued by coun-
tries outside the agreement would not be guaranteed, but such a 
case should never occur. 
The EMS rules should be reviewed, the EMS should fully guar-
antee MS public debts, except in the case where MS depart from the 
commonly agreed policy. The EMS should have unlimited access to 
ECB refinancing.
In this context, the ECB could assign itself the objective of 
maintaining long-term interest rates at low levels, below euro area 
GDP growth. The euro area needs to recover the 10 percentage 
points of GDP lost because of the crisis. This would lead euro area 
MS public deficits and debts to be sustainable. Abandoning this 
objective means accepting mass unemployment in Europe. The EU 
institutions should elaborate a consistent exit crisis scenario, based 
on demand recovery, on households’ consumption and public 
spending, on investments for the future, within the environmental 
transition process, and on coordinated decreases in today’s 
imbalances.
Euro area’s survival requires that the European project becomes 
popular again, therefore is a source of growth, social progress and 
solidarity. It is only within this framework that institutional 
progresses could be made.
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A EUROPEAN TAX
LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES
Alexandre Maitrot de la Motte
Paris-Est Créteil University
A European tax does not yet exist. For this myth to become reality both 
legally and politically, the European Union would need to have taxing compe-
tence allowing it to levy taxes for itself; the taxpayers, over whom it would have 
taxing power, would be the citizens of the European Union and companies 
headquartered or economically active in the European Union. In return for this 
tax, whose necessity is a function of the expected degree of EU integration 
(internal market / federation), a European mechanism of democratic consent to 
the tax ought to be established. Furthermore, the tax base should be chosen 
with great care, in line with intended objectives (financial revenue / sense of 
political belonging of European taxpayers and the addition of a tax dimension 
to European citizenship).
The idea of creating a European tax is extremely controversial. 
Indeed, taxes are a mark and evidence of State sovereignty (Buisson 
2002), and maybe even the ultimate mark and evidence of this 
sovereignty: taxation derives from supreme authority; it allows 
payees to finance their spending; and it requires exercising prerog-
atives of public power that fall outside the scope of common law. 
An etymological study of the term “fisc” and its derivatives is very 
telling in this regard: in ancient times, the Latin work fiscus
referred, on the one hand, to the basket or bin where tax collectors 
placed their taking, and on the other, to the Emperor’s private 
treasury, which was filled with the proceeds of repression (fines 
and confiscations).Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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taxation can explain why opponents of European integration 
oppose a European tax on principle, and why the development of 
European taxation is one of the prime targets of their fantasies and 
reservations. It also provides a means for understanding why 
member States are sometimes hostile to the idea of the European 
Union wielding a competing power to levy and collect taxes.
Yet the legitimacy of a European tax is also clear. Given the role 
it must play, the European Union has legitimate grounds for 
seeking financial autonomy and freedom from its financial 
dependence on the contributions that member States agree to allo-
cate. The Union could undoubtedly achieve financial autonomy if 
it was able to freely levy a tax for its purposes. At the same time, the 
creation of a European tax that was accepted and paid by European 
taxpayers would help close the famous “democratic deficit” that is 
too often and incorrectly blamed on the European Union.  
From a legal perspective this European tax could be defined 
traditionally, as a “monetary payment required of individuals via 
an authority, definitively and without consideration, to cover the 
public functions” (attributed to Jèze, as explained in Négrin 2008, 
p.139) of the EU. Accordingly, to qualify as a European tax, a levy 
would have to include five cumulative criteria.
The first criterion concerns the nature of the levy, which must 
be a monetary payment: since this characteristic does not raise any 
difficulties, there is no need to expand on it here. The second crite-
rion requires that an authority collect this money: the creation of a 
European tax must therefore result from the exercise of a European 
taxing competence, that is, a taxing competence that the EU is able 
to wield freely. Thirdly, the competence must be exercised in rela-
tion to European taxpayers: as obvious as this statement may seem, 
a European tax assumes the presence of European “individuals” 
(physical persons or businesses) liable for a tax receivable by the 
European Union, which would accordingly have the power as a 
public authority to set and collect the tax (exercising European 
taxing power). Finally, fourthly and fifthly, to qualify as a European 
tax, the levy in question would have to be definitive and allocated 
to cover European public functions: to do so, it would suffice that 
the proceeds be applied to the EU budget.          
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taxes already exist or have existed. Several types of taxes could 
probably qualify, such as harmonized taxes or certain earmarked 
taxes, for example. But given that the most harmonized tax (the 
value-added tax) still shows disparities, and more importantly, that 
the European Union does not exercise any coercion over those 
liable for VAT (since those taxpayers remain national taxpayers), it 
cannot be labelled a European tax (absence of European taxing 
power and European taxpayers). Past or current taxes earmarked for 
the EU budget are also not “European taxes”, be it the “ECSC levy” 
(created on the basis of article 49 of the ECSC Treaty) or the tax on 
the salaries of Community staff (that has its origins in article 13 of 
Protocol n° 36 on privileges and immunities of the European 
Communities, adopted in 1965).1 Indeed, these taxes were created 
by the States, which then allocated the proceeds to the ECSC or to 
the European Union, rather than by these organisations them-
selves (absence of European taxing competence). And so it appears 
that a European tax in the strict sense does not yet exist.2
In order to create one, the European Union would have to be 
able to freely levy taxes, and the taxpayers would be either citizens of 
the European Union or companies headquartered or economically 
active in the European Union. Thus, the question is the necessity of 
such a tax (1) and the conditions for its implementation (2). Some 
recommendations will finally be proposed (3).           
1. Is a European tax necessary? 
Within the current constitutional framework (internal market), 
the creation of a European tax in the broad sense of identical 
national taxes would seem to suffice (1.1). However, if the institu-
tional framework evolved towards stronger federalism, the creation 
of a European tax in the strict sense would become critical (1.2).   
1. This protocol was slightly modified by protocol n° 1 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty (See 
specifically. art. 1, 14), and became protocol n° 7. The tax it established is governed by 
regulation n° 260/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968 “laying down the conditions and 
procedure for applying the tax for the benefit of the European Communities”.  
2. The harmonized or earmarked taxes that have been mentioned can, however, be 
characterized as broad “European taxes.” Likewise, the European Union collects custom duties: 
given their legal nature (custom duties as opposed to tax duties), they are not taxes in the strict 
sense of the term.     
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market 
The smooth operation of an internal market involves a level 
playing field for competition, that is, tax neutrality and standardi-
zation of taxes for which companies are liable. The internal market 
is indeed where European demand and supply meet: in this market 
tax disparities can only distort trade, since all other things being 
equal, the goods that are most heavily taxed are less competitive 
and less attractive for consumers (demand); similarly, in the 
absence of standardization, taxes weigh in companies’ choice of 
where in the EU to set up (supply).      
In the absence of European taxes in the broad sense – that is, 
taxes with identical bases, rates and methods of collection across 
all States – tax neutrality cannot be achieved. Granted, many tax 
obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal market have 
already been eliminated, thanks to the prohibition of tax restric-
tions on the free movement of goods (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union [TFEU] 2009, art. 30, 110, 111 & 112), the ban 
on tax barriers to the free movement of people, services and 
capital,3 and the control of State aid in the form of taxes (TFEU 
2009, art. 107-109). In addition, national VAT and excise (tobacco, 
alcohol, energy products) tax laws have already been approxi-
mated.4 However, eliminating discrimination in each State does 
not translate into tax neutrality in the internal market. Moreover, 
while harmonisation has led to the reduction of some disparities, 
these remain significant. A uniformization of taxes on businesses is 
therefore necessary, even though the proceeds from these taxes 
would be collected by states rather than the Union.   
The creation of European taxes in the broad sense also seems 
necessary because of difficulties resulting from the simultaneous 
application of different tax systems inside a common area. Interna-
tional operations may be subject to double taxation, which 
hamper trade, but which the Court of Justice refuses to condemn 
on the basis of the European freedoms of movement.5 Further-
3. Since the Schumacker decision of 14 February1995 (ECJ, 14 February 1995, Case C-279/93, 
Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker, Rec., p. I-225), the Court of Justice controls laws 
applicable to direct taxation that hamper the freedoms of movement.  
4. On the basis of article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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consolidated corporate tax base for their EU wide activities to avoid 
the current costly inefficiencies of [twenty-eight] separate sets of 
tax rules” (European Commission 2001, p. 20).6 This is why the 
European Commission has proposed establishing a consolidated 
tax base (CCCTB) to allow companies with cross-border and inter-
national activities to calculate their overall income according to a 
single set of rules, and to develop consolidated accounts for tax 
purposes. A “one-stop-shop” system would allow them to 
complete their tax returns, which would then be used to determine 
the taxable base for each company, and to allow the member States 
in which a company is active to tax a share of this base. The share 
would be determined by a specific formula based on three factors: 
fixed assets, labour and revenue (European Commission 2011A).
1.2. The need for a European tax in the strict sense from a federal 
perspective 
If the European Union were to increasingly lean towards feder-
alism, the creation of a European tax in the strict sense would 
become critical. Furthermore, the creation of this tax is a precondi-
tion to any further European integration. Contrary to taxes in the 
broad sense that were considered above, this tax would have to be 
created by the European Union and ideally be collected from indi-
viduals. This would involve the devolution of taxing competence
and taxing power to the European Union (without this competence 
and power being exclusive), and hence the existence of European 
taxpayers. As a result, this tax would be able to address financial 
and political challenges.   
The existence of a European tax would give the European Union 
clear financial autonomy and guaranteed resources. With 
taxpaying competence and power, the European Union would no 
longer be dependent on member States to finance its budget. 
While the Court of Justice has repeatedly ruled that “own 
5. The Court believes that EU law does not contain any criterion for the distribution of taxing 
authority and that member states are not obliged to adapt their tax systems to those of the 
others (See in particular ECJ, 14 November 2006, Case C-513/04, Kerckhaert and Morres, Rec., 
p. I10967. - 12 February 2009, Case C-67/08, Margarete Block v. Finanzamt Kaufbeuren, Rec., p. I-
883. - and 16 July 2009, Case C-128/08, Jacques Damseaux, Rec., p. I-6823).
6. These additional costs are linked to the need to know how several different tax systems 
function and to complete tax formalities in them.  
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and from the outset,7 the Union cannot raise any more revenue 
than member States agree to provide. In these circumstances, there 
is no doubt that so long as no taxing competence and no taxing 
power are given to European bodies, member States could always 
decide to withhold all resources from the EU budget, or to not pay 
their contributions.8 Even when it has a claim on member States, 
the European Union does not have a claim on national taxpayers: 
this underscores the difference between the notions of “tax” and 
“contribution.” A “tax” implies a mandatory and direct claim on 
taxpayers; when the funding is based on “contributions”, this 
claim only exists indirectly, via member States, and provided that 
they accept the contribution in principle. 
In turn, the creation of a European tax would deepen European 
integration through the special relationship the tax would forge 
between the EU and European taxpayers-citizens. One of the impli-
cations of creating a European tax is tax citizenship, which has 
historically preceded political citizenship.  
The creation of European tax common to all European 
taxpayers should therefore be considered, because it would 
strengthen European citizenship and Europeans’ sense of 
belonging in the EU, which the tax would fund.         
2. What should be the conditions of a European tax? 
In exchange for the devolution of taxing competence and power 
to the European Union that would allow for the creation of a Euro-
pean tax, a European mechanism of consent to the tax would have 
to be put in place (2.1). In addition, the taxable base would have to 
be determined in line with intended objectives (2.2).
7. The Court has asserted “Member States are merely to establish those resources and make 
them available to the Commission […]. The role of Member States is limited to establishing the 
Communities’ own resources […], and subsequently making them available to the 
Commission”: ECJ, 18 December 1986, Case 93/85, Commission v. United Kingdom, Rec., p. 4011, 
points 16-18. 
8. In December 1978, France, Great Britain and Germany had refused to provide the “VAT 
proceeds” corresponding to the increase in the Community budget established by the European 
Parliament. This withholding ceased when an amending budget was adopted on 25 April 1979. 
A similar scenario unfolded in December 1980, involving France, Germany and Belgium.   
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The right to impose a tax liability on taxpayers is the exclusive 
prerogative of the community or the authority that can consent to 
the tax. In a democratic society, consent to taxation is an essential 
legal act that allows the imposition of burdens on taxpayers.
The development of ties between the European Union and its 
taxpayers therefore depends on the establishment of a European 
mechanism of consent to the tax, in line with the idea that “taxes 
can only be legitimately established through the consent of the 
people or its representatives” (Rousseau 1755, p. 73).9 In other 
words, the establishment of European consent to taxation is a legal 
necessity in the event of deeper European tax integration, but it is 
also above all a political necessity, meeting a democratic require-
ment. The significance of this consent would therefore lie in its 
ability to achieve the feat of reducing the Union’s democratic 
deficit while imposing a duty on European taxpayers. Once again, 
this illustrates the paradox inherent to the very principle of 
consent to taxation, whereby taxpayers collectively consent to 
something that is imposed individually. 
Seen as a key condition of legal taxation in many member 
States, the establishment of a European mechanism of consent to 
taxation would legitimise the European tax in the eyes of European 
citizens-taxpayers, especially if this consent was granted through a 
democratically elected body such as the European Parliament.10
Moreover, it would be worth expanding on Treaty provisions on 
European citizenship to include a tax dimension: this would allow 
for the citizen to be merged with the taxpayer, as often happens in 
democratic states. In fact, it would be dangerous not to do it, as 
demonstrated by several examples from the history of Western 
democracies (Great Britain, United States of America, Sweden or 
9. Montesquieu adds that this consent must regularly be renewed (Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des 
Lois, 1758, Livre IX, chapitre VI, rééd. Librairie Firmin Didot Frères, 1845, p. 136).
10. Along these lines, see Frans Vanistendael, “No European Taxation without European 
representation”, EC Tax Review, 2000, n° 3, p. 143: “the first question is not a question for tax 
lawyers but for European constitutional lawyers. Suffice it to say that any European decision on 
tax matters should live up to the standards of the Magna Carta, now almost 800 years ago: “No 
European taxation without European Representation”. These standards are more than just the 
abolition of the unanimous voting rule. They require an active role for the representatives of the 
European taxpayers in the European Parliament”.
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and tax revolts can become political revolutions.    
2.2. The need for an adequate tax base 
Furthermore, the European tax base would need to be carefully 
selected to reflect the intended objectives. Several options could 
meet financial or political goals.
If the sole purpose of a European tax were to provide financial 
resources to the European Union, the ideal solution would be for 
the Union to create a tax similar to the tax on financial transac-
tions, as initially considered by the European Commission. 
Following a communication dated 7 October 2010 (European 
Commission 2010), the Commission had indeed proposed that 
member states adopt a directive “on a common system of financial 
transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC” (European 
Commission 2011B). More specifically, the Commission had 
suggested that this tax be collected from transactions on financial 
instruments between financial institutions;11 this would bring in 
around 54 billion euros per year to member states and the Union, 
for which the tax would be collected. In return, it would have been 
possible to reduce member State contributions to the EU budget12
(European Commission 2012) and to fund new spending – in part 
to help fight the financial crisis and to pay down state debt.
If European taxation had a solely political objective, however, it 
would require imposing a direct tax on individuals residing in the 
European Union. Only this form of taxation could create a political 
link between the payee and the taxpayers, that is, between Europe 
and its citizens. Similarly, only a direct common tax – of which 
Europeans could take ownership, and which would play a part in 
their identity – is likely to create solidarity among Europeans.  
Finally, if European taxation had both a political and financial 
objective, it could take the form of an indirect tax, such as the tax 
on plane tickets that was also considered at one point (European 
11. It was proposed that share and bond trades be subject to a rate of 0.1%, and that derivative 
contracts be taxed at a rate of 0.01%.   
12. According to the European Commission, the allocation of a third of the proceeds of such a 
tax to national budgets, and the remaining two thirds to the EU budget, would reduce the 
“GNI” contributions of member States by 50%.
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direct tax, this type of tax would have the advantage of being easier 
to collect and control. It would also be more profitable, because it 
would require less administration and would generate more 
revenue. That being said, while such a tax would be common to all 
Europeans, it would not directly link European taxpayers to the 
European Union: as a poorly identified component of the price of 
products, it would paradoxically go unnoticed.   
In the end, the creation of a common tax to fund EU spending, 
levied on citizens and consented to by their representatives, would 
likely represent a major step forward in European integration. Like 
the common currency, it would probably be challenged. But just 
like the common currency, it would create links not only between 
the Union and its citizens, but also the citizens among themselves. 
In any case, the tax should not be an end in of itself, but rather a 
means to accomplish the European project.  
3. Recommendations
— A deepening of European integration is not seriously conceiv-
able without taxation. Tax harmonisation is often presented as an 
ideal, but should only be seen as one step in preparation for a Euro-
pean tax.
— From a legal perspective the creation of such a tax would 
imply that the European Union has taxing competence and taxing 
power over European taxpayers. In return, the latter should be able 
to consent to taxation through their representatives. 
— If this tax had a solely financial objective, it could be an indi-
rect tax (share of VAT revenue; or a tax on financial transactions). 
Conversely, if it had a political objective (strengthening the sense 
of belonging and the creation of a European tax citizenship), a 
direct tax on individuals would be more adequate.  
13. Other indirect taxes might be considered, such as taxes on electronic communications: see 
the Committee on Finance, the General Economy and the Plan session of 3 May 2006 (11-hour 
session) devoted to the hearing of MEP Alain Lamassoure on the European Communities’ own 
resources, record n° 62, pp. 2-9.
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BEYOND THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION
Jean-Paul Pollin
Université d’Orléans
After briefly recalling the progress and especially the limits of European 
Banking Union, this paper seeks to describe and evaluate reforms to complete 
the new agreement. Two types of proposals are then discussed: strengthening 
banking regulation by engaging in the separation of activities and defining a 
macro-prudential policy at the Union. An alternative project would consist in 
reducing the share of intermediation in financing the European economy by 
increasing the size of the markets. But these views risk hitting the foundations 
of economic and social systems of continental Europe.
In light of the hopes aroused by the project for a European 
Banking Union (EBU), the compromise that was reached (yet to be 
validated) is cause for real disappointment. The goal was to reduce 
the fragmentation of the European financial space, which has 
been aggravated by the crisis, namely the divergence in financing 
conditions among EU member countries (especially in the euro 
zone). A single monetary policy cannot in fact accommodate 
such differences.
There have been lengthy explanations of the need to break the 
destabilizing spiral that has developed in different States between 
the weakness of their financial institutions and their public debt 
crisis. These are mutually sustaining: public finances are under 
pressure from the need to support troubled banks, while the deteri-
oration in public debt is hitting the banks’ balance sheets, 
suggesting that the possibilities for a bailout are problematic. To 
break out of this vicious circle, it was necessary to find ways to Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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resolve the critical cases in an orderly fashion, but it was necessary 
above all to establish a “safety net” at the EU level to reduce the 
interdependence between the costs of State financing and the costs 
of the banking systems. More ambitiously, this initiative was 
viewed by some as a first step towards a fiscal union, or at least 
towards greater European solidarity.
It must be acknowledged that broadly speaking the banking 
union plan respects the way that it was originally laid out. It is the 
content of the union’s mechanisms and the concrete conditions 
for its implementation that have been emptied of their original 
principles and intentions:
— The single banking supervision mechanism (SSM) entrusted 
to the ECB will quickly be operational. This represents real progress 
insofar as it will help standardize practices in this field, where the 
ECB should be less complacent than the national authorities, who 
are more inclined to protect their financial institutions. It should 
be noted that the ECB’s jurisdiction will cover only the largest 
banks, i.e. approximately 130 of the 6000 banks in the EU. For 
other banks, the ECB will only monitor the supervision of national 
supervisory authorities. Germany will thus continue to exercise 
oversight on its regional bank network, which, though smaller, 
plays a unique strategic role in financing the country’s economy.
The ECB will proceed from early 2014 to conduct an audit (the 
Asset Quality Review, AQR). This work is intended to result in in 
assessments (Fall 2014) that should then lead in 2015 to decisions 
on recapitalizing or even closing or decommissioning establish-
ments. It is at this stage that the credibility of the supervisory 
mechanism will be decided. It will notably depend on how conclu-
sions from the supervisor’s observations and diagnoses on the 
situation of individual institutions will be drawn. This is precisely 
the purpose of the single resolution mechanism (SRM) which must 
also be in place to complete the SSM. It aims to unify both the deci-
sion-making procedures and the resolution process of troubled 
banks in the EBU.
— When a bank (under direct supervision of the ECB or with 
transnational activities) should be recapitalized, placed under 
administrative control or liquidated, the decision should be taken 
quickly (probably over a weekend) to avoid contagion. Two 
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been taken at the suprational level or left at the national level. 
Negotiations have resulted in an unduly burdensome compromise. 
First, the ECB shall notify the failure of the establishment to the 
Single Resolution Board. The Board will adopt a bailout or liquida-
tion decision in executive session (8 members) if not appealed to 
the resolution fund, or in plenary session (23 members) otherwise. 
The decision will then be submitted to the Commission for 
approval (the Council has the final say in case of disagreement) 
before transmission to the national authorities for execution. It 
would have been desirable to make the process easier and quicker.
— Regarding the resolution of troubled institutions, the Bank 
Recovery and Revolution Directive (DRRB), adopted for all Euro-
pean Union countries, states that losses will be primarily absorbed 
by shareholders and creditors in a predetermined order. Only 
holders of less than € 100.000 deposits and secured debt holders 
will be protected. With these exceptions, shareholders and credi-
tors participate in the bail-in amounting to less than 8% of the 
assets of the bank under resolution. If this is not sufficient, a public 
fund resolution would intervene for a maximum of 5% of assets. 
The aim is to avoid as far as possible to draw upon the taxpayers, 
that is to say, upon the public finances of the State concerned.
For EBU countries, the emergency fund should take the form of 
a single resolution Fund (SRF) constituted by contributions from 
all banks of the EBU. This mutualisation process is supposed to 
break through the vicious circle between bank failures and sover-
eign debt crises. But in reality this fund will be operational very 
gradually for 8 years from 2016; it will therefore reach the desired 
size (€ 55 billion or 1% of deposits and 0.2% of bank liabilities 
EBU) in 2024. In addition, pooling will also be realized after several 
stages: 40% the first year, 60% the second, 70% in the third ... 
Then, in 2018, a country will only be able to get about € 15 billion 
beyond the amounts contributed by its own banks. In 2020 the 
shared resources will amount to 28 billion and this amount should 
be compared to the 40 billion that Spain has taken from the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) to recapitalize some of its banks. 
It is expected that the SRF will have the capacity to borrow, but 
here again European partners have disagreements on the joint-
guarantees for these borrowings. Therefore, pooling will be purely 
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sary, thus failing to break the famous destabilizing spiral that the 
mechanism was supposed to neutralize. Note, moreover, that the 
Fund resolution will not even have begun when it will be necessary 
to draw the consequences of the ECB’s  AQR on whether to recapi-
talize or “resolve” a number of banks. But various estimates on the 
potential capital requirements, that would be needed starting from 
2015, range from 50 billion to 300 billion euros.
If we add that pooling of national deposit guarantee systems 
was postponed sine die, it is clear that the construction of the EBU 
will not be the final step, or even a decisive one, towards the finan-
cial integration. It will weaken without really breaking the vicious 
circle between public debt and bank fragility, thanks to the single 
supervisory mechanism, and the “bail-in” from shareholders or 
creditors much more than to the set up of the Resolution funds, 
that was supposed to introduce a new solidarity, which is yet 
nearly non existing. If we want to progress in reducing the frag-
mentation of the European financial area, we will instead need to 
rely on a consolidation of banking regulation in its micro and 
macro dimensions. However, we should mention another idea, 
from different sources, was recently discussed: strengthening 
market’s funding in Europe to circumvent the difficulties of finan-
cial intermediation (weak banking sector out of crisis). This view 
deserves to be discussed, because they seem to be naive and 
dangerous.
1. Completing banking regulation
In order for the Banking Union to achieve its goal of creating a 
more robust and homogeneous financial space, the supervisory 
mechanism clearly needs to enforce a set of coherent and effective 
rules. However, beyond the Basel III agreements, many questions 
need to be addressed in order to do this. Numerous examples could 
be mentioned (differences in calculating risk-weighted assets, the 
remuneration of trading operations, shadow banking etc.). But 
here we want to emphasize two points that merit special attention: 
first, the structural reform of the banking sector, and second, the 
institutional problem involved in the implementation of a macro-
prudential policy.
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There are many arguments for making a division between 
universal banks’ market activities on the one hand (financing and 
investment) and their traditional commercial banking activities 
(intermediation) on the other. The point is not to repeat these argu-
ments here,1 but rather to emphasize the complementarity that 
exists between separation and the EBU’s constituent mechanisms.2
The issue of banks that are “too big and too complex” to fail was 
in no way settled by Basel III. The additional capital that is to be 
imposed on systemic banks is not at all sufficient to contain the 
consequences if this kind of establishment fails. Recall in this 
connection that of the 29 banks classified as systemic, 12 belong to 
the European Union and eight to the euro zone. If they are allowed 
to remain in this state, regardless of the recommendations of the 
Liikanen report (but also those of the OECD Secretariat and the 
measures taken in the UK following the Vickers report), the opera-
tion of the EBU would be affected in several ways:
— First, in a systemic crisis involving two or three systemic 
banks, with balances that can reach 1000 billion euros (BNP's is 
2000 billion), the fund could, because of its size, intervene for at 
most 2% of the liabilities of the banks concerned (and not 5% as 
expected). Furthermore, the planned “bail-in” (8% of liabilities) 
would be difficult to implement without causing a major shock; this 
should give pause to the body or bodies responsible for reaching a 
decision on resolution. It should be acknowledged that this could 
happen only in the case of significant losses, of around 10% of 
assets, and / or in the event of a systemic crisis. But to be truly cred-
ible the system needs to be able to withstand such situations, even if 
they are fairly unlikely. It is clear that given the mammoth size of 
today's universal banks, this credibility cannot be guaranteed.
— On the other hand one could question whether it is possible 
or fair to share risks that vary so greatly in magnitude. All the 
banks will contribute to the resolution fund according to some of 
their characteristics and notably their risk profile. But the defini-
tion of such variables is very tricky and will be a source of conflicts 
1. For a presentation of these arguments cf. for example J.-L. Gaffard and J.-P. Pollin (2013).
2. Besides, it’s one of the objectives of the Barnier’s proposal on structural reform of EU credit 
institutions (see European Commission, 2014a).
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example, the systemic institutions are generally universal banks 
that are more dependent on short-term market financing and 
subject to market risks (the liquidity and volatility of asset prices) 
with extremely high values. In their case, the deposits (lower in 
proportion) are neither an indicator of risk nor a good indicator of 
size. What then is the sense of an insurance fund that groups 
medium-sized commercial banks together with universal banks 
that operate in numerous segments and countries? How functional 
will a European fund be that includes countries like France, which 
has a banking system where systemic institutions dominate, and 
others such as Germany that instead have a system composed 
mainly of medium-sized and small banks?
— Moreover, the feasibility and credibility of the resolution 
process depend on the ability to liquidate a defaulting bank in 
pieces. However, when the interweaving of activities is (delibera-
tely?) complex and opaque, it is very difficult in practice to break 
these up. So dismantling the institution will then involve a loss in 
value that renders this costly, perhaps too costly to be acceptable. 
A clear separation between different types of activities thus helps 
to reduce the size of the regulated entities and to reduce the costs 
of bank resolution.
— In a somewhat different vein, within universal banks there 
are inevitably cross-subsidies that act as barriers to optimal pricing 
and fair competition. It is likely that before the crisis the high profi-
tability of market activities led to under-pricing credit; it seems, 
however, that since the crisis the losses racked up by the financing 
and investment banks (or their lowered profitability) have been 
partly reflected in loans and other services for captive customers 
(SMEs, professionals and individuals) in retail banking. Neverthe-
less, the existence of integrated banks (commercial + investment 
and financing) poses problems very similar to those found in other 
commercial networks (transport, electricity, telecommunications). 
The issue of banks' access to services that they do not produce 
themselves (a commercial bank wishing to hedge or to enable its 
clients to do so) is posed in the same terms as in these other indus-
tries, and its solution should follow the same principle of third-
party access to networks as have been adopted there. This is why it 
is so surprising that the European Commission, which has been 
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ciple, especially in the case of rail transport and electricity, has 
until now never thought this might also concern the banking 
industry. How has it come to pass that the relatively timid separa-
tion of activities being proposed (Barnier project) is under fire, 
while the dismantling of integrated operators was imposed in 
certain network industries with no real opposition?
1.2. The relationships between micro and macroprudential policies
After a little thought and procrastination, the ECB has 
convinced itself that the single monetary policy could not be exer-
cised without getting involved in cleaning up Europe's banking 
systems. Moreover, the central banks gained experience during the 
crisis of how useful it was to the proper performance of their 
mission to have microeconomic information about the state of the 
financial institutions.
Indeed, the crisis has also changed the conception of the goal of 
monetary policy. It is now considered necessary to add an objec-
tive of financial stability to the traditional objectives, and as a 
consequence to expand central banks’ policy instruments. In addi-
tion to monetary regulation strictly speaking, this means adding 
macroprudential policy, whose mission is to monitor changes in 
the level and terms of financing, changes in asset prices, and so 
forth. But this seriously complicates the task of central banks, not 
only because they will have to coordinate the use of a broader 
range of instruments, but also because they will probably need to 
share (or at least coordinate) their new mission with other actors. 
At the European level, a Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) exists since 
2011, but its recommendations are not binding.3 So, the formula-
tion and implementation of macroprudential policy still takes 
place mainly at the national level. And it turns out that the bodies 
that receive the opinions of the ESRB and are responsible for 
macroprudential policy differ in their status and competence from 
one country to another: in France, for example, the Board reports 
to the Ministry of the Economy, whereas it is connected to the 
3. It is worth pointing out that the ESRB’s authority covers not only the banking system but 
extends to the entire financial system (non-bank financial institutions, financial markets) of the 
members of the European Community.
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simply integrated into the central bank.4 It could obviously be 
considered paradoxical that while the microprudential is currently 
shifting up to the supra-national level, the macroprudential 
remains within the competence of the Member States – especially 
since it is perfectly clear that the macro-financial imbalances in the 
euro zone arose much more out of growth in private sector debt in 
the countries of the periphery. It now seems clear that differenti-
ated macroprudential policies managed at the European level 
would have made it possible to modulate the divergent effects of 
the single monetary policy and of uncontrolled capital flows. At 
the very least, these national policies need to be coordinated, 
including with the central bank.
Overall, the institutional arrangements intended to bring finan-
cial stability to Europe (and especially the euro zone) create 
interdependencies between monetary policy, the single supervi-
sory mechanism (for the larger banks), the ESRB and the national 
authorities responsible for macroprudential supervision. This 
tangled and perplexing web leads to real scepticism about the 
possibilities of ensuring coordination between all these bodies. 
Obviously, things cannot remain like this, so it is necessary to 
consider either:
— giving the ECB responsibility for all macroprudential policy, 
which would reinforce its power, perhaps excessively, and 
would require in return reconsidering its independence;
— or reforming the ESRB by granting it real decision-making 
power. 
2. The false solutions of disintermediation
In reality the fragmentation of the European financial area does 
not date from the crisis. As far back as March 2007, in its first 
report on financial integration in Europe, the ECB had already 
noted (on the basis of indicators of prices and quantities 
constructed for the occasion) that the equity markets and espe-
cially the banking markets were not very integrated.5
4. Cf. E. Nier et al. (2011).
5. Cf. ECB (2007).
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banking integration that were already in place eight or nine years 
after the launch of the euro. In its March 2007 report, the ECB 
regretted the insufficient presence of cross-border banks and of 
mergers and new banks of this type.
The ECB suggested making Europe’s financial systems more inte-
grated and more efficient by developing the capital markets, that is 
to say, through a shift towards the “Anglo-Saxon” model: a system 
dominated by markets rather than by intermediation.6 This position 
is highly debatable, but it is nevertheless re-surfacing today under 
fairly similar arguments: the disintermediation of financing would 
help to both minimize the adverse effects of the banks’ weaknesses 
and more easily unify the European financial area.7 This could take 
the form of renewed securitization (in which case it would involve a 
banking disintermediation) or greater access to capital markets. In 
either case it would mainly affect SME-ETI financing, insofar as the 
disintermediation of large companies has already existed for a long 
time.8 This position is neither realistic nor desirable.
2.1. Stimulate the securitization of credit?
A desire to revive or rather to give a new impetus to securitization 
may seem to be a surprising and dangerous idea, given that it is well-
known that it was a crucial ingredient in the crisis. However, there 
are various options for making this type of product more secure: 
reducing its complexity, improving transparency (by increasing the 
securities held by issuers), homogenizing securitized portfolios, etc. 
On the other hand, this kind of sale of credit is likely to improve the 
liquidity of the banks issuing these products, and perhaps their 
capital ratios as well, thereby reducing financing costs.9
6. Cf. J.-P. Pollin (2010).
7. This position is expressed in particular by B. Coeuré (2013), J. Viñals (2013), A. Sapir and G. 
Wolff (2013). It seems that this proposition also inspired the recent communication of the 
European Commission on the long term financing of European economy (see European 
Commission, 2014b).
8. We will not discuss here the securitization of mortgage loans since the crucial issue is to 
restart lending to business.
9. Also note that with the exception of the United Kingdom, the use of securitization is the 
practice in countries where the banking system is weak, i.e. the Netherlands (for 17.5%), Italy 
(12%) and Spain (11.5%).
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which are the most strategic, it is clear that the market is virtually 
nonexistent. For Europe as a whole, the volume issued in 2012 
came to only 45 billion euros out of a stock of securitized loans of 
158 billion.10 Furthermore, a large proportion of this volume 
(approximately 60-70%) was retained by the issuing banks to be 
used as collateral on the repo market, and especially for their refi-
nancing with the ECB. By comparison, note that in this same year 
issues of securitized mortgages came to 224 billion euros and trans-
actions 1000 billion.
The idea of reviving securitization is actually based on the 
assumption, probably a false one, that in the future new regulations 
will make it more difficult and more expensive for banks to finance 
SMEs. But there is no evidence for this. Nor is there any evidence 
that the return demanded by investors on securitized loans (after 
taking into account the price of the operation and the lack of market 
liquidity) is lower than the cost of bank financing. Banks today 
clearly prefer refinancing these loans by recourse to ECB funds or on 
the interbank market rather than through securitization. And when 
interest rates rise, it is likely that the inertia of the cost of bank 
financing, due in particular to the large scale of deposits, will 
increase the comparative advantage of intermediation.
The best way to facilitate SME-ETI financing is undoubtedly to 
make the banking system sound again. If it is necessary to go 
further to improve access to credit for certain businesses, this 
might be done by using special channels to encourage the refi-
nancing of these loans with the central bank or by giving them 
public guarantees. But there is little evidence that securitization 
can help in this area.
2.2. Promoting the development of market financing
One way to overcome the weakness of the banking sector is to 
promote the use of direct financing. In support of such a shift in 
the European financial systems, it can be argued that the weight of 
bank assets in the euro zone is almost triple the level of GDP, while 
this weight in the United States is only 70%. 
10. These figures are found in H. Kraemer-Eis et al. (2013).
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and/or regulatory adjustments to substitute market financing for 
intermediated financing and facilitate a recovery in financing and 
thus investment is very simplistic. This is because, first, in the euro 
zone the difficulties SMEs face in accessing credit affect only a few 
very countries that were hit hard by the crisis (Greece, Portugal, 
Italy and Spain), together with the Netherlands.11 It is very 
doubtful that it would be possible in these countries to create or 
develop markets for these SMEs to obtain financing more easily 
and at a lower cost. Elsewhere the problem of access to credit is 
virtually non-existent. So it is difficult to see how shifting the 
financial system towards a “market-oriented” model would repre-
sent significant progress.
It is true that financing the capital of start-ups or young compa-
nies is a serious problem. But this is a very different issue since the 
activity of capital investment does not much concern the banks 
strictly speaking. It primarily involves the intermediation of “busi-
ness angels”, specialized funds or spin-offs from large companies. 
And it must not be forgotten that equity markets are only margin-
ally a source of capital. They serve, above all, to evaluate 
companies, to facilitate mergers and acquisitions and to ensure the 
liquidity of investments made by venture capital funds. This is 
undoubtedly important for the development of innovations, or at 
least some of them, but it has almost nothing to do with the moti-
vations for the change suggested for Europe’s financial systems or 
the essential problem it poses.
From this point of view it is essential to understand that there 
are institutional complementarities between the structure of the 
financial systems and the economic and social systems in which 
they operate. A “market-oriented” system demands greater 
mobility in the allocation of production factors (and thus more job 
instability) and lower social protection (which is replaced by 
private insurance). An intermediated system, on the other hand, 
11. Cf. on this point the ECB survey on access to credit for SMEs-ETIs in the euro zone (ECB, 
November 2013). For the zone as a whole, more than 70% of companies that requested a loan 
obtained it in whole or in large part. This rate is however on the order of 40% in Greece and the 
Netherlands, and a little over 60% in Spain and Italy. But it is on the order of 90% in Germany 
and Austria and 80% in France, Belgium, and Finland. All data is from between April and 
November 2013.
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their suppliers, and so forth, as is illustrated by the well-known
Mittelstand, which is often used as an example of an organization
in which coordination is based to a large extent on non-market
relationships. These dissimilar financial systems give rise to
different kinds of models of innovation and development, but it is
not possible to establish an a priori hierarchy between them in
terms of efficiency.
What a paradox it would be if the construction of Europe’s
banking union were ultimately to lead to the negation of conti-
nental Europe’s economic and social model.
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DEALING WITH THE ECB’S TRIPLE MANDATE?
Christophe Blot, Jérôme Creel*, Paul Hubert and Fabien Labondance
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* OFCE-Sciences Po and ESCP Europe
The prevailing consensus on the role of central banks has eroded. The 
pursuit of the goal of price stability only is now insufficient to ensure macroe-
conomic and financial stability. A new paradigm emerges in which central 
banks should ensure price stability, growth and financial stability. Recent insti-
tutional developments of the ECB go in this direction since it will be in charge 
of the micro-prudential supervision. In addition, the conduct of monetary 
policy in the euro area shows that the ECB also remained attentive to the evolu-
tion of economic growth. But if the ECB implements its triple mandate, the 
question of the proper relationship between these missions still arises. Coordi-
nation between the different actors in charge of monetary policy, financial 
regulation and fiscal policy is paramount and is lacking in the current architec-
ture. Besides, certain practices should be clarified. The ECB has played a role as 
lender of last resort (towards banks and, to a lesser extent, towards governe-
ments) although this mission was not allocated to the ECB. Finally, in this new 
framework, the ECB suffers from a democratic illegitimacy, reinforced by the 
increasing role it plays in determining the macroeconomic and financial 
balance of the euro area. It seems important that the ECB is more explicit with 
regard to its different objectives and that it fulfils the conditions for close coop-
eration with the budgetary authorities and financial regulators. Finally, we call 
for the ex nihilo creation of a supervisory body of the ECB, which responsibility 
would be to discuss and analyze the relevance of the ECB monetary policy.
The financial crisis which began in 2007 initiated a debate on 
the role of central banks and monetary policy before, during and 
after the economic crisis. In particular, the consensus that had 
prevailed since the 1980s has cracked. It was based on four main 
features:Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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banks; 
— Short-term monetary policy has real effects on growth; 
— The financial stability can be borne by the central bank or 
delegated to another authority, but it remains that, 
according to the Tinbergen principle, these two objectives 
have to be achieved through the use of two independent 
instruments. The objective of price stability is achieved 
through changes in the central bank interest rate while 
financial stability is based on the control of credit institu-
tions via a micro-prudential policy; 
— Price stability leads to financial stability and to macroeco-
nomic stability (around the potential of the economy).
This consensus is now being challenged. The crisis has shown 
that price stability was not sufficient to ensure financial stability1
and could even be a vector of financial imbalances.2 Hence one has 
questioned the role of central banks.3 Should they be concerned 
about financial stability and if so, what is the best instrument to 
achieve it? Several options can be considered. Central banks can 
integrate the objective of financial stability in the conduct of 
monetary policy (the so-called “leaning against the wind” policy). 
In addition to the micro-prudential regulation, central banks may 
implement macro-prudential policy. This differs from a micro-
prudential approach in that it identifies and limits the sources of 
systemic risk.
Moreover, this question must take account of the macro-finan-
cial environment marked by high unemployment in the euro area 
and the increase in public debt. Monetary policy decisions have an 
impact on inflation but also on growth, employment, the 
dynamics of public and private debt and the level of risk in the 
financial system. This article aims at shedding light on these issues 
from a European perspective. If price stability remains the primary 
objective of the ECB, the Maastricht Treaty does not preclude other 
objectives, including growth and employment. Moreover, the 
1. Already claimed by Borio & Lowe (2002) and White (2006).
2. Macroeconomic stability makes it possible for central banks to keep interest rate at a 
moderate and stable level, which leads the financial system to increase its level of leverage and 
vulnerability.
3. See Betbèze et al. (2011).
Dealing with the ECB’s triple mandate? 165implementation of a banking union explicitly devotes a new 
prerogative for the ECB: namely, financial stability. The ECB is 
thus now responsible for banking supervision (micro-prudential 
instrument). The link between the ECB, pursuing different objec-
tives, and other institutions (national governments implementing 
fiscal policy and the European Systemic Risk Board managing 
systematic risk) must be clarified and we show that this link is still 
raising questions.
1. The ECB’s de facto triple mandate
The ECB is de facto dealing with three mandates: price stability, 
growth (employment) and financial stability:
— Price stability has been enshrined in the Treaty (Article 127) 
as the main objective for monetary policy;
— The growth objective is relegated to second rank. The Treaty 
actually states that “without prejudice to the primary objec-
tive of price stability, the ESCB [European System of Central 
Banks] shall support the general policies in the Union”;
— The implementation of a banking union grants the ECB a 
role in financial regulation (Council Decision of the Euro-
pean Union of 15 October 2013). ECB will be in charge of 
banking supervision, micro-prudential policy, as part of a 
SSM (Single supervisory mechanism). Under the new system 
of supervision, the ECB will directly supervise “significant” 
credit institutions. It will assume these new responsabilities 
in Autumn 2014 and will work in close cooperation with 
national competent authorities.
Even if the treaty establishes a clear hierarchy among objectives, 
in practice, the ECB has been concerned with both changes in 
inflation and growth.4 An explicit dual mandate would probably 
be more appropriate. In the US case, Rosengren (2013) considers 
indeed that the dual mandate helps the Federal Reserve to better 
account for expansionary monetary policy in times of crisis, where 
unemployment is very high. In EMU putting equal weights on 
inflation and growth objectives would imply a revision of the 
4. Castro (2011) has recently estimated Taylor rules over 1999:1 et 2007:12 and has found that 
the ECB has significantly reacted to inflation and output gap.
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members. Pragmatic views may then be privileged. Since the defi-
nition of price stability or optimal level of inflation is not clearly 
established,5 the ECB has already sufficient leeway to articulate its 
action appropriately according to the objectives of employment 
and inflation.
Moreover, the decisions of the ECB during the crisis have illus-
trated pragmatism from the ECB. It has notably met the liquidity 
needs of European banks, changing the operational framework 
when it was deemed necessary. The ECB has played a role as lender 
of last resort for banks, although this task is not included in its 
mandate. Larger defaults resulting from the liquidity crisis could 
then be avoided. The ECB created a very long term refinancing 
operation (VLTRO) by which it provided funds to credit institu-
tions for a 3 years period. It was not only important to cover 
liquidity needs but also allowed banks to support sovereign debt 
market. Under the SMP (Securities Market Program), the ECB 
proceeded to purchases of public securities in the secondary 
market. This program and the OMT6 announcement (Outright 
Monetary Transactions), that has followed in September 2012, 
have illustrated the will of the ECB to tackle the sovereign debt 
crisis. It has shown that the ECB was able to avoid a narrow inter-
pretation of its mandate and missions.7 This was notably justified 
by the need to restore the transmission channels of monetary 
policy, that had been impaired by the financial turmoils on sover-
eign debt markets (Cour-Thiman and Winkler, 2013). More 
recently, Mr. Draghi has adopted a forward guidance strategy, in 
which the central bank announces that it maintains its main 
interest rate at a level close to zero for an extended period. The aim 
is to drive expectations of interest rates, and thus enhance the 
transmission of monetary policy. This new communication breaks 
with past speeches ECB in which the ECB did not commit on 
future interest rate decisions.
5. See Billi & Kahn (2008), for example.
6. The ECB may buy unlimited amounts of sovereign bonds issued by countries which are 
under EFSF – ESM programs.
7. It should nevertheless be remind that these decisions have generated considerable debate, 
including the Board of Governors. J. Weidman, president of the Bundesbank, had notably made 
clear his opposition to the outright purchases of government securities.
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action reflects broader concerns. The ECB has focused on both 
inflation and growth. It has contributed to financial stability, as 
should do a lender of last resort. In addition, recent regulatory 
decisions will increase its powers giving the ECB the micro-pruden-
tial supervision of the banking system. The ECB therefore pursues 
three objectives.
2. A Work in progress
If the triple mandate proves to be right, the question of the 
proper relationship between these missions still arises. The tradeoff 
between inflation and growth is already duly integrated into the 
action of the ECB. Press releases routinely evoke the balance of 
risks between inflation and growth. In the current context of a 
deflation risk, the ECB could build on its forward-guidance strategy 
to make explicit a target for unemployment. This choice, made by 
the Bank of England (BoE) would clarify the communication 
strategy of the ECB since the stance of monetary policy would 
become contingent to a threshold on a direct observable variable 
(Bank of England, 2013). The action taken by the BoE indicates 
that such a decision is not inconsistent with an inflation target or a 
mandate focused on price stability.
Another tradeoff arises regarding the relationship between 
monetary policy and micro-prudential policy. It is common for 
central banks to be jointly responsible for the conduct of monetary 
policy and for banking supervision (Netherlands, Spain, United 
States in particular). Central banks have some expertise of banking 
monitoring since they collect information for their monetary policy 
operations. Given the link between the two objectives, a single 
institution in charge of these two objectives appears more effective 
to internalize interdependencies. Finally, to the extent that the ECB 
is the lender of last resort for banks, it is desirable that it has the 
necessary information and powers to meet liquidity needs.
Moreover, if the SSM provides the ECB with prerogatives in 
terms of micro-prudential policy, the implementation of macro-
prudential policy amounts to a new institution: the ESRB (Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board). This new tool is essential insofar as the 
supervision of financial institutions at the individual level is insuf-
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whole. However, the ESRB is only a proposal body. The macro-
prudential policy implementation, through restrictions on the 
loan-to-value ratio, is ultimately up to the Member States which 
shall notify and coordinate their decisions with the ECB. Because 
there is a strong complementarity between monetary policy and 
macro-prudential policy, it would have been more appropriate for 
this task to be handled by the ECB, especially as some regulatory 
tools, such as capital requirements, can be seen as part of both 
macro- and micro-prudential policies. Moreover, it is likely that 
with the macro-prudential tool, the ECB would have been able to 
reduce the asymmetries resulting from the implementation of a 
common monetary policy in a structurally heterogeneous area. 
Between 2001 and 2007, the ECB interest rate was probably too 
high for Germany and too low for Spain. The housing bubble in 
Spain (or Ireland) could have been avoided if appropriate restric-
tions on credit growth and loan-to-value ratios had been 
implemented. Similarly, the monetary authorities could have 
sounded the alarm about the hypertrophy of Irish or Cypriot 
banking systems.
Furthermore, the ECB will have to be transparent on the link it 
intends to do between its monetary policy and financial stability 
actions. The principle of strict separation of instruments is ques-
tioned in favour of a so-called integrated policy-mix in which the 
central bank may decide to use its conventional instrument (the 
interest rate) for financial risk considerations. To this end, the ECB 
might amend its second pillar about monitoring a monetary aggre-
gate to assess risks to medium-term price stability. Its monetarist 
bias is no longer relevant given the downward trend in money 
velocity, and could be transformed to reflect a set of signals (credit 
growth, level of financial system leverage, debt of non-financial 
agents, real estate prices, etc.) about financial and monetary risks.
The question of the lender and buyer of last resort should be 
clarified. The ECB has played this role for banks while it was not 
specifically in charge of this mission. The question is even more 
acute for the sovereign debt market to the extent that governments 
are subject to liquidity risks (Buiter and Rahbari, 2012 or De 
Grauwe, 2011). Since illiquidity causes problems of macroeco-
nomic, financial and social instability, it becomes justified to 
Dealing with the ECB’s triple mandate? 169guard against this risk through central bank intervention. The 
panic on sovereign debt markets has been a major threat for the 
euro area. De Grauwe (2012) points out that the fragility of the 
members of a monetary union is increased because its entities are 
in fact indebted in a currency they have no control over. The SMP 
implementation and the OMT announcement in the euro area or 
the BoE and Fed interventions have shown that this type of meas-
ures is essential for the effectiveness of monetary policy and to 
mitigate risks of financial instability. While the ECB has acted 
pragmatically, it remains that the doctrine on this issue must be 
stated. In the absence of further fiscal integration, the formaliza-
tion of the role of lender and buyer of last resort attributed to the 
ECB, for both banks and governments, should be considered. 
Finally, it is crucial that future ECB monetary policies are not 
conditioned by the attitude or psychology of the central banker in 
charge, sometimes pragmatic, sometimes dogmatic, as uncertainty 
harms central bank credibility and the anchoring of expectations.8
De facto, central banks own and manage a large amount of 
public debt (Blommestein and Turner, 2012), a task that they 
already fulfilled in the past (Goodhart, 2010). The implementation 
of unconventional monetary policy reinforces the interactions 
between monetary and fiscal policies and raises the problematic of 
their coordination. But, nowadays, none of European institutions 
are in capacity to built such coordination. Decentralised fiscal poli-
cies increase the challenge to create it. Nevertheless this is crucial. 
Moreover, we have to raise the question of ECB’s independence 
and its democratic accountability. The current architecture gives 
the ECB a very strong independence both in terms of means and 
objectives. An enlargement of ECB’s missions to the financial 
sphere gives to the central bank an essential role in the determina-
tion of Eurozone’s macroeconomic and financial equilibrium. The 
question of its democratic legitimacy (a debate already evoked by 
J. Stiglitz in 1998) becomes even more accurate. On this subject, 
8. This personalization of monetary policy passes on to Bernanke et al. (2001) that despite a 
sort of de facto inflation targeting by the Federal Reserve, in particular under the mandate of A. 
Greenspan, it was important to establish a de jure inflation targeting: whatever the personality 
and charisma of the U.S. central banker, the implementation of her/his action in a clearly 
defined institutional framework would promote the credibility of the commitment to achieve 
the Fed’s dual mandate.
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responsibilities, central banks are even more subject to political 
pressures and they need additional protections to guarantee their 
action. This is the idea defended by the CIEPR (2011). In this case, 
ECB’s independence has to be maintained and may be reinforced. 
At the opposite of this position, one can imagine that ECB’s 
mandates along with the current macroeconomic and financial 
context plead for a re-examination of central banks’ independence 
in order to insure a better democratic control. We can recall that 
independence is nor a historical constant (e.g. Forder, 1998), 
neither necessary to insure stability (e.g. Hayo, 1998). Finally, in 
the European perspective, a third way could be to protect ECB’s 
independence in terms of means but to modify its independence in 
terms of objectives. Objectives of price stability, employment and 
financial stability could be decided regularly, coordinated and 
democratically controlled. In the US, this control is exerted by the 
congress. At the European level, the situation is more complex 
because the European Parliament gathered not only eurodeputies 
from Eurozone’s countries. This institution has thus to be invented.   
3. A subsidiary question: the exchange rate policy
ECB’s actions in order to facilitate the recovery and to correct 
the imbalances could use exchange rate policy. The Maastricht 
Treaty gives to the European Council the power to formulate 
general orientations for exchange rate policy. But before that, a 
consensus has to be reached in the Eurogroup that requires 
homogenous preferences. And after, the ECB will accept these 
recommendations only if it doesn’t undermine its primary objec-
tive. These institutional arrangements lead in fine to a capture 
(Cartapanis, 2006) or a “quiet hold-up” of the exchange rate policy 
by the ECB (Creel et al., 2007). This issue is essential since there is 
currently an international currency war at the expense of the euro. 
A euro depreciation could be an efficient remedy to help stimulate 
growth, via more exports, and to alleviate deflation risks. More-
over, a decrease of the euro could have asymmetric rebalancing 
effects. Blot & Cochard (2008) estimate export price elasticity and 
suggest that a decrease of the European single currency could be 
first in favour of the Spanish exports and then help the French 
ones and lastly the German.9 An active exchange rate policy could 
Dealing with the ECB’s triple mandate? 171then be effective in reducing the heterogeneities into the Eurozone 
without envisaging a termination of the monetary union or 
competitive devaluations in each member states that only exacer-
bate deflation. In the short run, a consensus between governments 
is a chimera. Nevertheless, it is now recognized that the ECB’s 
monetary policy is too restrictive given the macroeconomic 
context (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2014). A more expansionist mone-
tary policy could allow a depreciation of the euro. 
4. Conclusion and policy recommendations
We have emphasized that the ECB has actually followed three 
objectives. However, the articulation between these objectives 
needs clarification. To this end, we provide the following 
recommendations:
1. Without modification of existing treaties, it is important for 
the ECB to be more explicit on the different objectives. The 
priority given to the objective of price stability does not 
seem now to match the practice of monetary policy. The 
growth objective is essential, as well as financial stability. 
More transparency would make monetary policy more cred-
ible and more effective. It would help to prevent from future 
financial and banking crisis. Exchange rate policy should not 
be overlooked because it can redound to the reduction of 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.
2. In the absence of such clarification, extensive independence 
of the ECB should be challenged to better match the interna-
tional standards in this area. Central banks have rarely 
independence objective: for example, the Federal Reserve 
pursues an explicit dual mandate, while inflation targeting is 
institutionalized for the BoE. An explicit triple mandate 
could be imposed on the ECB, in charge of the governing 
Council to deal with the tradeoff between these objectives.
3. Yet, the difficulty to handle this tradeoff increases with the 
number of objectives. This difficulty is amplified in the 
current context of high public debt and where central banks 
9. More recently, Héricourt et al. (2014) find however that the differences between the French 
and the German price elasticity are very small.
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mandate of the ECB should explicitly mention the role of 
lender of last resort, the usual task of central banks, which 
would clarify the need for a closer coordination between 
governments and the ECB. 
4. Rather than questioning the total independence of the ECB, 
which never get unanimity among the Member States, we 
call for the set up ex nihilo of a supervisory body of the ECB, 
responsible for discussing and analyzing the relevance of the 
conduct of monetary policy under the broader objectives of 
the ECB: price stability, growth, financial stability and 
sustainability of public finances.
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HIGH INEQUALITY AND ITS IMPACT ON 
THE ECONOMY: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS1
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OFCE-Sciences Po, SGPP-Jakarta, SEP-LUISS
This brief argues that increasing inequality had deep macroeconomic conse-
quences as it contributed, in combination with credit institutions, to either 
stagnating aggregate demand or to increasing public and private debt. 
Inequality may also contribute, along with supply factors, to the drifting 
towards secular stagnation. Income distribution would then be one of the major 
determinants of the increasing global imbalances that made the world economy 
extremely fragile at the outset of the crisis. The crisis in turn exacerbated 
inequality, especially in peripheral Eurozone countries. The path towards 
sustainable future growth passes therefore for a reduction of inequality that, in 
particular in European countries, needs to be coordinated. Finally, if rent-
seeking plays an important role in the past increase of inequality, then active 
fiscal policies and regulation need to be part of the effort to curb inequality.
1. Why the increase in inequality since the 1970s? 
It is widely established that inequality increased substantially, 
both in developed and in emerging economies, starting from the 
late 1970s (IMF, 2007; OECD, 2008; Piketty and Saez, 2013; 
Piketty, 2013; Piketty et al., 2011) In some countries, in particular 
in Europe and in the US, those who lost ground were the middle 
classes, while in others (e.g. China) were the very poor. But in all 
1. Paper presented at the workshop “Réformer l’Europe”, Paris, January 9, 2014. The 
intellectual debt to my coauthors, in particular Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Jean-Luc Gaffard, is 
evident. All errors remain mine. This research project benefited from funding from the 
European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement 
n°320278 (RASTANEWS).Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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rich (the top one percent of the population, see Figure 1), giving 
birth to what Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) defined the “Super-
star Economy”.
In the past decades, the increase of inequality was mostly 
ignored by mainstream economists. This is explained by the 
revival of the neoclassical tradition, after the crisis of Keynesian 
economics in the 1970s. The neoclassical theory relies on the tradi-
tional textbook dichotomy between efficiency and fairness in the 
allocation of resources, which in turn is rooted in a fundamental 
tenet of the theory: the equality between productive factors’ remu-
neration and their marginal product. Productivity is an “objective” 
criterion for determining the efficient allocation of resources 
among participants to the economy. This has the very strong 
implication that the social desirability of such an allocation, its 
fairness, is not a concern for the economist. Sociologists and polit-
ical scientists may of course prone redistribution on the basis of 
extra-economic concerns, like social stability, fairness, and the 
like. Economists only need to make sure that such redistribution 
does not introduce distortions, i.e. that it does not break the link 
between marginal productivity and factor’s income.
Within this traditional view, two related phenomena would 
help explain the increase of inequality. The first is the skill bias 
introduced by the recent waves of technological progress. The 
impact of the IT revolution was unequal, affecting the productivity 
of high-skilled workers more than that of those with no or little 
education (Katz and Autor, 1999; Rajan, 2010) Diverging wages 
would therefore reflect the widening productivity gap. The second 
phenomenon impacting wage inequality is globalization. Low-
skilled workers entering the global labour market from emerging 
and developing economies lowered the average marginal produc-
tivity of labour, thus lowering its share of national income with 
respect to capital. Furthermore, the increase of competition in 
labour markets reduced the bargaining power of on unions and 
wage setters. Taken together, skill-biased technical progress and 
increased competition in global labour markets could explain 
increasing (wage) inequality as an unavoidable process that policy 
was not supposed to address, if not at the price of reduced effi-
ciency and growth. The idea that the “tide lifts all boats” would 
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very high incomes that accompanied the two prosperous decades 
1990s and 2000s. The traditional view also admits other drivers of 
inequality, for example imperfect financial markets that prevent 
liquidity constrained agents from investing in human capital. 
These, nevertheless, are easily dealt with, once structural reforms 
limit market imperfections.
The financial crisis challenged the traditional view, among 
other things because in spite of the heavy hit taken by the financial 
sector, it disproportionately hit middle and low incomes (OFCE, 
IMK and ECLM, 2014; OECD, 2011). In particular, Galbraith 
(2012) and Stiglitz (2013) argue convincingly that much more 
than the “fundamentals”, like globalization and technological 
progress, what accounts for most of the increase of inequality in 
the past decades is the rise of predatory behavior. Precisely because 
the elites have been appropriating more than a fair share of 
national wealth, increasing inequality has been hampering well-
being and distorting the economy. The rise of rent-seeking and 
predatory behaviour has coincided with the paramount role played 
by an increasingly deregulated financial sector, where the discon-
Figure 1. Average change in income shares for different percentiles, 1980-2007
In %
Note: Unweighted average of the following countries: SP, DK, NZ, FR, SW, NL, UK, IR, SG, SD, IT, JP, US.
Source: Author’s calculation on data from the Piketty and Saez Top income database.
Top 10%
Top 5%
Top 1%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Francesco Saraceno180nect between wages and marginal productivity quickly became 
evident. Empirical evidence also seems to run counter the tradi-
tional view. Recent work (see e.g. Ostry et al., 2014) shows that 
there is a robust negative correlation between inequality and 
growth and that, as a corollary, countries with some form of redis-
tributive policies in place tend to grow faster.
Emphasizing rent-seeking (Gaffard and Saraceno, 2014) helps 
explain why the increase of income inequality in the past decades 
benefited the very top incomes (Piketty et al., 2011);² more impor-
tantly, it also highlights the importance of policy choices. The 
economic power of the elites and the conservative revolution in 
politics mutually reinforced each other, leading to increasingly less 
progressive tax systems, and to a downsizing of the welfare state. 
(Creel and Saraceno, 2010; Hacker and Pierson, 2010). Rent-
seeking and the excessive weight of finance in GDP seem more 
convincing than the traditional view in explaining the rise of the 
superstar economy. 
2. The crisis, debt, and inequality
At the outset of crisis, in the summer of 2007, the world 
economy was in a situation of structural weakness, caused by the 
progressive accumulation of external imbalances. Some countries, 
most notably the United States and peripheral European countries 
had an excess of demand over domestic production, shown by 
increasingly important trade deficits. This deficit was financed by 
the excess savings that, with different causes, characterized other 
regions like East Asia, oil producing countries, and last but not least 
core European countries. These opposite imbalances compensated 
each other for almost two decades, resulting in an overall balance 
that the crisis showed to be fragile. Excessive debt of the deficit 
countries, be it public or private, suddenly became a burden that 
triggered a race to deleveraging and a generalized drop in spending.
Inequality has a large role to play in explaining the accumula-
tion of debt (Charpe et al., 2009; Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; 
Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010, 2011). The transfer of resources from 
the poor and the middle class to the wealthiest, i.e. from those who 
consume almost all of their income to those who have a high 
propensity to save, caused a reduction in the average propensity to 
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effects, that both played a role in the current crisis. The first is a 
huge mass of liquidity that fuelled a series of speculative bubbles. 
High returns in finance, and its increasing weight in GDP triggered 
a vicious loop by which no real sector investment could compete 
with the yields offered by the financial sector. Resources were 
therefore diverted from productive uses of savings into financial 
assets whose value was artificially inflated. The tendency of 
advanced economies to jump from bubble to bubble can therefore 
be explained, among other things, by the increase of inequality 
(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011; Galbraith, 2012; Stiglitz, 2013).
The second effect of income redistribution towards the very 
rich, is a chronic tendency to depressed aggregate demand. At the 
IMF Fall 2013 annual meeting Larry Summers conjectured that 
advanced economies in the future will face a low, possibly nega-
tive, equilibrium interest rates, that may lead to a “new normal” 
made of hard choices between unstable, debt-driven growth, and a 
quasi-depressed economy. A number of factors, from aging and 
demographics to slowing technical progress, may support the 
conjecture that globally we may be facing permanently higher 
levels of savings and lower levels of investment, leading to nega-
tive natural rates of interest.
Summers’ conjecture has been widely discussed. Surprisingly, 
the focus was mostly on supply side factors; the long run tendency 
of the propensity to consume to decrease because of inequality was 
not mentioned in the discussion. And yet, redistribution, by 
compressing aggregate demand, may have contributed, along with 
demographics and slowing innovation, to the slow drifting of the 
global economy towards secular stagnation.
 But how did inequality contribute to global imbalances, which 
we claim above are among the structural causes of the crisis?
3. From inequality to structural imbalances
How could the same phenomenon, increased inequality and 
the resulting compression of aggregate demand, lead in some areas 
to excess savings, and in others to excess demand? The answer to 
this apparent paradox lies in the interaction of the trend in income 
distribution, common to all countries, with institutional differ-
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different forms. In the US the reduction in income was offset by 
private borrowing favoured by a less regulated financial system, 
but also by a widespread perception of "end of history” which led 
to believe that all constraints the unlimited growth of some sectors 
(finance, real estate) had been permanently removed (Cynamon 
and Fazzari, 2008). Consequently, aggregate demand (consump-
tion and investment) remained high, even if increasingly financed 
out of debt and not out of income. This did not happen in most of 
Europe, where stricter regulation of financial markets, and less 
accommodating monetary policies, made borrowing for house-
holds and firms more difficult. Fiscal policy was also generally 
more restrictive in European countries, constrained by the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Stability Pact, while the United States, where 
the welfare system and automatic stabilizers are less developed, 
fiscal policies had to be more active to reduce fluctuations of 
income (Creel and Saraceno, 2010). 
Thus, the downwards pressure on aggregate demand, prompted 
by growing inequality in income distribution, was hidden in the 
U.S. (and to a lesser extent in peripheral European countries) by 
increasing private and public indebtedness (which led to strong but 
ultimately unsustainable growth); in Europe (mainly continental), 
higher costs of borrowing, and greater inertia of macroeconomic 
policy have prevented an adequate level of aggregate demand, and 
the result was a long period of soft growth. The U.S. growth was 
financed by European savings and in turn lifted the old continent 
with its imports, at least partially compensating insufficient 
domestic demand. The excess of savings in other areas (East Asia, 
oil producing countries) also helped to perpetuate this delicate 
balance, which nevertheless was sooner or later doomed to break.
While there is no hard evidence about the interaction of institu-
tions and inequality in explaining different patterns of 
indebtedness and growth, we can look at some stylized facts. 
Figure 2, taken from Fitoussi and Saraceno, (2011), shows that 
countries where short term (consumption) loans increased more in 
the decade leading to the crisis, are the ones in which growth over 
the period 1995-2007 was more robust. This points to a growth rate 
driven by domestic consumption and debt, bound to be fragile.
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If income inequality contributed to building imbalances and to 
an increasingly fragile economy, the ensuing crisis in turn exacer-
bated inequality. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 mainly hit asset 
prices, thus having a major impact on the richest layers of the 
income distribution. This was short-lasted, nevertheless, as the 
prolonged recession, and the jobless recovery that followed, 
quickly restored, and further deepened the distance between the 
rich on one side and the middle and lower classes on the other 
(OECD, 2011). Piketty and Saez’s Top Incomes Database unfortu-
nately does not yet have data for 2012, except for a handful of 
countries. One of them is the United States, where it is clear that 
after the initial drop all top percentiles of the distribution recov-
ered. As a consequence the income share of the top 10% is today 
one percentage point above its pre-crisis peak (Figure 3).
The impact of the crisis on income inequality is particularly 
evident in Europe, where the sovereign debt crisis was met with 
draconian austerity plans and painful supply side reforms. The 
consequence was a double-dip recession from which the Eurozone 
is barely recovering. While top incomes and profits are today at the 
Figure 2. Cumulate change in household short term loans vs change in real GDP, 
1995-2007
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Source: OECD.
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Francesco Saraceno184pre-crisis level, output is well below its peak, and the social fabric is 
seriously deteriorated. Unemployment and poverty hit in 
particular the weakest part of the population (OFCE, IMK and 
ECLM, 2014). 
5. What policies to reverse the trend?
High inequality may be becoming the new normal (Piketty, 
2013). Furthermore, If Summers’ secular stagnation conjecture is 
correct, the pattern that led to the crisis is bound to be repeated in 
the future, as different countries will react differently to declining 
potential growth. A durable rebalancing of the global economy can 
only happen if we manage to escape chronically depressed aggre-
gate demand. This means that as long as domestic imbalances are 
not reabsorbed, both in surplus and in deficit countries, there is 
little hope for achieving structurally solid growth. It is also an illu-
sion to think that a mere realignment of exchange rates (real or 
nominal) would solve the problem, which originates in domestic 
disequilibria. While increasing popular, the option of more or less 
orderly eurexits would hardly allow contrasting the tendency 
towards secular stagnation of which inequality is one of the drivers.
Figure 3. Evolution of top income shares including capital gains – United States
In %                                                                                                                                                  In %
Source: Author’s calculation on data from the Piketty and Saez Top income database.
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may turn out to be the easiest lever to pull in order to fight secular 
stagnation. Demographic factors, or innovation trends, are hard to 
govern and to orient. Inequality can instead be tackled by acting 
on multiple levels:
1. Increase the progressiveness of the tax system, in particular 
for high and very high incomes. This should happen in a 
coordinated way to avoid excessive high-skill workers 
mobility.
2. Renew the focus on the provision of public goods, particu-
larly intangible ones such as education and health.
3. Strengthen the insurance role of the government. The trend 
towards reduced importance of automatic stabilization 
should be reversed.
These measures mostly pertain to the national level. Neverthe-
less some form of coordination, at least at the European level, 
would be necessary to avoid tax competition, wage deflation, and 
social dumping, the modern versions of beggar thy neighbor poli-
cies. The reduction of income and consumption inequality would 
stabilize the economic cycle and reduce aggregate savings. This 
would allow for growth rates that may be less remarkable than in 
the past, but certainly more sustainable and equitable.
Three specific proposals, aired in the past few months, should 
become concrete legislative acts in the next European Parliament 
legislature:
1. A European Unemployment subsidy, to be adopted along-
side existing national ones. While not flawless, a good 
starting point, could be the Commission proposal of October 
2nd, 2013 (European Commission, 2013). This would intro-
duce solidarity among Member countries, contribute to fight 
macroeconomic divergence, and help dampen inequality.
2. Introduce a European minimum wage (OFCE, IMK et ECLM, 
2014), to sustain labour income and make tax competition 
harder.
3. Introduce a European corporate tax, also a way to limit tax 
competition, and possibly a way to finance an enhanced 
European budget (see Jacques Le Cacheux or Maitrot de la 
Motte in this issue).
Francesco Saraceno186It is important to stress in conclusion that rethinking the role of 
tax policies is unavoidable. Efforts on capacity building, like on-job 
training and education, are always useful; but, if as Galbraith and 
Stiglitz argue the main cause of inequality is rent-seeking behavior, 
then curbing this through appropriate active fiscal policies 
becomes paramount. This also means that in Europe, prior to the 
implementation of specific economic measures we need a change 
in the political culture that dominated the European construction 
since the Maastricht Treaty.
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Europe is seen as the engine of public policy on gender equality, particularly 
through Member States’ implementation of EU law into national law. Strad-
dling legislative components and soft law instruments (such as a cross-cutting 
approach and promoting “best practices”), EU gender equality policies repre-
sent a vantage point for analyzing the Europeanization process. We shall begin 
by discussing the specificity of national situations before analyzing the transna-
tional dimension of the EU law on non-discrimination. We shall then look at 
European equality policies by looking at current debate including: issues 
surrounding the European employment Strategy, connections between hard 
law and soft law, gender equality and Europeanization.
In affirming the “principle of equal pay, without discrimina-
tion based on sex”, Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome embodies the 
founding dimension of gender equality in the European project. In 
this way, EU texts – from the Common Market to the internal 
market, and then to integration – place gender equality at the 
crossroads of economics, law and politics. 
After highlighting how diverse the situation is in different coun-
tries, we will present the ways in which European policy on 
equality addresses this through EU law on non-discrimination. We 
then take up the debates provoked by policy changes, both in 
regards to the aims (supporting growth, demographic targets, the Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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implementation (between the non-binding open method of coor-
dination and the binding legal corpus, as well as between roadmaps 
and charters on the one hand and directives on the other).
1. Gender inequality in Europe
Inequalities between women and men take multiple forms, 
whether in the area of employment, political representation, 
reconciliation, the private sphere (in particular the sharing of 
household and parental tasks), violence, contraception and abor-
tion laws, etc. 
1.1.  A wide range of differences among countries
To take just two examples, the employment rate of women 
ranges from 45.2% in Greece to 76.8% in Sweden (an average of 
62.4% in the EU27), and the rate of part-time work ranges from 
2.5% in Bulgaria to 76.9% in the Netherlands (an average of 32.1% 
in the EU27). The employment rate in terms of full-time equivalent 
is fluctuating between 42% in Malta and 69% in Sweden (an 
average of 53% in the UE27). The gender gap in employment rates 
(of all durations) varies from 1.5 points in Lithuania, to 32.2 points 
in Malta (an average of 12.2 points in the EU27).1
The rate of women’s participation in government is 54% in 
Sweden but only 7% in Slovakia; in the national parliaments, it 
varies between 43% in Sweden and 16% in Greece (with an average 
of 24.7%).2
These are only snapshots, but the figures do demonstrate none-
theless the size of the gap in the situation among different 
countries.
1.2.  National “compromises”
Discrepancies among countries are the result of a number of 
factors based on different gender arrangements (Dauphin, 2011; 
Letablier, 2009):
1. 2012 data, 20-64 years, source: Eurostat.
2. 2012 data, source: Eurostat.
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which women have been integrated into the labour market 
including both full or part-time forms;
— a welfare state regime;
— “models of articulation” between professional and private 
spheres, which determine the impact of parenthood on 
employment;
— work-share and flexible scheduling policies;
— social protection system (family or individual-based);
— social transformations of the family and of parenthood;
— national public policy, whether regarding coordination poli-
cies (childcare facilities for young children, school schedules, 
or parental leave plans and eligibility conditions for family 
benefits), or the way in which countries provide the means 
to achieve the targets of the European employment Strategy, 
particularly the employment rate target;
— methods of adjusting employment during periods of 
economic crisis (adjustment in work time or in internal or 
external flexibility).
At the European level, the “reconciliation between professional, 
private and family life” has four segments (Math, 2013, 2009): 
parental leave, childcare facilities for very young children, inde-
pendent women workers and assisting spouses, and maternity 
leave. As regards childcare facilities, in 2002 the European Council 
meeting in Barcelona established targets of 33% for children under 
the age of three and 90% for those over age three. The summations 
at the end of the first decade of 2000 demonstrate the discrepan-
cies both among the various countries and in the prerogatives of 
countries, some of which do not feel bound by simple recommen-
dations. In the 2010 Directive of the European Council on parental 
leave, which is formally more binding, the question of pay is left 
vague, which is a significant limitation. The directive on maternity 
extended the length of leave (14 weeks). Thus between the 
minimum standard for maternity leave and the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of States on childcare arrangements, the impact of European 
policies has been limited and inconsistent. The 2008 “reconcilia-
tion package” has done little to align the countries in this matter. 
The analysis of the gendered division of social roles is thus an 
issue in the policy choice, whether economic (structural or 
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fiscal, social, etc., from which the roles arise and which they 
reflect. How does the gendered dimension of public policy choices 
apply nationally and transnationally, especially within the EU 
(Jacquot, 2009, 2013)?
2. European equality policy
Europe is the engine for public policy on gender equality 
(Dominguez Alcon, Forest and Sénac, 2013; Kantola, 2010), in 
particular through Member States’ application of EU law in their 
national law. The application of the primary law of the European 
treaties3 and of the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
associated with the transposition of EU directives4 and with the 
impact of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on 
national jurisprudence (Sénac-Slawinski, 2006). Europe also sets 
out the multiannual strategy, the aims of which range from the 
economic independence of women to the eradication of violence. 
However, in the absence of any binding means, these aims remain 
general and are not achieved.
2.1. Cross-cutting community legal and institutional framework
Pay inequality between male and female workers is the leading 
factor in the inequality of treatment among salaried workers that 
EU law addresses specifically, “through Article 119 in particular of 
the Treaty of Rome (which became the current Article 141), which 
the European Court of Justice held was directly applicable since 
1971 (Defrenne judgement of 25 May 1971), but the sphere of 
which is limited to pay equality, with protection subsequently 
extended by the 1976 directive (76/207) to all recruitment, 
training and working conditions” (Bailly, 2004:83).
Since 1979 gender equality has been one of the values that the 
Council of Europe has the mission of protecting and promoting, as 
3. Cf. in particular Article 1bis and Article 2 paragraph 3 of the European Union Treaty, as well 
as Article 8 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
4. Cf. in particular, Directive 75/117/CE of 10 February 1975 on equality of pay and Directive 
2006/54/CE of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation 
of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast). 
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laid out in the two main legal instruments of the Council of 
Europe: the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the European Social 
Charter (1961). 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of 7 December 2000, as 
adapted on 12 December 2007 in Strasburg, has the same legal 
value as the treaties.5 It stipulates that “everyone is equal before 
the law” (Article 20), that “any discrimination based on sex shall 
be prohibited” (Article 21), and that “equality between men and 
women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work 
and pay” (Article 23). 
The 2007 Lisbon Treaty establishes gender equality as one of the 
common values and aims of the Member States of the Union 
(Article 1bis and 2).
The principle of non-discrimination in pay laid out in the fair 
competition framework, which was a condition of the Common 
Market and then of the single market, is thus now a general prin-
ciple of non-discrimination. It is embodied institutionally by the 
fact that the equality policy, initially under the DG for Employ-
ment, is now the responsibility of the DG for Justice.
2.2. The three phases of the gender equality approach: from legal 
equality to positive action and to gender mainstreaming
The normative framework for measuring gender equality is 
clarified by a recommendation “on the promotion of positive 
action for women” (84/635/EEC) adopted by the Council of 
European Ministers on 13 December 1984. The reports set out by 
the European Commission in 1988 and 1995 regret that in the 
absence of any binding measures, positive action is at best a public 
policy instrument and not a legal pillar of equal opportunity. 
Article 19, the former Article 13 TEC, stipulates that “The European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, may adopt the basic principles of 
Union incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States, to support action taken 
5. Cf. Article 6 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Françoise Milewski and Réjane Sénac194by the Member States” “in order to combat all forms of 
discrimination based on sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or 
beliefs, disabilities, age or sexual orientation.” Article 23 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights on gender equality states that “the 
principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or 
adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour 
of the under-represented sex”. 
Teresa Rees (2002) analyzes the EU legal non-discrimination 
framework by identifying three phases that are both chronological 
and theoretical: equality of treatment in the 1970s, giving way to 
positive actions in the 1980s and to gender mainstreaming in the 
1990s. She associates equality before the law with a form of 
“tinkering” with what exists, while the adaptation of the rule of 
law to differences in the situation of each person through adopting 
specific measures is considered to be “tailoring”. Gender main-
streaming (Dauphin and Sénac-Slawinski, 2008) for its part is 
associated with transformation in so far as it is positioned above 
both isonomy and corrective equality. Indeed, it “should ideally 
make it possible to identify systems and structures at the origin of 
indirect discrimination and rethink them in order to find 
remedies” (Rees, 2002: 46–48).
Challenging any unequivocal or ideal definition, Judith Squires 
analyzes the scope and practical limits of this concept-method by 
offering three possible approaches: a new strategy to change public 
policy (transformation), a bureaucratic instrument to integrate 
gender (inclusion), and a process of adding it to the agenda 
(displacement). Her thinking emphasizes the need to reflect on 
gender inequality and discrimination in relation to other forms 
of discrimination.
2.3. Contributions of EU law: indirect discrimination and sharing 
the burden of proof 
Pierre Bailly, senior judge at the Social Division of France’s Cour 
de Cassation, outlines four points regarding the main contribu-
tions of EU jurisprudence to French jurisprudence in the matter of 
equality between men and women workers: the method of veri-
fying inequalities by introducing the concept of indirect 
discrimination; evidentiary rules to be applied; possible justifica-
tions of differential treatment; and the issue of “positive” 
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as characterizing the approach to equality by EU law, express a
common goal: to give full effect to the prohibition of discrimina-
tion between men and women workers by changing the rules of 
evidence. “After 1980 the EU judge … has recourse to the notion of 
indirect discrimination: the application of an apparently neutral 
criterion, foreign to the sexual identity of the salaried employee 
and establishing differential treatment between workers, can in 
reality conceal discrimination towards persons of a particular sex. 
For instance, if a collective agreement denies part-time workers the 
benefit of an end-of-the-year bonus and if in reality it turns out 
that this category is primarily made up of women, it will be an 
example of indirect discrimination. (ECJ, 9 September 1999, 
Krüger, no C 281/97)” (Bailly, 2004: 83). ECJ jurisprudence 
considers in fact that as soon as differential treatment statistically 
affects a majority of workers of the same sex, unjustified by objec-
tive facts, this represents indirect discrimination. It has ruled in 
particular that a difference in taking into consideration the 
seniority of the full- and part-time workers is discriminatory.6
In addition, EU Directive 97/80 of 15 December 1997 and EU 
jurisprudence7 impel the States to transpose the principle of 
sharing the burden of proof. “The main judgments of the Court 
have been about equality in pay. These include the Danfoss, 
Enderby and Royal Copenhagen cases, as well as the Bilka judge-
ment” (Lanquetin, 1998: 688). 
2.4. Multiannual strategy
The priority areas for action are defined in the roadmaps and 
the multiannual strategy. These reflect the changes in targets and 
priorities. The first one, dated 1 March 2006, sets out six areas for 
action for the 2006-2010 period: 
— equal economic independence for women and men;
— reconciliation of professional, family and private life;
— equal representation in decision-making;
— eradication of all forms of gender-based violence and slavery;
— eliminating gender-based stereotypes in society; 
— promoting gender equality outside the European Union. 
6. EJC 7 February 1991, case C. 184/89 (Nimz), Rec. I, p. 91.
7. EJC 13 May 1986, Bilka, case 170/84; EJC, 27 October 1993, Enderby, case C-127/92.
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It is now part of the Europe 2020 strategy. The priorities are similar, 
except that reconciliation disappeared from the six priority areas 
for action (although it is still covered by the instruments) and is 
replaced by equal pay.
Another sign of the times, the equality policy which throughout 
the 1970s and 80s was part of the free competition framework, was 
in 2006 included in the growth and employment programmes as 
well as those dealing with demographic changes. The Roadmap 
clarifies that not only is gender equality a fundamental right and a 
common value of the European Union, but also a necessary condi-
tion for attaining the EU’s goals for growth, employment and social 
cohesion (EC, 2007): “The Pact demonstrates the Member States' 
determination to implement policies aimed at promoting the 
employment of women and guaranteeing a better balance between 
professional and private life in order to meet the challenges of 
demographic change. …The ageing of the population, combined 
with declining birth rates, raises considerable challenges for our 
societies... It is clear that policies on gender equality will contribute 
significantly to meeting those challenges: on the one hand, by 
stimulating the employment of women, thus compensating for the 
forecast decline in the working population; and, on the other, by 
supporting the individual choices of women and men, including 
decisions on the number of children they wish to have.” 
The 2010 strategy highlights the contribution of gender equality 
“to economic growth and sustainable development” while “taking 
inspiration from the Charter’s priorities and the experiences of the 
2006 gender equality roadmap.” Between the two, sustainable 
development has replaced the demographic challenges. Simply a 
change of language? 
3. Some debates
3.1. The European employment Strategy: employment rate  
and/or job quality?
According to the Lisbon employment targets set in 2000, by 
2010 for the 15-64 age group the rate of women’s employment was 
to reach 60% and the overall rate 70%. Neither of these two targets 
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between 2008 and 2010 due to the crisis. In 2010, the rate was 
5.9 points short of the goal for the overall employment rate and 
1.8 point short of that for women.
The European employment Strategy set a goal for 2020 of 75%, 
for women, as for men, but this time for the 20 to 64 age group. 
Therefore it will be easier to achieve (if the Lisbon target for 2010 had 
been set for that age group, it would have been achieved for women).
The major remaining question, however, is that of the means to 
get there. If the rise in the employment rate is based on an increase 
in part-time and temporary jobs, it is not a guarantee of economic 
independence, which is after all the number one objective of the 
roadmaps. Worse, the appearance of new forms of inequality is 
another result. The Commission is vacillating from this point of 
view between an analysis of inequalities brought on by the fact 
that the part-time jobs are in the main held by women and the 
vagueness of recommendations on how to reach the employment 
rate objectives. Beyond that, there are still ambiguities regarding 
flexibility: flexibility is sometimes extolled as an instrument of 
employment policy (eliminate the rules that create rigidity), and at 
others times as an element of reconciliation policy (flexibility and 
scheduling arrangements for parents).
By neglecting the multiple forms of employment inequality, 
the targets established are not likely to reduce these inequalities. 
The question of job quality is thus vital.
3.2. “Best practices” and soft law against anti-discriminatory law? 
As far as the legal framing is concerned, in the context of devel-
oping the EU’s anti-discriminatory law, promoting equality as soft 
law (charter, label) “without rights or obligations” (Junter and 
Sénac-Slawinski, 2010) reveals tensions between managerial norms
and legal-political norms (Beveridge and Velluti, 2008). Thus it is 
essential to question the normative stakes of promoting gender 
equality through soft law, stripped of any binding dimension, 
which “is also inevitably a fuzzy law (Delmas-Marty, 1986, 2004). 
Formulated in terms of targets or recommendations, the law loses 
precision; not only do vague terms tend to multiply, such as 
“charter” or “partnership”, but formulations such as “principles” 
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(Delmas-Marty, 2004: 143–44).
3.3. Gender equality interrogates the Europeanization process
EU policies on gender equality provide a vantage point for 
analyzing the Europeanization process (Lombardo and Forest, 
2012; Radaelli, 2003) at the intersection of three perspectives 
(Liebert, 2003): institutional (directives and ECJ decisions), cognitive
(analysis of frames of reference, through which the “public 
problem” of gender equality is reformulated (Muller, 2005)); and 
interactionist (in relation to the creation of transnational voices 
representing “gender interests”).
Taking into account the multiple types of discrimination with 
an intersectional approach of discriminatory criteria is in 
particular a challenge for 21st century Europe (Squires, Skeje and 
Krizsan, 2012). Currently “the method of processing appeals cases 
seeks the motive behind the discrimination or the motive that 
appears the easiest to demonstrate, not the interactions” 
(Lanquetin, 2009: 103–4).
From a cognitive point of view, equality policies were first 
conceived to eliminate distortions in competition, but then have 
changed, without at the same time questioning the soundness of 
free competition. Between supporting growth (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2013) and anti-discriminatory principles, the justification 
of these policies in the name of social investment (Morel, Palier 
and Palme, 2012) interrogates the principle of justice at work 
(Sénac, 2012).
The decision level is also problematic: simple guidelines and 
principles of subsidiarity now allow some countries to implement 
regressive policies on gender equality, while all are facing budget 
cuts for social policies in this period of crisis. This environment 
makes a convergence of the different countries unlikely.
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EUROPEAN(S) LABOR(S) MARKET(S)
Gérard Cornilleau
OFCE-Sciences Po
Since its foundation the European Union has experienced an increase in the 
dispersion of its welfare systems. The goal of a Social Union, completing the 
economic and monetary union, is increasingly out of reach. The absence of a 
jointly regulated labor market is a destabilizing factor that triggers social compe-
tition and wage deflation. To avoid the risks associated with such a situation it 
is necessary to agree on policies aimed at returning to full employment and to 
choose between “neo-liberal” or “social” work sharing. The absence of short-
term prospects for a complete social harmonization requires the acceptance of 
jointly managed of social boundaries that allow both the mobility and the effec-
tive protection of workers.
Employment policies and social protection have been 
excluded from the domain of Community policies in the name of 
subsidiarity. Member States are the sole responsible for the defini-
tion and implementation of social policies. In theory, only the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is used to influence 
national policy and if possible make them more or less consistent 
and convergent.
But in practice the freedom of States on social protection is 
restricted by constraints stemming from other Community 
policies. Thus:
— The coordination of fiscal and economic policies imposes 
strong constraints on the financing of social protection, 
particularly during times of crisis. Governments face limits 
in the use they can make of social protection to stabilize 
economic activity. They are therefore encouraged (when Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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in social dumping.
— The free movement of persons, freedom of establishment, 
and competition laws, set constraints on subjecting workers 
to national law. Temporary work and the posting of workers 
from one country to another permit, to some extent, to 
circumvent labor law and choose where to pay social 
contributions.
— Competition policy and treaty interpretation by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, set the limit of public intervention in 
matters of social insurance; for a health insurance or a 
pension plan to be sheltered from competition, they must 
meet a number of strict conditions: social object, compul-
sory membership, etc.
— Citizens' rights and the principle of non-discrimination 
impose obligations derived from treaties and not just from 
national laws (in terms of retirement age, for example, or 
family benefits that cannot be modulated by gender). In this 
area, as in the previous case, established law cases play a 
central role.
The issue of rationalization of Community constraints on labor 
law and social protection, beyond good practices recommenda-
tions, arises in a context of generalized crisis and strong 
heterogeneity of economic and labor markets performances. After 
a short analysis of the situation (§ 1), we present the two main 
options to overcome the crisis and return to full employment 
(§ 2). Finally we will examine possible broad lines of a long-term 
program of social convergence in Europe (§ 3).
1. Unemployment crisis, and European divides 
Europe as a whole is in crisis, and its labor market is very unbal-
anced: the unemployment rate of the EU27 is 10.8% (January 
2014) and in the euro area it raises to 12%. Overall, Europe is far 
from full employment. The causes of this crisis are well known: 
triggered by the recession of 2008/2009 due to the financial crisis, 
rising unemployment has not been halted by the economic poli-
cies whose primary purpose was, since 2011, to reduce public 
debt. Macroeconomic analyses of rising unemployment in Europe 
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economic policy; as a consequence, the priority for Europe should 
be to revise its macroeconomic doctrine (Blot, Creel and Timbeau, 
2014 OFCE, IMK, ECLM, 2014). Issues specific to labor market 
functioning are of second order at best ; while it is certain that 
improving market smoothness, and bridging the gap between 
labor supply and demand would certainly contribute to improving 
the situation, specific employment and labor market policies will 
not by themselves bring back to full employment, most notably in 
the countries affected by mass unemployment.
Unemployment in Europe is both massive and widely 
dispersed. In December 2013, the unemployment rate was 27.5% 
in Greece and 5% in Austria.  The difference between maximum 
and minimum is of nearly 23 points. By comparison, the United 
States unemployment rate in November 2013 was 7% with a 
maximum of 9% in Rhode Island and a minimum of 2.6% in North 
Dakota, a difference of 6.4 points. The variation coefficient1 in 
unemployment in Europe and the United States were very different 
with a level of 51% in Europe (57% in the Eurozone) and 24% in 
the United States.
If we look at income dispersion between countries, it worsened 
over time, with the enlargement to eastern economies increasing 
remarkably de diversity of the European institutional space 
(Table 1). 
The history of the European Union is characterized by a first 
phase of convergence ranging from 1958 to 1995 followed by a 
period of divergence initiated by the enlargement of the Union to 
the East (Table 1). Today, the income convergence in Europe is 
stalling and this is reason of concern for the future, because the 
very large differences created by enlargement continue to weigh on 
the building of solidarity among states with very heterogeneous 
levels of wealth and income.
Very large income and wage inequalities among countries are a 
defining European feature. They explain the difficulty of imple-
menting common policies as they encourage the development of 
1. The variation coefficient measures the dispersion of a variable as the ratio between the 
standard error and the average
Gérard Cornilleau204social competition, the less wealthy having the tendency to use 
their wage advantage to gain competitiveness with respect to 
partner countries.
Last, Europe is very heterogeneous in what concerns demog-
raphy. On the one hand, Ireland, France, Britain, the Scandinavian 
countries, Belgium and the Netherlands have maintained fertility 
rates between 1.7 and 2 which allow a long-term stabilization of 
population. On the other, Germany, southern, and eastern Euro-
pean countries have very low fertility rates, below 1.5, that will 
lead to decreasing total population and workforce. These countries 
face very negative evolution of potential growth and of the ratio 
between active and inactive population. Migration between coun-
tries would likely homogenize the demographic outlook. But 
Europe remains a linguistic mosaic and this structurally limits 
mobility between EU states. This heterogeneity of demographic 
perspectives has a significant impact on long-term macroeconomic 
constraints facing each zone. Countries with low fertility rates 
must prepare for the future by saving to finance an increasing 
pension burden. Their debt is less sustainable in the long term and 
they must implement rigorous public spending policies. Countries 
with higher fertility rates must also prepare for the future, but their 
constraints are different: their main problem is to finance educa-
tion for the future labor force, while they are less constrained by 
Table 1. Coefficients of variation of GDP per capita in Europe: from the founding 
members to the Europe of 27
In %
1958 1973 1986 1995 2004 2007 2011
UE 6 16 10 6,5 7 9 11 14
UE 9 13 13 8 14 16 14
UE 12 21 19 20 22 22
UE 15 17 18 19 20
UE 25 35 32 31
UE 27 36 35
EU6 : Germany + Belgium + France + Italy (+ Luxembourg) + Netherlands
EU9 = EU6 + Denmark + Ireland + UK
EU12 = EU9 + Greece + Spain + Portugal
EU15 = EU12 + Austria + Finland + Sweden
EU25 = EU15 + Cyprus + Estonia + Hungary + Latvia + Lithuania + Malta + Poland + Czech Republic + Slovakia + 
Slovenia
EU27 = EU25 + Bulgaria + Romania.
Source: Penn World Tables; Note: calculations do not take into account the Luxembourg.
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long-term labor market effects. Countries with low fertility rates 
have less potential for growth, while at the same time not needing 
it as much as high fertility countries ; the latter in addition also 
suffer more from negative macroeconomic shocks.
Europe’s heterogeneity is a challenge for the harmonization of 
social policies. So far the Commission and all the political authori-
ties in Europe have always argued that recommendations could be 
of general applicability. The very principle of the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), which is the main tool for social legislation, 
is built around the definition of “best practices” aimed at achieving 
universally applicable policies. It might be useful to revisit this 
assumption and examine all the consequences of strong heteroge-
neities of income, labor market and demographic, with the 
objective of designing policies that best fit the situation of each 
country. Labor market policies are a simple example showing that 
it is not possible to conduct the same policy in all countries: work 
incentives obviously do not play the same role in countries which 
are at full employment and in those that experience mass unem-
ployment. Strict management of unemployment insurance may be 
justified in the former, while in the latter it may lead to impover-
ishing the unemployed.
2. The Main Options for Employment and Labor Market 
Policies
The wide dispersion of unemployment, and diverging demo-
graphic trends, have led some, especially in Germany, to suggest 
that migration between states could be a solution. Of course, 
mobility is useful for ensuring a better match between supply and 
demand for labor, in particular if growth gaps are significant. It 
should be encouraged, especially because exchanges between Euro-
pean citizens are useful in strengthening the solidarity across 
countries. However, free movement should not be turned into an 
obligation of mobility, which would risk causing the opposite 
effect of feeding nationalistic and anti-European sentiment. Labor 
mobility should furthermore be complemented by the effort of 
moving capital and production to regions where labor availability 
is larger. It would be important to put in place a coherent territo-
Gérard Cornilleau206rial policy at the European level, going well beyond the mere 
financing of infrastructures. A precondition for this would be the 
definition of a European industrial policy, that in turn would 
require challenging the dogma of governments abstaining from 
intervention in the definition of industrial choices.2 The debate on 
this issue is nonexistent.
Beyond macroeconomic policies, only labor market specific 
policies may ultimately be used to try to reduce unemploy-
ment. Especially when, for countries facing very high 
unemployment, it becomes evident that the absence of growth 
policies in Europe requires searching for national solutions. 
Employment policy deals with work sharing and with labor 
income. Blaming malfunctioning labor markets for the current 
level of unemployment in Europe is not very serious. Spain 
provides a good example of unemployment rooted in the problems 
of other markets, notably finance and housing. The Spanish unem-
ployment rate was 7.9% in May 2007, it rose to 17.9% in May 2009 
and it has reached over 26% in January 2014. This trend is rather a 
sign of extreme flexibility than of rigid labor markets.3 Explana-
tions based on structural gaps between demand and supply of 
skills, or the sudden appearance of the unemployed’s reluctance to 
react to incentives, obviously makes very little sense. Under these 
conditions, improving the functioning of labor markets, while 
making little harm, can only have a very marginal impact on 
unemployment.
Specific policies that may have an important impact all involve 
a very significant drop in wages and labor costs. In an open 
economy, this may be sought in order to gain competitiveness vis-
à-vis foreign competitors on external and domestic markets. It is 
obvious that this option, wage deflation to gain market shares is 
absolutely inappropriate to the situation in Europe: besides its 
non-cooperative features, at odds with the supposed solidarity of 
European countries, wage deflation cannot succeed if it is applied 
simultaneously in all countries (OFCE, IMK, ECLM, 2014). The 
2. There are exceptions to the dogma. Localization of Airbus plants, for example, has been the 
subject of intense political bargaining. But the European Commission never intervened to put 
forward the European’s general interest.
3. For an analysis of the reaction of labor markets to the crisis, see: Cochard Marion, Gérard 
Cornilleau et Eric Heyer (2010).
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the world, would be largely insufficient to compensate for the 
resulting decrease of domestic demand. It may even be offset by an 
overall appreciation of the euro if the lack of demand in the EU 
leads to a current account surplus vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
There are two solutions to enable labor and income sharing. The 
“neo-liberal” solution is to decrease the cost of labor, whether or 
not initiated by labor market flexibility. The “social” solution is the 
collective reduction of working time, some harmonization of social 
conditions, and wage coordination that avoid any temptation to 
rely on social dumping for the return to full employment.
The choice between the two solutions needs to be a political 
one. There is no “economic” supremacy of one or the other. Both 
options should be subject to debate, but the choice is often 
obscured by the discourse falsely assuming that “there is no other 
solution” than the neo-liberal one. 
Work sharing can rely on lower overhead salaries (contribu-
tions borne by the business) that can be decided by the 
government in centralized countries or by bargaining in the most 
decentralized countries. This solution allows to manage the distri-
butional effects of reduced benefits or social expenditure that must 
accompany the reduction in social contributions. This method is 
in between the neo-liberal and social method. But it can only be 
applied up to a certain extent, as is the case in France, because it 
quickly leads to possible reductions in benefits or to increases in 
other taxes acceptable.
Making labor markets more flexible is the preferred, and 
certainly the most effective way to lower wages in the long 
term. This is the method that has been used in Germany and is also 
applied, in a less systematic manner in France (less effectively, 
thanks to the existence of a minimum wage).The primary means for 
increasing flexibility is the reduction of protection for the unem-
ployed to reduce their wage claims and demands of job 
stability. Increased flexibility thus requires slashing the generosity 
of unemployment insurance and the drastic reduction of legal 
restrictions on the employment contract. On this basis many unem-
ployed are then forced to accept short-term employment, with 
unstable and low wages. Employment may increase due to the 
Gérard Cornilleau208reduction of relative labor and capital costs, but also because 
consumers are encouraged to shift towards sectors of the economy, 
especially services, whose earlier development was limited by the 
cost of labor. The end result may well be an increase of employment 
and lower wages, so that work and labor income sharing are 
attained. But this policy also leads to an increase of inequality and 
working poverty (see Francesco Saraceno in this issue). It has a social 
cost, with redistribution from the unskilled to the skilled, which in 
addition benefit from cheaper services provided by the unskilled 
workers forced to accept jobs at the limit of dignity.  It is the task of 
the political debate to settle the question of whether the neo-liberal 
management of unemployment should be accepted or not.
The other option for job sharing is collective reduction of 
working time. It can be permanent as was the case in France during 
the transition to 35 hours working week. In this case there needs to 
be an assessment of the long term growth prospects of sectors that 
need to be supported, or on the contrary dismissed. In the case of 
work sharing by the market, we have seen that some service sectors 
were favored by increased flexibility. One can legitimately chal-
lenge the interest of creating such low-quality jobs, and prefer a 
collective and orderly reduction of working time. As an alternative, 
the collective reduction of working time can also be counter-
cyclical and temporary. This is the solution put forward in 
Germany, which has also been applied, to a lower extent, in France 
and in other countries. Partial unemployment is the preferred 
means of this form of “social” sharing.  Its limit is obviously the 
fact that it only applies to existing workers.
If we admit that there are multiple solutions to work-sharing, 
and that collective organization may be equally effective as sharing 
by the market, then it possible to discuss on the two methods and 
their combinations.
We must choose whether to focus on the market or on collective 
organization. Focus “market-sharing” means reducing the coverage 
of unemployment insurance, limit workers’ rights, and avoid 
minimum wages. If “social” sharing is favored, it must instead 
have an explicit national wage policy with widely applied 
minimum wage and generous unemployment insurance. There 
also need to be an extensive system of partial unemployment to 
manage work sharing during the cycle; this latter feature could be 
European(s) Labor(s) Market(s) 209organized across the EU to maximize the stabilizing effect of the 
system in case of asymmetric shocks. In the long term it is the 
social and political debate that should choose the sectors to 
develop and elaborate guidelines on working time references. 
Market and social work sharing are not totally exclusive. In practice, 
labor market institutions combine both methods. In France the 
weakened application of labor laws has allowed the massive devel-
opment of part-time and short or very short duration jobs. But the 
effect of this liberalization has been limited by the existence of a 
minimum wage and relatively generous unemployment insur-
ance. In Germany, work sharing was overwhelmingly initiated by 
the reduction of unemployment insurance in the context of no 
general minimum wage. But in this crisis it is “social” work sharing 
arrangements that have prevented a sharp rise in unemploy-
ment. The prospect of establishing a general minimum wage in 
Germany should bring it closer to the social sharing model. It 
would be useful to have a collective discussion about the desirable 
combination of liberal and social sharing allowing to put in place 
incentives to work when at full employment, to set the minimum 
acceptable wage in each European country, and to clarify the 
boundaries between decent work and undignified minijobs.
The problem is that without explicit discussion about these 
choices, countries that favor the neo-liberal work sharing will 
always have an advantage over their EU partners. In a world of 
pure competition, the lowest bidder in the social sphere will always 
win. With massive unemployment, unhindered markets will lead 
to sharp wage decreases that will either directly, or directly 
through cost decreases in non-tradable service sectors, allow to 
increase competitiveness with respect to countries that choose to 
keep labor protection. The broad lines of social choice work-
sharing and income should be set collectively if we want to lift 
Europe out of a vicious circle of social competition that ultimately 
can only lead to dissolving the Union.
3. Social Europe in practice
Beyond the grand themes of economic and labor market poli-
cies adapted to the heterogeneous European countries’ situations, 
we must face many practical questions in order to make compat-
Gérard Cornilleau210ible the free movement of persons, competition in markets for 
goods and services and free choice by each country about its social 
protection and labor market institutions.
Two approaches are possible depending on whether one wishes 
to maintain the full freedom of Member States in the definition 
and management of social protection or one opts for reducing 
such a freedom with the scope of progressing towards common 
institutions including social protection. The prospect of social 
harmonization, similar to what was done for the goods market, 
must be studied. But it goes without saying that this is a very long-
term perspective and only limited progress is to be expected in the 
coming decade.4
The first option involves the precise definition of “social 
boundaries” to ensure States that their laws cannot be circum-
vented by opportunistic choices about the location of businesses 
and jobs. The domain of public social protection must be clearly 
defined, so that the European Court of Justice does not have to 
deliberate about the boundaries between public and private insur-
ance, creating a legal uncertainty that hampers the freedom choice 
of States. The principle of free movement of persons could be 
strengthened by clarifying the mechanisms of detaching workers
and strengthening the rights of citizens of the Union who succes-
sively work in different countries. For detached workers, in 
addition to issues of controlling the application of the rules, which 
are being resolved, the problem is the link with the country of 
origin’s social protection system. This rule allows direct competi-
tion with social workers in the country where the worker is 
detached, if the latter is a country that imposes higher social 
contributions.5 There are two options to avoid this competition: 
the first is to require the detached workers to pay social contribu-
tions in the destination country, with benefits computed 
proportionally to the time spent paying contributions to each 
4. Europe realized the customs union and the complete unification of the goods market. The 
Eurozone has unified its currency... and yet the EU has not been able to establish a common tax 
base for corporate taxes. It also failed to unify indirect taxation. As a consequence, tax 
competition crowds out economic activity. It is clear that a social unification of Europe is much 
more complex and, if we want to undertake it, is a much longer term endeavor.
5. When a country finance social spending by general taxation, the social contribution rate is 
lower. It follows that even with identical coverage detaching a worker in a country with higher 
social contributions will be cheaper than directly hiring a worker in situ.
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legally no right to impose a qualification period (particularly with 
regard to retirement). This solution would also clarify the situation 
of those working in different countries without being detached; for 
these workers it should actually be considered independently of 
the treatment of detached workers. A second option would be for 
the detached workers to maintain affiliation to the country of 
origin’s social security system that would then receive the contri-
butions from the destination country’s system the paid 
contributions. If these were larger than normal, additional rights 
could be triggered. If these are lower, then the firm should cover 
the difference for its detached worker. Whatever the chosen solu-
tion, improving the transferability of contributions and rights 
would also be favorable to the mobility of workers
In Europe many systems coexist that for financing rely on taxes 
and contributions in a different way, which implement public 
social protection system, or mixed public and private systems with 
different coverage, which chose different levels of protection for 
the poor or for families. This explains the difficulty of harmo-
nizing, and the postponement, since the beginning of the EU, of a 
social union. Some partial solutions have nevertheless been 
proposed, for unemployment benefits, whose countercyclical 
features are paramount.6
A common unemployment insurance scheme would subtract it 
from the domain of fiscal rules and allow using it more effectively 
as an automatic stabilizer after both a symmetric and or asym-
metric shock. It is nevertheless impossible to endow the 
Commission with the management of the scheme, or even with 
the condition for the aid. Unemployment insurance systems are 
based on very different combinations of general means-tested 
benefits and direct benefits of the unemployment insurance 
scheme. Therefore, seemingly more generous countries in terms of 
direct unemployment benefits can in the end be as generous 
towards the unemployed as countries that use a mix of different 
benefits (Coquet, 2013) . A Global regulation of unemployment 
6. The proposal of a euro-wide unemployment insurance is old. It is found already in 1975 in 
the “Marjolin” Report (Commission of the European Communities (1975)). For a recent 
proposal, see for example: Henrik Enderlin, Luca Guttenberg Jann and Spiess (2013)
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countries that have opted for social regulation of the labor 
market. The only possibility is implementing a system of uncondi-
tional transfers in case of negative economic shocks. Being 
proportional to the magnitude of the shock, such a transfer system 
would help strengthening the automatic stabilization of the 
economy, which would benefit the whole Union. Such a mecha-
nism would also strengthen solidarity among Member States of the 
Union. A precondition for it, on the other hand, would be that an 
agreement is reached on the broad guidelines for economic and 
social policies of the European Union. Europe has probably 
reached the point at which the method of small steps and gradual 
harmonization is no longer effective. Even small steps now involve 
an agreement on principles that is not limited to form. Referring to 
social Europe without specifying the content is no longer enough.
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FROM AUSTERITY TO SOCIAL INVESTMENT: 
EUROPE NEEDS TO SHOW THE WAY
Bruno Palier
Sciences Po, Centre d'études européennes
Since 2010, austerity measures are imposed in Europe to deal with the crisis 
of sovereign debt, and to reassure financial markets. The measures adopted by 
various European governments are mainly of three types: social protection 
reforms, privatization, freezing civil servants' wages and reducing their 
number. Cuts are planned in social spending, structural reforms are imposed: 
increase in the age of retirement, increased flexibility of the labour market, 
lower unemployment benefits to make work more attractive, hours of work 
required for recipient of assistance, increased competition in the area of health 
and social services. These policies lead to the destruction of the social cohesion 
of Southern and Eastern European countries, and ruin further the little soli-
darity between the peoples of Europe. Europe must lead the way tomorrow to 
conduct policies for the future, and to support countries in their efforts for 
social investment.
The measures adopted by governments in Europe, as well as 
European institutions' recommendations are mainly of three types: 
reform of social security, privatizations, freezing of salaries and 
reduction of the number of employees in the public sector. Social 
spending cuts are planned and structural reforms imposed: rise in 
retirement age, more flexibility of the labour market, reduction of 
unemployment benefits in order to make work more attractive, 
mandatory work for people receiving unemployment assistance, 
strengthened competition in health and social services.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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Social spending is at the front line of austerity plans. In addition 
to budget cuts, structural reforms are implemented (it is often a 
result of pressures coming from European institutions, joined by 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank 
in the case of Greece): increased labour market flexibility, augmen-
tation of the retirement age, strengthened competition in services 
including health and social services.
In many countries, plans include the reduction of unemploy-
ment benefits and the assistance for the unemployed who reach the 
end of their benefits (Germany, Portugal, Romania and Denmark – 
before the change of government – Ireland, United Kingdom, 
Spain, Greece). The aim is to “make work pay” by reducing social 
benefits in a way that makes employment preferable to the situa-
tion of assistance, as if, in the current situation of economic 
stagnation, people were currently choosing to be unemployed!
Several countries also plan to reduce the possibility for unem-
ployed to refuse a job proposition (Spain, United Kingdom). Many 
measures have been adopted in order to increase labour market 
flexibility, in particular for workers under open-ended contracts 
(Spain, Portugal, and Denmark). The unemployed are not the only 
ones concerned by the loss of benefits. Many countries are also 
planning reductions on government healthcare spending. These 
measures have been imposed on Greece, Ireland and Portugal as 
pre-conditions for the help they receive.
Austerity plans also provide for a more fundamental pension 
reform justified by the need to “reassure” financial markets and 
rating agencies. Plans include either to push back the age of retire-
ment beyond the age of 65 in Ireland, Spain, the Czech Republic 
and Germany or to accelerate increases in retirement age already 
decided (United Kingdom). Spanish and Greek reforms also 
include the modification of the method for calculating pensions. 
The IMF and European aid package for Greece, Romania or 
Bulgaria was conditional on pension reform. In October 2011, 
pressure was also brought to bear on Italy to re-open procedures for 
a pension reform.
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On the whole, these measures are not original, except for their 
scale and swiftness. They are directly inspired by an economic 
theory that became dominant during the 1980s. For this theory, 
social policies are conceived as a burden for the economy. It is said 
that they discourage investment and job creation and are accused 
of being too generous, discouraging thus the unemployed to 
search for a new job. Since we have been applying these ideas for 
the past thirty years we must think that they are still valid. 
However, is it the social protection system really responsible for 
the economic difficulties in Europe and for the current situation of 
over-indebtedness in some states?
For at least two decades, the strategy to return to growth and job 
creation is based on the freedom of the supply side of the 
economy, which is supposed to be constrained and inhibited by 
the expansion of the welfare state. A reduction in taxes and rigidity 
to restore profits was supposed to stimulate the growth of invest-
ment; this would lead to more job creation (it is the famous 
theorem of Helmut Schmidt, 1974).
Indeed, these policies restored profits and permitted the rich 
people to become richer but neither investment, nor employment 
were stimulated. A recent BIT study (Making Markets work for jobs, 
published in 2011) underlines that in developed countries, profits 
rose by 83% between 2000 and 2009; however, the level of invest-
ment stagnated during the same period. Increase in profits lead to 
dividend growth for the shareholders (from 29% of the profits in 
2000 to 36% in 2009) and stimulated financial investments rather 
than productive investments (Financial investments of non finan-
cial companies rose from 81.2% of developed countries’ GDP in 
1996 to 132.2% in 2007).
The error was to believe that markets would be able to trans-
form profits into productive investments. The huge incomes have 
been mainly used for speculation, while the middle class has had 
to borrow to maintain a certain standard of living. It is precisely 
this private debt, which provoked the financial crisis of 2007/2008.
Furthermore, companies' strategies to restore margin were, most 
of the time, against the idea of quality employment. In order to 
limit production costs, companies chose to restrict the number of 
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the development of non-standard and temporary jobs. Overall, 
growth is not created by this strategy, and poor-quality, low-wage 
jobs are generated. Since these are frequently subsidized, the cost 
to the state is much more than the unemployment benefits. This 
strategy based on social dumping and on the impoverishment of 
employees and states, explains to a large extend the current budget 
problems faced by the states that chose to adopt it.
As indicated by the weak economic growth in 2011 and 2012 
and by the 2013 forecasts, these policies do not allow the economy 
to recover. It is strange that we should continue implementing 
such policies, which have already failed and which are responsible 
for the current crisis. Instead, it would be preferable to build a new 
economic and social model based on the necessary investments for 
the future. Today, the countries, which are suffering most, are 
those which had not made the necessary investments in the past.
Instead of relying on the markets for delivering the necessary 
investment, we need to decide to collectively invest in innovative 
and sustainable economic activities, capable of stimulating the 
creation of high quality jobs. These investments also need to 
provide people with the qualifications necessary to succeed in a 
new economy driven by innovation and knowledge. It is necessary 
to invest in human capital, in early-years childcare, in education, 
in lifelong learning and in policies which reconcile professional 
and private life.
In February 2012, a timid start was made by the European 
Commission on that direction. It was proposed to Member States to 
adopt a “social investment package”. This package takes up ideas 
developed by numerous academics1 (and some Europeans coun-
tries, especially the Nordic countries). These ideas present social 
policies not as a cost for the economy but as an investment. We will 
develop on the policies that have to be implemented (and financed 
in part at the European level) in the remainder of this paper.
1. See Morel, Nathalie, Palier, Bruno, Palme, Joakim (eds) Towards a Social Investment Welfare 
State ?, Policy Press.
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To abandon the current practice of cuts in social spending, we 
must first stop considering work as a cost that needs to be cut 
down, but think of it more as an asset to invest in. Investing in 
good working conditions does not lead to forced and exhausting 
productivity, but to productivity based on creativity, innovation 
and quality.
Investing in employment quality needs to become both a 
common goal and a normal corporate behaviour. This attitude 
concerns a whole package of social rights with a view to safe-
guarding career paths, access to training for those who work, even 
with non-standard contracts (fixed-term contracts, temporary 
employment, subsidized employment etc.), a workflow which 
makes the workplace compatible with family life, jobs that give a 
sense of satisfaction to the employees and allow everyone to be 
represented in the decision-making of the company. It is also 
necessary to guarantee for all those in work access to social security 
(currently, for example, women, as part-time workers and due to 
interruptions in their career, have usually less retirement benefits, 
compared to that of men).
A key element for the improvement of the quality of employ-
ment and production relates to professional qualifications. First, 
access to professional training should be guaranteed for everyone, 
but, more structurally, it is necessary to redirect public policy 
towards investment in human capital, from childhood to retire-
ment. This will require providing high quality childcare, an equal 
system of education, an investment in youth, a better balance 
between working and family life for both women and men.
4. Lifelong learning for everyone
New information and communication technologies have 
increased the pace of change. Knowledge and know-how, all 
become quickly obsolete. In this context, the ability of perma-
nently renewing the activities exposed to global competition is key 
for economic success. It is essential to transform companies into 
organizations that learn and change, and permit employees to be 
included in this constant evolution of skills.
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Europe are those which can improve working conditions for 
everyone, reduce the difference of wages, encourage “creative 
work” and autonomy, and develop the logic of learning inside 
their company.
In order to avoid labour market polarization between those 
increasing and renewing their skills, and those who do not, or even 
worse, whose skills are degraded during their career, it is critically 
important to develop a professional lifelong training policy for 
everyone.
Among the proposals for strengthening employment and inclu-
sion of persons who are on the fringe of the labour market, some 
highlight the placement and the back-to-work policy, for any jobs, 
even for those which require less skills than those of the person; 
others insist on the necessity of subsidized lower-skilled jobs, by 
reducing social contributions on low wages; and most give a 
supplement to the salaries of poor workers. Focusing on quality 
employment and the strategy outlined in this paper, is based on 
the organization of professional transitions, access to lifelong job 
training, and support of mobility through high wages guarantee 
during training and employment search, without loss of social 
rights. It is under these conditions that professional and geograph-
ical mobility (every year, 1/3 of Danish workers are changing 
position or company) or the extension of the retirement age (offi-
cial retirement was at the age of 63,8 in Sweden in 2008), are 
socially acceptable.
5. Improving education and care facilities for all the young 
children and investment in youth
Nowadays, the unemployment affects first, all those who are in 
lack of qualifications or those whose qualifications have become 
obsolete. How do we enable everybody to acquire the necessary 
skills for the current economy? Many things are actually deter-
mined during the very early ages. Cognitive capacities, 
communication and relational abilities, which are nowadays 
necessary for school and professional success, are acquired even 
before the age of compulsory schooling. Children who were born 
in privileged socio-economic backgrounds take advantage of many 
From Austerity to Social Investment: Europe Needs to Show the Way 219opportunities for the growth and development of their capacities, 
something that is not the rule in disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Offering a chance to young people without exceptions presupposes 
an early childhood public service of high quality, easily accessible 
to everyone.
While we were prepared to support the emergence of the third 
age (retirement) and while we consider it important to prepare the 
support of the fourth age (dependence), the youth continue to be 
neglected by social policies. This particular period of life did not 
exist fifty years ago (where we used to pass directly from school to 
work or marriage); while it is a life-period when many things 
happen and many choices have to be made (for example to carry 
out studies, to begin a career, to find housing, to set-up a family, to 
have children), it is nonetheless neglected by public policies. All 
over Europe, young people are suffering most from the difficult 
economic situation. That is why it is essential to give a second 
chance to young people who left the school system, to focus on 
particular employment policies for access to a first job and to 
ensure a minimum wage for young people without any other 
resources. Europe could pride itself on promoting and financing a 
plan for youth to help young Europeans, which could be based on 
those first initiatives (youth package and youth guarantee).
6. Encourage equality between men and women
To encourage work for all under the best possible conditions 
also means thinking about professional equality between men and 
women. While young girls are more successful than boys in higher 
education, women have less satisfying careers than men (less-paid, 
more often in part-time jobs, less-responsibility). Women have to 
pay the professional price because they are the ones who interrupt 
or stop their careers to take care of children (and also of elderly 
dependent persons). Allowing women to get the career they want 
and which corresponds to their qualifications, requires the adop-
tion of an egalitarian policy in the familial sphere, the deep 
restructuring of the parental leave system, in order to encourage 
households to better allocate childcare (a parental leave shorter 
but better paid, where the duration increases if it is shared between 
the parents).
Bruno Palier 220The development of high-quality childcare services for younger
children makes it possible to meet the new needs of both families
and children, but it also creates stable, qualified and well-protected
employment, contrary to the private provision of home care
services (subsidized since long in France and in more and more
countries), which are part-time jobs with low levels of qualifica-
tion, low-paid and often marked by insecurity. This makes
professional and family life compatible and so it encourages
women to find employment that corresponds to what they want
(obtaining financial autonomy), but also serves a double social
need: reducing the risk of poverty for children (which is always
lower in households where parents work, in particular for single
parent families) and to increase employment rates.
7. Conclusion
These new policies have already proved their success at both
levels, economic and social. At a time when many states suffocate
by the debt and the imposed austerity measures, Europe could lead
the way, not only by relying on its social investment package, but
also with concrete financial actions: a plan of massive support for
young Europeans (starting with the youth package and the youth
guarantee recently adopted) and a proposal to stop recording as
public expenditure, in the definition of Maastricht, the child-care
expenditures and start considering them as an investment, in order
to stimulate early childhood policy. That might be a start for the
reconciliation of some European citizens with Europe, whose
austerity policies do nothing but dig its own grave.
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A GREEN “NEW DEAL” TO BOOST EUROPE
Xavier Timbeau
OFCE-Sciences Po
To exit the Great Recession and initiate the transition towards a low carbon 
economy, we propose a public-private investment plan in the energetic transi-
tion of about 2 points per year of European GDP. The key concept of this plan 
is the opportunity to reconsider the criteria for public finances using, as the 
goal of stability a concept of public debt net of created public assets (in percent 
of GDP), instead of gross public debt. An impartial body (eg the European 
Commission) could assess ex post and ex ante the value of investments, creating 
the incentives for coherent and effective public expenditure policies.
1. The Great Recession and the great emergency
It is common to multiply the gloomy warnings about climate 
change and its consequences for the future. The Copenhagen 
conference failed to impose a mechanism to replace and expand 
the Kyoto Protocol. The commitment of a large number of coun-
tries, including the United States and China, not to let average 
global temperature to increase by more than 2°C compared to 
preindustrial levels was not followed by radical action. Yearly emis-
sions of per capita greenhouse gas emissions in developed 
countries have not been reduced, and no concrete mechanism 
seems to be able to make this happen. In particular, carbon taxes, 
and the price per ton of carbon are at very low levels. However, 
these levels of annual emissions (in Europe, about 12 Gt of 
CO2 equivalent per year and per capita, including emissions gener-
ated in the manufacture and transportation of goods and services) 
are well beyond the earth’s absorption capacity. Emissions’ growth 
in emerging markets (both because of raising living standard and of Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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level in developed countries and has led to a per capita emission 
level of more than 40 Gt CO2 equivalent, whereas climate stability 
would require yearly emissions of 10 Gt.1 Repeating a dramatic 
message ends up emptying it of its meaning, but one would have 
wished that, confronted with this policy inaction the “very serious 
persons” that Paul Krugman mocks would take the subject at heart 
when it became serious, and begun implement operating solu-
tions. According to the IEA (International Energy Agency, 2011), 
given the climate emergency, and the depreciation rates of existing 
machinery or buildings, each year of delay in the adoption of the 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction path will increase the future 
cost of adoption since it will force early scrapping of the non “low 
carbon” equipment.
The 2008 economic and financial crisis, also called the Great 
Recession, also legs us another disaster, namely the state of our 
economies, particularly in Europe. The sovereign debt crisis has 
triggered an unprecedented austerity for fear of a sudden stop of 
public debt financing in Europe. The possibility for financial 
markets to arbitrate between 18 public debts, all issued in euros, 
has forced some countries, in greater difficulty than others, to 
quickly reduce their public deficit. As fiscal multipliers were very 
high – because of the state of the financial system, of deflation 
expectations, and of private agents’ deteriorated balance sheets – 
cutting spending or raising taxes did not reduce debt and deficit as 
much as it was hoped. The synchronization of restrictive fiscal 
policy amplified the problem. As a result, public deficits were 
reduced very little, leaving the original problem (convincing finan-
cial markets) even worse than before. The implicit pooling of 
public debt in the euro zone ended the downward spiral of the 
euro; but high unemployment persists, together with economies 
on the verge of deflation. Therefore, the implicit mutualization 
1. Between 2000 and the date at which emissions are stabilized at 10 GteCO2 is stabilized, 
2000 GteCO2   can be emitted. We can therefore continue to emit at current rates (which 
implies an effort of reduction by developed countries to compensate for the convergence of 
living standards and emissions of emerging countries) until 2050. Beyond that date we will 
need to emit around one ton of CO2 equivalent per capita. (GIEC, 2007, International Energy 
Agency, 2011).
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the eurozone.
On the eve of the European elections of May 2014 and of the 
Parties climate conference of Paris in November and December 
2015, all leverage available to engage on a path of significant green-
house emissions reduction is an absolute imperative. Finding a way 
to make the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions compatible 
with exiting the crisis appears to be unavoidable. The purpose of 
this brief is to try to link these two issues so as to emerge from the 
pernicious logic that under the false pretext that we need not to 
leave debt to our children, fails to give them a habitable planet.
2. What the 2008 crisis leaves us
The reduction of economic activity and of public deficits had a 
considerable impact on public investment and residential invest-
ment in developed countries, particularly in the eurozone.
Reducing investment does not generally result in the improvement 
of an agent’s balance sheet, since today’s foregone expenditure is 
largely offset by the need of compensating future invest-
ment. Cutting investment in physical assets may also result in 
crossing the “collapse threshold”, which will require higher invest-
ment in the future than what was currently saved. In the case of 
education, a cut in the flow of investment is irreversible, as genera-
tions who have received little or poor education do not return to 
school in the future. This is why intelligent budget rules allow a 
special treatment of investment, or correct the measure of public 
deficit with the change in value of net assets (public or global). A 
reduction in the gross deficit resulting in an equal deterioration of 
net assets, does not improve financial sustainability.
However, in the Great Recession, in many countries, both 
public investment and housing investment were cut. Figure 1 
shows public investment as a percent of potential output as 
defined by the OECD (in this case the EO93 database of May 
2013.2 The OECD estimated slowdown in potential growth since 
2. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/oecd-economic-outlook-statistics-and-
projections/oecd-economic-outlook-no-93_data-00655-en?isPartOf=/content/datacollection/eo-
data-en
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able and largely reduces the effect of cutting public investment. If 
we had retained and extended the 2007 OECD estimate of poten-
tial growth, then the reduction of the ratio appears more 
severe. Figure 1 shows that public investment was cut from 2010 
and the years 2011 to 2013 saw this trend continue.
Table 1 details the share of public investment reduction in the 
structural budget consolidation effort made between 2009 and 
2013 and identifies the countries that have used the final public 
investment as a means of adjust their public finances. In most 
countries, public investment, measured relative to potential GDP, 
decreased. Part of this decrease results from the revision of poten-
tial GDP (in the Eurozone, potential GDP has been revised by 10%, 
so the investment to GDP ratio is decreased by 0.06% GDP), but, 
nevertheless, public investment did decrease, in some countries 
strongly. In the crisis countries the pre-crisis period was character-
ized by high public investment, but net investment is today 
clearly negative in crisis, the period before 2007 was very auspi-
cious in terms of public investment but is now negative net 
investment in these countries. At the euro area level the reduction 
of public investment is 0.6 percent of GDP compared to 0.7 in the 
United States. A recovery of public investment is needed to offset 
Figure 1. Public net investment in percentage of potential activity
Source: Economic Outlook, 93, May 2013.
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colored of green.
Housing investment has the same profile, as Figure 2 shows. At 
the euro zone level, nearly 2 percentage points of GDP of housing 
investment were lost (almost 2.5 percentage points in the 
USA). The fall in housing investment is related to the collapse of 
real estate markets, to real estate bubbles bursts in some countries 
(notably the United States and Spain) and to reduced bank loans to 
households. This decline followed a long period of stability (since 
1990, gross investment in housing fluctuates at around 
6 percentage points of GDP in the Eurozone and 5.5 in the United 
States; the real estate bubble has led to increased investment of 1 
percentage point of GDP in the United States against a less than 
half a percentage point in the Eurozone). The correction is severe 
and investment today lags behind the needs implied by demo-
graphics and existing capital depreciation. 
3. A “Green New Deal”
Supporting growth is a priority today. This must first and fore-
most rely on a public investment plan, reversing the trend 
described above, and supporting the also urgent energy transi-
tion. A second pillar should be a recovery of private investment in 
residential housing, needed to ensure sufficient housing, and to 
make the transition to an energy efficient housing stock. These two 
Table 1. Share of structural effort imputed to the decline in net public investment
USA GBR EUZ DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD PRT IRL
% Structural effort given 
by investment 14 -9 17 6 10 23 46 10 29 9
Public investment,% 
potential GDP (1990-2007) 1.2 0.6 0.6 -0.1 0.8 0.6 2.0 0.9 1.7 2.6
Public investment,% 
potential GDP (2013) 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 0.5
OECD potential revision 
2013-2007, in % -7 -12 -13 -10 -10 -14 -22 -11 -16 -35
The first line reads as follows: For a budget restriction of 1 percentage point of GDP in the United States, public invest-
ment in the United States has been reduced by 0.14 percentage point of GDP compared to the average ratio of 
public investment to potential GDP in the years 1990-2007.
Sources: Economic Outlook, 93, author's calculations. 
Xavier Timbeau226pillars would allow to attain the double objective of exiting the 
crisis and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In the iAGS 2014 report (OFCE, 2013) we detail a public invest-
ment plan in energy transition. Table 2 gives an overview. This 
plan was put together drawing from materials such as white papers 
or Roadmaps published by the European Commission or the Euro-
pean Union. The iAGS 2014 report estimated the required 
investment surplus compared to a “business as usual” scenario. 
When investments in energy transition come in substitution of 
regular investments, there is no accounting of extra investment. 
The numbers in table 2 refer to extra investment over business as 
usual investment, and not, as usually, numbers generally presented 
as gross investment.
Such a package could increase investment in the euro area of an 
amount between 150 and 200 euro billions, i.e. between 1.4 and 
2 percentage points of GDP, if we add to the energy transition a 
recovery of public investment towards the pre-crisis trends. 
Combined with fiscal multipliers still high (especially considering 
that investment would be made more than proportionally in coun-
tries in crisis), one would expect this package to boost the European 
economy for about 2 percentage points of GDP. Although insuffi-
Figure 2. Private residential investment as percentage of potential activity
Source: Economic Outlook, 93, May 2013.
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A green “New Deal” to boost Europe 227cient to completely overcome the crisis, this stimulus would be a 
great step forward.
4. Financed by public debt
The financing of such a package is the key to its impact on the 
economy. The proposal here is to primarily finance it through 
public debt. This idea may seem shocking when, at least at first 
sight, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone was due to exces-
sive public debt. Yet the public investment implied by this package 
has a positive net worth since it allows preparing for the energy 
transition. This positive net value is computed on the basis of a 
widely studied implicit price for the ton of carbon depends. Given 
today’s low sovereign interest rates, the target price needs not to be 
very high (less than 50 euros per tCO2). The built infrastructures 
should target profitability. Various instruments can be used for this 
aim. The objective would to make explicit the price, so far implicit, 
of a ton of carbon, either through emissions rights trading or 
through a carbon tax. Standards, legal obligations or tax incentives 
may be other instruments to change incentives and behaviors.
In the case of buildings energy efficiency, financing is not 
necessarily public. To overcome blockages generally recognized 
that prevent positive net value investment to be realized, we 
propose third party investors schemes, in which specific agencies 
carry the debt related to investments and finance it through the 
realized energy savings. This can be combined with tax incen-
tives. Even in this case, a price per ton of carbon helps to increase 
the profitability of investment. This debt would not be public, but 
Table 2. Green New Deal
Billions of Euros per year
Annual investment 
EA17
Annual investment
EU28 
 “Low carbon” Transeuropean Transport 
Network (TEN-T) 50.7 80.00
European Integrated Electric networks 6.65 9.39
Renewable energy production 26.83 40.60
Buildings’ thermal renovation 48.43 64.31
Total 132.61 (1.4% of GDP) 194.30 (1.5% of GDP)
Sources: iAGS Report 2014 from (EC, 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; ENTSO-E, 2012; EREC (European Renewable 
Energy Council), 2011, ETUC, 2013, “The EU climate and energy package – European Commission”, nd).
Xavier Timbeau228in order to reduce its cost (and hence to increase investment profit-
ability), a public guaranteed can be designed, through large and 
regulated institutions.
5. Conclusion: how to control public investment?
The crisis was accompanied by a slowdown in investment at a 
moment in which, for a reasonable estimate of the implicit price of 
carbon reasonable, investment in the energy transition would be 
most needed and convenient. Low sovereigns rates in the euro area 
make financing this investment easy, and its sustainability is guar-
anteed by the accumulation of assets and unchanged net debt. The 
value of these assets will depend on the implicit price of carbon but 
explicit price changes may also be required as changes in behavior 
are likely to require strong price signals.
It remains that the proposal to increase debt may seem at odds 
with the current trend of public deficit reduction. The paradox is 
that fiscal rules in the EU focus on an irrelevant criterion, gross 
debt, instead of taking into account the correct measure, that is 
debt net of accumulated assets. Measuring the latter, however, 
requires an assessment of the value of these assets and the assess-
ment can be problematic because it is based on a projection into the 
future, of the return of the investment, but also of the changes in 
behavior induced by policies changes. For instance building freight 
railway transportation infrastructure is easy. But the value of such 
infrastructures depends on the quality of connection opened, the 
density of the network and the matching with flows of freight. A 
well-designed infrastructure will only have value if it is used and if 
the transport by road turns out to be more expensive than transport 
by rail. This can be done through an environmental tax, higher 
tolls, a ban on road transit or subsidies to rail transport. But without 
at least one of these accompanying policies, the new infrastructure 
may fail to capture traffic and therefore have no value.
The risk is that to revive our economies, heavy investment is 
undertaken where it is easy to invest rather than where it is appro-
priate. A number of schemes to stimulate investment (whether 
residential or infrastructure) are done with this perspective, and 
then suffer from low profitability. The European Commission has 
a potentially important tool to overcome this flaw. Current fiscal 
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incentive to reduce investment. If budget criteria were softened for 
investments with positive net worth, in an intelligent golden rule, 
the Commission could have a dialogue with European government 
on a project by project basis. In assessing a posteriori, the effective-
ness of investment, both in itself and concerning accompanying 
policies, the European Commission could control the quality of 
investments, avoiding the pitfall of grandiose but inadequate 
constructions. This would be a new instrument of public finance 
management in Europe and a way out of the absurd public debt 
hunting, including when it originates in necessary investment.
Some concrete proposals to overcome the crisis and at the same 
time address the urgency of energy transitions could be:
— Revive European economies through a public and private 
investment plan of about 2 percentage points of GDP per 
year, broken down as follows:
■ Public investment in the transition to low carbon 
economy, of the order of one percentage point of GDP per 
year;
■ End of under-investment in existing infrastructure (around 
0.5 percentage points of GDP);
■ Stimulus by various mechanisms of energy transition in 
the residential sector (around 0.5 percent of GDP).
— Partially finance the plan with public debt by amending the 
treaty provisions on stability and growth, so that govern-
ments need to target debt net of asset creation instead of 
gross debt. This goes along with proposals on introducing a 
golden rule;
— Support the investment plan with any tool that ensures its 
profitability (tax policies, emission rights, fiscal policies, 
taxation, subsidies or standards);
— Give a (trusted) third party the ex ante and ex post assessment 
of the value of public investment for the calculation of net 
debt to guarantee the policy coherence and effectiveness of 
proposed investments.

COMPETITION AND INNOVATION
A CHALLENGE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
Jean-Luc Gaffard and Lionel Nesta
OFCE-Sciences Po
Real divergences in economic performances that emerge between countries 
belonging to the Eurozone make it necessary to define an economic policy 
oriented towards a re-industrialization of some regions in Europe. In a world 
characterized by irreversibility of investment and imperfection of market infor-
mation, supply-side reforms should consist in establishing a framework aimed 
at supporting both competition and cooperation between the various players of 
innovation, and thus allowing firm strategies to be successful. This requires 
reconsidering both national and European policies that are growth-enhancing, 
that is, industrial policy, competition policy, labour policy, regional policy, and 
banking policy. However, any change in the industrial landscape in Europe will 
only be possible if a new macroeconomic policy prevents the inappropriate 
destruction of productive capacities.
1. A dangerous problem
There is now a new and very dangerous problem in Europe:  the 
increasing real divergence between European countries, particu-
larly between France and Germany both in terms of industry 
development and in terms of trade balance, which feeds the obses-
sion of competitiveness. 
As a matter of fact, unit labour costs have increased in France 
relatively to what happened in Germany. This is a signal of an 
increasing competitiveness gap, during the last decade. But it 
would be a mistake to only focus on costs and prices while the 
main difference between the two countries lies in the nature of 
industrial organisation.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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medium-sized firms (16,000 firms with between 500 and 5,000 
employees). Production segments are outsourced to low-cost coun-
tries with highly qualified employees, so that real wage costs 
(taking into account the labour costs of countries in Eastern 
Europe) are about 20% lower than those of other countries in the 
euro area. 
In France, large firms that are specialised in a specific area – 
aeronautics, energy, environment, luxury goods, etc. – perform 
exceptionally well on global markets. However, when these firms 
relocate some part of their business, it is to less-developed coun-
tries most often characterised by low wages and low skills. On the 
other hand, there are too few medium-sized firms (4,000 firms 
between 500 and 5,000 employees), and successful SMEs are 
rapidly sold and acquired by large firms, when they should instead 
be allowed to grow without losing their identity. The consequence 
is that firms belonging to large segments of industry are more 
sensitive to price competition.
During the 1990s, in manufacturing sector, the total firm turn-
over (entry plus exit rates) was about 3% in Germany, while it was 
around 11% in France. Moreover, firm exit outpaced firm entry in 
France, while Germany experienced a more balanced pattern. 
Entry and exit rates are positively correlated in Germany, while 
they are negatively correlated in France. This can be interpreted as 
meaning that the creative destruction process is predominant in 
Germany, while sector profit shock is predominant in France. 
However, another interpretation is possible: that in Germany 
market structures are relatively stabilised and investment behav-
iours are relatively well co-ordinated, while more turbulences 
persist in France, revealing a weaker degree of co-ordination within 
industries which affect firms’ performance.
Given this gap, and according to the actual consensus, supply 
or structural reforms would be the only way to re-establish growth 
and full employment, and to favour real convergence among the 
European countries. These reforms would consist in promoting 
competition to diminish economic rents on both the goods and 
the labour markets. In France for example, dismantle the 
monopoly power of taxis aimed at overcoming the shortage of 
supply should allow increasing competition and reducing prices. 
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less rigidity in labour times would favour employment and 
growth. Indeed, although the reduction of abnormal economic 
rents is well grounded in several instances, dismantling entry 
barriers is not the sole means neither a simple means to promote 
industrial development.
2. Real coordination issues
Competition plays a central role in the co-ordination process, as 
it determines the way in which the relevant market information is 
being made available step-by-step, so that the required adjust-
ments in productive capacity can actually take place. 
But, rather than conceiving competition as a state of affairs, it is 
more appropriate to conceive it as a process, whereby new products 
are being introduced onto the markets, and incumbents are being 
challenged by potential and actual new players. Competition helps 
to make innovation process viable and to obtain the productivity 
gains deriving from it. In this light, it is not only aimed at equal-
ising supply and demand in a given market and technological 
environment, but also has to adapt both structure and technology 
to the fresh opportunities created by expanding markets.
This is where argument about the real nature of the information 
process comes to rescue. Innovation requires both competitive and 
complementary investments. On the one hand, investment by a 
single firm will be profitable provided, first, that the volume of 
investment by rival does not exceed a critical threshold, and, 
secondly, that the volume of complementary investments reaches a 
minimum level. On the other hand, investments decisions are 
taken by entrepreneurs on the basis of expectations whose relia-
bility depends on their being grounded on adequate market 
information that is not immediately available. As a consequence, 
entrepreneurs will have access to the market information they 
require only if there exists a variety of restraints to which their 
freedom of action is subject. These restraints feature as imperfec-
tions or frictions, which are in the nature of the competitive system.
In this context, policies to ameliorate industry performance 
should be aimed at improving market information to firms, 
creating a more stable environment, and should then help indus-
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Obviously, governments do not have more accurate information 
than firms do about markets and technologies. But they have the 
devices that help firms to access information about market condi-
tions, and thus in their efforts to innovate and grow. 
3. Industrial policy
From this perspective, industrial policy, rather than being 
targeted at promoting specific sectors or technology, must be an 
array of horizontal interventions that concern the relations 
between firms, between firms and their employees, between firms 
and financial intermediaries, or between firms and public research 
institutions. This final option is preferable to any other since such 
intervention does not shield any particular firm or sector, but 
rather increases the quality of incentives, which are strongly 
dependent on conditions of co-ordination. Subsidies must not be 
devoted at supporting national champions or high tech sectors per 
se, but at encouraging cooperation between firms, including, of 
course, the firms that compete with each other. 
Hence industrial policies should be horizontal. But instead of 
replicating or re-establishing the conditions of full (perfect) 
competition as required by those calling for supply-side reforms, 
they should be aimed at validating some restraints or monopolist 
practices that allow firms acquiring market information.
In other words, competition policy must consider the distor-
tions that the growth process necessarily carries in and the 
necessity of having temporary market imperfections. Instead of 
targeting a mythic state of perfect competition, it must be aimed at 
enforcing the viability of the innovation process.
Connexions among firms can then be viewed as a necessary 
aspect of the production and the dissemination of knowledge in a 
market economy. In this perspective it is surely incorrect to call 
them imperfections: Schumpeter coined them as the natural 
features of an economic process driven by creative destruction. 
Therefore policy-makers face a dilemma. On the one hand, 
contrived arrangements help firms to invest and innovate, thereby 
contributing to economic growth. On the other hand, it is some-
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extract undue profits. But it is another story to argue that all imper-
fections are against the public interest per se. It is then necessary to 
provide policy makers with guidelines by specifying the circum-
stances in which these practices may or may not justified. 
4. Labour market policy
The prevailing view in the literature and in most political circles 
is that the possibility of hiring and firing freely, and of offering 
wages at a freely-chosen level, is an incentive to invest and hence 
favours innovation and growth.
Yet the fundamental aspect of a thorough process of innovation 
is the creation of skills. It results from job tenure and, thereby, 
favours on-the-job training. Employment protection affects not 
only employment but also human capital accumulation, and 
hence productivity and welfare. Then, labour market policies, far 
from being oriented to the dismantlement of the welfare state, 
should promote labour market organisation and forms of 
bargaining between employers and employees that help with 
adjustment to technological and market changes. In France, it 
would be more appropriate to reinforce bargaining procedures 
between employers and employees, and to revise the working of 
internal labour markets rather than suppress them.
Therefore, the effect of employment security regulation and of 
the partial reforms recently carried out, which extend to the use of 
temporary contracts for newly-hired workers leaving employment 
protection unchanged for permanent workers, and hence make the 
labour market more flexible, have only favoured a segmentation of 
this market and the appearance of a new category of workers, 
namely the ‘short-term’ workers. This segmentation might even be 
an obstacle to workers’ mobility and growth by preventing volun-
tary quits from ‘solid’ jobs.
5. Banking policy
Banking policy must be considered in relation to the problem of 
providing firms facing innovation processes with the required 
amount of liquidity, and the right distribution of this liquidity at 
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tant, not so much because they are associated with incentives 
schemes that are more or less appropriate in the sense of deter-
mining a higher or lower saving rate, a better or a worse resource 
allocation, but as for the capacity to smooth the fluctuations of 
outcome. Therefore the debate about the role and the functions of 
banks appears as essential. 
When liquidity is needed to cover sunk costs associated with 
research and development investments, what is at stake is the 
ability of financial intermediaries to support firms along this path. 
As a matter of fact, relationship-banks offer continuation – lending 
at more favourable terms than transaction banks to innovative 
firms. This is why the regulation of the banking system is neces-
sary. The separation between credit banks (or relationship-banks) 
and investment banks as proposed by European commission aims 
at ensuring that credit bank activities are not unduly influenced by 
a short-term oriented strategy associated with risky investment 
bank activities.
6. Regional policy
It goes without saying that industrial policies have a territorial 
dimension insofar as there are local learning processes. But, there is 
no evidence that local or regional governments are better informed 
than the national government, have a higher degree of compe-
tence, or are less easily captured by lobbyists. Competition between 
regional governments may prove inefficient if its main conse-
quence is to promote the performance of a small number of regions 
at the detriment of all others. Such inequalities would be detri-
mental to real convergence and affect negatively global efficiency. 
The conjecture can be made that the smaller the regions, the 
more wasteful competition between them will be. This might be so 
because small regions are more inclined to compete with each 
other by proposing generic advantages such as tax reductions or 
set-up subsidies, which reduce the sunk costs that firms have to 
bear and make setting-up more instable. Larger regions, on the 
other hand, would be more inclined to promote cooperation 
between firms within and outside its territory, and to pay subsidies 
aimed at sustaining large public programmes such as environ-
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mass, to allow diversification or differentiation among regions, 
and most of all, to facilitate adjustments to changes affecting tech-
nologies and preferences.
Clusters as well as technological competencies are the result of 
innovation rather than a precondition of it. Again, policy-makers 
face a dilemma, which concerns both the appropriate level of deci-
sion-making and the relevant geographical area of public 
intervention. 
7. The European challenge
The main objective of any policy in Europe should be to re-
establish the conditions of a convergence in real terms, which 
means re-establishing a balanced trade between the large European 
countries, and, thus, re-industrialising some parts of the euro-zone. 
This requires reconsidering both national and European policies 
that are growth-enhancing, that is, competition policy, labour 
policy, regional policy, but also industrial policy stricto sensu.
First of all, it would be worthwhile to abandon the idea that 
supply-side reforms making the factor markets – among which the 
labour market – more flexible in all countries would reinforce the 
competitiveness of each without damaging global demand and 
growth at the European level. Efforts by governments to reduce the 
cost of labour can only be bounded, for the target cannot be to 
reach a cost of labour similar to that of, say, Eastern European 
countries. More flexibility in the factor market may be worthwhile 
only when backed by strong public support. For example, it has 
been shown that liberalization in the energy markets has led to an 
upsurge in innovation in renewable energy only when strong poli-
cies supporting green innovation are being implemented. In the 
same vein, the search for increased flexibility in the labour market 
encouraging professional mobility should be accompanied by 
strong support to lifelong learning, among other things. More than 
securing employment, public policies should secure employability.     
Therefore, in contrast with the common belief that competition 
demands no or low state intervention, industrial policy and 
competition policy might appear as complements in favouring 
innovation. Supply-side reforms should consist in establishing a 
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eration between the various players of innovation processes. This is 
largely the case in Germany, but not in France and not at the Euro-
pean level. Therefore, other countries in Europe should take 
advantage of the German experience and revisit their national 
policies. At the same time, a new European initiative should take 
the form of large public programmes defined at appropriate 
geographic levels, that is, levels that permit avoiding the destruc-
tive competition between regions or countries, typically 
technological programmes in transversal fields such as energy 
production and distribution, transportation, health-related indus-
tries such as the pharmaceutical industry. 
The main reason for developing such programmes is that they 
qualify as general purpose technologies, rather than being sector 
specific both in terms of activities, firms and countries, and they 
aim at improving market information for firms, creating a more 
stable environment, making it credible and relevant for these firms 
to invest. 
It remains that changes in the industrial landscape in Europe 
will only be possible if a new macroeconomic policy is under way. 
Generalised austerity is now destroying large segments of the Euro-
pean industry. Although fiscal consolidation is a necessary part of 
a rebalancing strategy, it should be progressive, going hand to 
hand with structural reforms that correspond to a coherent variety 
of capitalism.
EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION 
AND ASYLUM POLICIES
THE NEED FOR A CHANGE OF APPROACH
Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche
Jean Moulin Lyon III University, Institut Universitaire de France
European immigration and asylum policies need to be reconsidered. Indeed,
the current approach is based on a misdiagnosis: contrary to prevailing opinion,
receiving third-country nationals is not only financially sustainable but also
economically strategic. As a result, current measures have proven to be detri-
mental: the European union EU and its Member States have both deprived
themselves of a means of responsible development and lost their standing in
the protection of rights. In other words, the mismanagement of a politically
sensitive issue has unfortunately harmed the competiveness and credibility of
the EU and its Member States. 
Observations, comments, criticisms, proposals and recom-
mendations on European immigration and asylum policies are in
order as the European elections approach and as the follow-up to
the Stockholm programme is being prepared.1 The Tampere 1999,2
Hague 2004,3 and Stockholm 20094 Programmes set guidelines for
European immigration and asylum policies that are both politi-
cally and legally challenging.
1. See the answers to the consultation the Commission launched on 29 October 2013 on the
Debate on the future of Home Affairs policies: An open and safe Europe – what next?, http://
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2013/consulting_0027_en.htm
2. Tampere European Council, 15 & 16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions, points 13 to 17.
3. Brussels European Council, 4 & 5 November 2004, Presidency Conclusions, points 14 to 20.
4. Brussels European Council, 10 & 11 December 2009, Presidency Conclusions, points 25
to 33.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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results from a misdiagnosis that has led to wrong remedies, which 
have in turn caused new problems. The misdiagnosis comes from 
the idea that the reception of immigrants and asylum seekers is not 
financially sustainable in Europe because of the economic crisis 
and budgetary constraints. While four fifths of migration is South-
South migration, many economic studies show that receiving 
migrants is an engine for growth, and some call for removing visa 
restrictions on migration in order to promote economic recovery 
in the South and North (OECD, 2013; Bodvarsson and Van den 
Berg, 2013). Such a misreading has impacted the choice of reme-
dies. Methods that involve choosing, and actually reducing, legal 
immigration by strengthening external border controls – and 
externalising them if necessary – have led to unfortunate conse-
quences: the latter notably include the wrongful refusal to 
recognise international protection, the worrisome growth in illegal 
immigration, the dangerous contribution to a nationalist and even 
xenophobic atmosphere, the increasing number of shipwreck 
victims, and the consolidation of human trafficking networks.5
The current approach is also legally problematic. Connecting 
immigration and asylum issues has simply allowed the funda-
mental right to asylum6 to be undermined by migration 
management imperatives (Julien-Laferrière et ali., 2013; Belorgey, 
2013). The need for a change of approach seems imperative and 
involves making a distinction between asylum and immigration, 
which pertain to different political dynamics and legal frame-
works. The goal is to develop a new model for addressing asylum 
and immigration. 
1. Rethinking the approach to granting asylum 
While the asylum package (recast) that is supposed to create a 
Common European Asylum System CEAS is to be enforced, a crit-
5. Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, “European Union 
border control policies undermine human rights”, CP, 06/11/2013.
6. The issue is not only a moral imperative affirmed at the international level by the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 14), but also a legal obligation under the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees along with the 1967 New York Protocol, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Art. 18) and indirectly the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Art. 3).   
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Union has developed on asylum. Directive 2011/95/EU (the so-
called Recast Qualification Directive) provisions that are clear, 
precise and unconditional, entered into force on 22 December 
2013.7 For now, Member States have been working to reform their 
national asylum systems to ensure the transposition into national 
law of this text, as well as the recast Directives on Reception Condi-
tions8 and Asylum Procedures.9 The application of the Dublin III 
Regulation 604/2013/EU started 1 January 2014;10 whereas Eurodac 
Regulation 603/2013/EU will start on 20 July 2011.11 This is there-
fore a good time to ask whether the CEAS complies with obligations 
under the 1951 Geneva Convention: without requiring that States 
grant asylum to refugees, it imposes an obligation of non-refoule-
ment to a country where their life or freedom might be threatened 
on one of the grounds listed in the Convention (art. 33-1), and an 
obligation to grant immunity from penalties for their illegal entry 
or stay (art. 31-1). Yet the difficulties asylum seekers experience in 
submitting an application for international protection – and even 
more so in being granted it – highlight the necessity to simplify 
access to international protection on the one hand, and guarantee 
protection to those who need it on the other.
1.1. The need to simplify access to protection 
In order to guarantee the effectiveness of the fundamental right 
of asylum, two objectives must be formulated and pursued: first, 
the clarity of the procedures for determining the EU Member State 
that is responsible for examining the asylum applications lodged 
by a third country national should be enhanced; secondly, the 
7. Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 amending Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 
2004 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals as refugees or as persons who 
need temporary protection. 
8. Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 amending Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 
laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in Member States. 
9. Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 amending Directive 2005/85/EC of 1st December 
2005 on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
10. Regulation 604/2013/EU of 26 June 2013 amending Regulation 343/2003/EC of 18 February 
2003 on determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged 
by a third-country national, also known as Dublin II. 
11. Regulation 603/2013/EU of 26 June 2013 amending Regulation Eurodac 2725/2000/EC of 
11 December 2000 on the creation of a system for the registration and comparison of the 
fingerprints of asylum seekers; Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection in the event of a massive influx of displaced persons.
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emphasis on the principle of human dignity.    
Under the Dublin II and now Dublin III Regulations, only one 
Member State is responsible for considering an asylum application 
presented by a third country national on the EU territory. It is thus 
assumed that all Member States process asylum applications in the 
same way. This is deleterious fiction that contributes to glaring 
inequalities in access to the right to asylum. The criteria used to 
determine which State is responsible for examining an asylum 
application tend to entrust to the State with which the asylum-
seeker has family, administrative or material ties. Yet the responsi-
bility for handling the application is most often entrusted to the 
State where the migrant first entered the EU. Access to interna-
tional protection hence depends on the geographical origin, 
financial resources and migration paths of third-country nationals 
seeking asylum. This results in great discrepancy in the effective-
ness of such a fundamental right; which is not compatible with 
international, European, national legal instruments of human 
rights protection. 
Regarding the reception conditions, they harshly depend on 
the concerned EU Member States. In some of them (i.e. Greece, 
Bulgaria), the ECtHR has notably acknowledged inhuman and 
degrading treatments, as defined in Article 3 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.12 Moreover, reception conditions are highly tricky as 
the almost systematic detention of asylum seekers, including 
vulnerable people, is admitted. While the Commission was 
pushing for a framework on detention during the negotiations on 
the Reception Conditions Directive and Dublin III Regulation, 
Member States imposed vague formulations granting them consid-
erable leeway in their interpretation, assessment and action. To be 
sure, States cannot detain a person solely on the ground that s/he is 
requesting international protection. However, Member States can 
detain asylum seekers on a great number of loosely termed 
grounds. The situation of asylum seekers is thus in quite an odd 
manner finally similar to the one of illegally staying third country 
12. ECH Court, 21 01 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Req. n° 30696/09; CJEU, GC, 21/12 
2011, N.S. et ali., joined cases C-411/10 & C-493/10.
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that, besides, limits asylum seekers’ access to the legal assistance 
needed to seek international protection and claim their corre-
sponding rights (Basilien-Gainche, 2014).
1.2. The need to grant required international protection
In addition to the need to simplify access to international 
protection, there is a need to grant asylum to those who need it. 
The CEAS fails in doing so because it allows for many procedural 
exemptions and substantive limitations.
The recast Asylum Procedures Directive establishes common 
standards of safeguards and guarantees to access a fair and efficient 
asylum procedure. The procedures applicable for the examination 
of asylum applications have actually proven to be long. The new EU 
norms tend therefore to make them faster and firmer, even though 
such procedures may in practice last 21 months some asylum 
seekers are likely to spend in detention. However States sought and 
managed to drastically reduce the duration of asylum procedures 
when applications are deemed inadmissible or unfounded, in order 
not to better guarantee effective access to the right to asylum but to 
better limit public expenses. Two issues are worth mentioning 
(Julien-Laferrière et ali. 2013). First, numerous grounds allow the 
bypassing of normal and lengthy procedures, and some are in 
contradiction with the principles linked to the right to asylum (the 
principle whereby the asylum seeker does not need to have any 
document whatsoever to be able to exit a State’s territory and enter 
the territory of another State to seek international protection). 
Second, such derogatory accelerated procedures allow States to 
swiftly remove asylum seekers. Admittedly, judicial remedies exist. 
However, effective protection against a decision of refusal of entry 
into the territory or access to normal procedures is particularly 
hindered by the lack of an automatic suspensive effect.13
This is the case when an asylum seeker is the national of a “safe 
country of origin.” This notion is very awkward because Member 
States do not interpret it in the same way and some consider 
notable dangerous countries as safe (i.e. France regarded Ukraine as 
13. Also see ECH Court, 2 02 2012, I.M. v. France, n° 9152/09.
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narrow view of international protection and of the right of asylum. 
If asylum seekers are unable to benefit from the conventional 
protection and so the refugee status, they might be granted EU 
subsidiary protection. Nevertheless these two forms of interna-
tional protection are not equivalent: the former confers the right 
to a long-term residence permit whereas the latter only guarantees 
a temporary residence permit. While the number of asylum appli-
cations has risen (435 000 in 2013 versus 332 000 in 2012 and 
302 000 in 2011), this increase needs to be assessed within a longer 
time frame (480 000 in 2001). The HCR has estimated that the 
number of asylum seekers has fallen by 42% over the past decade 
across industrialised countries.14 While 102 700 third country 
nationals received protection in 2012 in Europe, they only 
accounted for 25% of asylum seekers.15 Worlwide, the CEAS is the 
most developed harmonised regional asylum regime. Yet it is still 
largely conditioned by its implementation by Member States that 
view the right to asylum as an element of immigration manage-
ment. This also needs to be reconsidered.
2. Renewing the approach to immigration management 
Although not all migrants who come to Europe looking for a 
better life are asylum seekers, many of them are. This is the case of 
the Eritrean, Somali and Syrian migrants who venture onto the 
Mediterranean sea to escape the persecution stemming from the 
conflicts that plague their countries of origin. 20.000 of them have 
perished in the Mediterranean over the past 20 years, including 
4 000 in the last two years. It can besides be argued that the situa-
tion of those shipwrecked at sea does not fall within the scope of 
migration policy, but rather the basic obligation to protect the 
right to live that is of particular importance in the Law of the Sea.16
Yet the reality of these shipwrecks highlights the harmful implica-
tions, to say the least, of the policies implemented by the European 
Union and its Members States to manage migration flows and 
14. http://www.unhcr.fr/522f2ad59.pdf
15. Eurostat, “Decisions on asylum applications in the EU27”, 96/2013 to 18/06/2013.
16. Labayle H., 2013. “Lampedusa: chronique de drames annonces” [Lampedusa: chronicle of 
tragedies], http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/2013/10/14/asile/ lampedusa-chronique-de-drames-annonces/
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should be reviewed in particular: it is necessary to question and 
evaluate the redefinition of the EU borders as they are relocated, 
extra-territorialised and de-territorialized.
2.1. The need to question the extra-territorialisation of borders
In order to secure Europe’s borders, migration policies have 
focused on preventing the arrival of migrants by outsourcing 
border control to neighbouring States on the one hand, and by 
entrusting the Frontex agency with the coordinationof surveil-
lance operations on the other.
The EU and its States have transferred the responsibility for 
monitoring borders to neighbouring countries by prompting them 
to accept migration related provisions in some agreements, or to 
conclude readmission agreements, as a condition of development 
aid.17 In order to meet European requirements, neighbouring 
countries modify their norms and practices: they have employed 
ethnic profiling at border crossings, confiscation of travel docu-
ments, detention in centres funded by the EU, inhuman and 
degrading treatments, and practices of pushback of migrants to the 
desert. Moreover neighbouring States tend to prevent the depar-
ture of people suspected of wanting to apply for asylum in Europe, 
hence depriving them of the right to leave a country, including 
theirs (COE, 2013). This raises some concern about the credibility 
of EU discourses regarding human rights protection.
Frontex coordination of border surveillance operations brings 
up the issue, among other troubling ones, of the responsibility for 
the violation of rights committed during related operations. The 
aim of these being to locate, catch and redirect migrants to their 
country of departure or transit, interceptions can take place in 
international waters or in the territorial waters of third countries, 
in conjunction with police authorities of partner States under 
working agreements concluded and implemented by Frontex 
without any monitoring.18 The issue of shared responsibility is 
17. Billet C., 2010. “EC Readmission Agreements: A Prime Instrument of the External 
Dimension of the EU’s Fight against Irregular Immigration”, European Journal of Migration and 
Law, 12/1, 45-79.
18. Own-initiative inquiry launched by the European Ombudsman on the compliance of 
Frontex with fundamental rights obligations, OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ.
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law of the Luxembourg Court.19 However, the Council of Europe 
has asserted its positions: the Strasbourg Court found Italy in viola-
tion of its extra-territorial human rights obligations under the 
ECHR, reminding the country of the implications of exercising its 
jurisdiction over a vessel flying its flag and receiving shipwreck 
victims on the high seas;20 the Parliamentary Assembly has worked 
on the problem of Lives Lost in the Mediterranean Sea (doc. 12895 of 
5 April 2012). Yet the responsibility that Frontex must bear raises 
the question of what to do with people who have been rescued, 
particularly where they should be disembarked. Here the denial of 
responsibility highlights the lack of solidarity between the Member 
States. Furthermore, Frontex is in charge of managing Eurosur, the 
European Border Surveillance System that has been running since 
December 2013 and includes all the personal databases involved in 
home affairs.
2.2. The need to assess the digitalization of borders
The extra-territorialisation of borders occurs through their digi-
talization: migrants’ personal data are collected, consulted, and 
exploited throughout their journey.
The goal of the European Union and its Members is to create a 
digital grid over the space they wish to control by using databases, 
and to streamline cooperation between the authorities that use 
them through interoperability between these databases (Visa Infor-
mation System; Schengen Information System; European Electronic 
System of Travel Authorisation; Entry/Exit System; Register Traveller 
Programme; Eurodac system). There are problems with the guaran-
tees offered to migrants regarding the use of personal data thus 
collected and used. In particular, the new version of the Eurodac 
Regulation paves the way for national and European police author-
ities invoking fights against organised crime and terrorism to access 
this database of asylum-seeker fingerprints. This results in the 
assimilation of asylum seekers and migrants on the one hand, with 
criminals and terrorists on the other, thereby fostering a xeno-
phobic atmosphere and encouraging a criminalizing approach, 
19. CJEU, GC, 5 09 2012, Parliament v. Council, case C-355/10.
20. ECH Court, GC, 23 02 2012, Hirsi Jamaa v. Italie, Req. n° 27765/09.
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in Europe.
Nevertheless using these new surveillance technologies comes 
at a cost. One is financial: the public funding of technological 
research and development programmes that support the activities 
of private sector operators, as well as the public expenses of 
purchasing systems developed by these private operators who 
market them (Bigo et ali., 2010). There is also a political cost, given 
that the surveillance operations are conducted by private opera-
tors, for instance when processing visa applications on behalf of 
consulates, or when airline companies check identity documents 
of their boarding passengers. For the time being, the efficiency of 
such expenditures, which have reached billions of euros, has not 
been questioned.
3. Conclusion
Reforming Europe involves questioning the model that Euro-
pean immigration and asylum policies are following, in order to 
unveil its disadvantages and contradictions. The idea is to 
profoundly change the way the EU and its Member States deal with 
such a sensitive issue. 
A few recommendations:
1. Conduct quantified cost-benefit analyses of external border 
control policies by dividing total expenditures by the 
number of intercepted third-country nationals; by consid-
ering the social cost of the absence of a willingness to 
integrate foreign populations and to provide a welcome 
worthy of asylum seekers; by accounting for the foregone 
economic growth incurred by the closing of borders.      
2. Reverse the conception and implementation of immigration 
and asylum policies by clearly distinguishing asylum rights 
from migration management; by understanding sovereignty 
as the power not only to refuse, but also to accept the entry 
of a third-country national; by defining guidelines no longer 
in terms of private operators’ needs, but rather in terms of 
public authorities’ ambitions; by considering immigration as 
Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche 248a driver of responsible development; and by asserting asylum 
as a fundamental right to which there may be no derogation. 
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EUROPE’S TRADE POLICY 
BETWEEN THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL STABILITY 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Pierre Boulanger and Patrick Messerlin1
Sciences Po, Groupe d'économie mondiale
This paper situates the EU's trade policy in the much broader context of the 
integration of regional and international markets. While the WTO is arguably 
the best forum to negotiate quantifiable targets and to handle dispute settle-
ment, its primacy in regulatory matters is less obvious. The EU is engaged in the 
negotiation of numerous preferential trade and investment agreements, with 
objectives that differ depending on the partner country or region. This article 
therefore proposes distinguishing between a policy for a “near circle” (countries 
neighbouring the EU), dominated by a goal of political stability, and a policy 
for a “broad circle” (countries with a level of development comparable to that 
of the EU), dominated by a goal of economic growth. 
The European Union (EU) is the world’s leading commercial 
player, in terms of both exports and imports. This supremacy is 
however crumbling rapidly with the emergence of new trading 
countries, in Asia in particular. The EU has opened its borders, and 
is continuing to do so. In 2014, the average Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariff applied was 5.5%, with a rate reaching 14.8% in agri-
culture and high rates (over 10%) on a significant number of 
industrial products (WTO, 2013).2 
1. The opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the authors alone.
2. It should be pointed out that this article does not deal with the access of the least developed 
countries to the European market, nor the preferences accorded to the developing countries.Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
Pierre Boulanger and  Patrick Messerlin 250The WTO has lost its role as a forum for negotiations, but not 
with regard to disputes. The Doha Round has stalled, perhaps for a 
long time. The reasons for this are to be found in the major geopo-
litical swing that is taking place between the United States, Europe 
and Asia-Pacific, and not in trade relations per se. The stall in the 
Doha process is one of the effects of this ongoing mutation, which 
is affecting a wide range of diverse issues, including climate 
change, water supplies and the struggle to promote growth in 
Africa.3 Free trade zones of an unprecedented size are being negoti-
ated, such as the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the EU-Japan agree-
ment, the China-Japan-Korea agreement, and the Taiwan-
mainland China agreement. These agreements pose a real systemic 
risk to the functioning of the international trading system due to 
their ability to fragment the global economy. These cross negotia-
tions deserve special consideration with regard to the strategy of 
opening up the European market.
The EU has exclusive competence in trade and investment 
policy. Before starting negotiations over a preferential trade and 
investment agreement (PTIA), the Commission must first obtain 
permission from the Council, which decides on a qualified 
majority. To ratify an agreement, the European Parliament (simple 
majority) and the Council (qualified majority) vote on the agree-
ments in their entirety. The unanimity of the Council is required 
in some cases, particularly for the ratification of provisions relating 
to intellectual property rights to certain services (audiovisual, 
education and health).
This article distinguishes between the EU’s trade policy towards 
its neighbours (near circle) and policy towards its trading partners 
that are at a similar stage of development (broad circle). Indeed, 
signing a PTIA with countries in the broad circle is a unique way to 
boost European growth. This differentiation between near circle 
and broad circle policies will help to situate the EU’s trade policy 
within a perspective of economic diplomacy based on differenti-
ated gains: on the one hand, stability and peace in a regionally 
3. A great deal of research has been devoted to the determinants of the marasm ensnaring the 
WTO. Messerlin (2012a) presents an overview of the international and domestic reasons.
Europe’s trade policy 251integrated EU; and on the other, economic growth stimulated by 
targeted global integration.
1. Policy on the near circle: the argument of political stability 
The EU’s trade policy for its neighbourhood is a key element in 
its external activity. Based on full membership in the EU or on the 
conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, this near circle trade 
policy aims to promote peace and stability on the borders of the EU 
on the one hand and economic development through the expan-
sion of the common market on the other. The political aspect 
corresponds to a short-term need, particularly in response to the 
recent crises on the southern and eastern borders of the EU. The 
economic criterion is reflected in the spread of European regula-
tions in a space that is thus conducive to the flow of goods, 
services, people and capital.
The EU is composed of 28 members. The recent accession of 
Croatia is the result of a gradual process that started well before 
July 2013. Furthermore, this will encourage the faster economic 
integration of other Balkan countries so as to reduce trade distor-
tions, mainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (Boulanger, 
Ferrari, Michalek Vinyes, 2013). Serbia is a candidate for EU 
membership, along with Iceland,4 Montenegro, the Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey. However, these countries 
are at different stages of integration, with the customs union 
between the EU and Turkey having entered into force in 19955
while Serbia began accession negotiations only in January 2014. 
Potential candidates such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo,6 for which accession negotiations have not yet been 
opened, are on a path for integration into the common market so 
as to benefit from a process of stabilization and association.
4. Iceland, a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), like Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Sweden, has already entered into a process of integration into the European 
common market. Unlike the European Neighbourhood Policy, EU-EFTA relations are dictated by 
economic considerations, as with the broad circle policy with countries at a similar stage of 
development.
5. Andorra and Saint Marin also have a customs union with the EU.  
6. “This designation is without prejudice to positions on its status and is in conformity with 
Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council as well as with the opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo”.
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countries bordering the EU, is a tool of economic diplomacy of 
inestimable influence. The 16 countries in the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy will bring together more than 330 million people 
in 2030, corresponding to two-thirds of the EU population.7 The 
neighbourhood policy is based on the negotiation of PTIA agree-
ments that are called Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTAs). Unlike existing agreements – association 
with the South, or partnership and cooperation with Eastern 
Europe – the scope of liberalization covered by a DCFTA goes well 
beyond simply reducing barriers or opening tariff quotas. It 
includes trade in services, government procurement, competition, 
intellectual property rights, and the protection of investments. It 
tends to integrate the ENP countries into the European single 
market gradually, as they adopt numerous technical standards and 
regulations (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary measures) and develop 
enhanced cooperation.8 In order to cope in particular with the 
high cost of implementing European standards, the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which covers 
the 16 ENP countries and Russia, has a budget of about 15 billion 
euros for the period 2014-2020.  
The ENP countries are characterized by 1) an asymmetric trade 
relationship with the EU, 2) a significant growth potential but 
requiring prior political stability, and 3) a mediocre regulatory 
system, aside from a few exceptions such as Georgia, whose Doing 
Business performance indicator outstrips that of some EU coun-
tries. The greater freedom of movement of goods and services 
should be accompanied by an increase in capital flows between 
partner countries and by transparency and predictability in the 
regulatory framework. Likewise, cooperation between countries 
should allow greater mobility of people. It is worth noting that the 
latter already exists and should be enhanced by the cooperation 
7. The enlargement policy countries will represent some 20% of the EU’s population in 2030, 
mainly due to the weight of Turkey, which will have a population of between 81 and 93 million 
by 2030 (UN Population and World Prospects, 2010 projections: http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/population/).
8. The Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean and Black Sea Synergy are 
regional forums that help to strengthen cooperation projects that include public and private 
bodies.
Europe’s trade policy 253provided for in the DCFTAs. The number of visas issued is a good 
indicator of mobility (Table 1). 
The benefits expected from integration depend on a significant 
reduction in non-tariff barriers. Modelling this shows that the 
aggregate GDP of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia could increase by 
more than 10 billion euros in 2020 (2.7% of GDP) due to a DCFTA, 
compared with the status quo in trade matters. While the increase 
in European GDP is much less (6 billion), the gains from a stable 
Table 1. Europe’s near circle policy
EU total 
import.
EU total 
export.
GDP/
capita
Doing 
Business 1
 Schengen
Visas
DCFTA
Negociations 
2011
In %
2011
In %
2012
In €
2014
rank
2012
1000s
As of 01/01/
2014
EU 6.42 7.83 25,500 5-103
Neighbourhood policy - South
Algeria 52.1 50.8 4.405 153 280.4
Egypt 29.1 30.7 2.360 128 120.9 Underway
Israel 34.6 27.7 24.969 35 11.3
Jordan 20.6 4.7 3.815 119 34.7 Underway
Lebanon 36.1 11.9 8.110 111 85.5
Morocco 48.3 57.5 2.380 87 322.1 Underway
Palestine 9.2* 1.7* 1.890 138 2.5
Syria 25.3* 40.5* 2.114* 165 3.3
Tunisia 57.5 76.4 3.334 51 110.1 Underway
Neighbourhood policy - East
Armenia 26.0 46.0 2.364 37 35.8 Agreed
Azerbaijan 32.3 59.6 5.820 70 49.9
Belorussia 18.9 38.9 5.204 63 693.4
Georgia 29.0 26.5 2.700 8 59.4 Agreed 
Moldova 43.5 48.9 1.662 78 48.6 Agreed 
Ukraine 31.2 26.3 2.935 112 1 283.0 Underway
Enlargement policy
Adhesion negotiations in course Iceland, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey
Potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo
1. The higher a country's rank, the weaker its regulatory performance. 
2. Exports from the EU towards the ENP countries as a % of total EU exports
3. Imports of the EU from ENP countries as a % of total EU imports.
* 2010.
Sources: European Commission (2013), Eurostat, Doing Business.
Pierre Boulanger and  Patrick Messerlin 254and transparent regulatory environment (conducive to invest-
ments), and especially the non-monetary gains (political stability), 
are not taken into account (Boulanger, Kavallari, Rau, Rutten, 
2013). Finally, any trade openness leads to winners and losers, 
which should be targeted by public redistribution and adjustment 
policies, such as provisions of the CAP related to investments in 
human and physical capital or measures funded by the European 
Globalization Adjustment Fund helping people who have lost their 
jobs as a result of major structural changes in international trade. 
In the short term, the economic integration of the near circle is 
first and foremost a political objective. For the broad circle, the 
objective is above all economic, and PTIA negotiations need to be 
guided by the search for growth.
2. Policy on the broad circle: the argument of economic 
growth
Any PTIA signed by the EU must be evaluated according to its 
ability to stimulate growth in Europe and to promote any reforms 
needed there. PTIAs that are unable to stimulate growth will not 
be of interest to Europe’s top politicians (Heads of State or Govern-
ment, Ministers of Finance). They will thus be left to the special 
interests, leading to only limited results while exacerbating the 
internal conflicts that any liberalization triggers, even a small-
scale one. 
This ability to stimulate growth requires that the partner of a 
PTIA should satisfy three conditions: 1) it must be sufficiently large 
compared to the huge European economy, 2) it must have a good 
“regulatory quality” compared to that of Europe, and 3) it must be 
well connected to the rest of the world. If the Doha round had 
succeeded in opening all the world’s economies simultaneously on 
a non-discriminatory basis, Europe’s businesses would have been 
able to find countries that meet these three conditions at any time. 
Liberalization based on a series of PTIA negotiations makes it 
necessary to determine which countries will be most likely to meet 
these three criteria, prior to launching negotiations.
The size criterion is based on a simple argument: the larger the 
size of the partner’s markets, the more European firms can increase 
the economies of scale of their operations and the variety of their 
Europe’s trade policy 255products, and, as a consequence, the more the PTIA in question 
will help to change the relative prices of goods and services in 
Europe. This change in relative prices is the mechanism that 
enables Europe’s consumers to find more varied and cheaper prod-
ucts and services. This size criterion has a crucial time dimension, 
because the EU is facing a pressing need for growth. The EU has 
little interest today in initiating negotiations with a partner that is 
too small to have an impact on the EU economy, even if this 
partner has a huge growth potential in the distant future. Being 
late in opening negotiations (once the partner has passed its peak 
size) has a considerable opportunity cost for Europe’s growth. 
The EU-Korea agreement could be considered a model. This 
recent agreement (signed in 2010) between two developed econo-
mies takes into account almost all the subjects that other PTIA 
negotiators need to address. In addition, there is good reason to 
believe that the provisions of the TPP will be close to those of the 
EU-Korea Economic Partnership Agreement (and Korea-USA). This 
observation stems from Korea’s very peculiar positioning as a dual 
“platform” in terms of both investment and trade. The expected 
benefits of this agreement for trade are considerable, on the order 
of 50 billion euros (Table 2).
The level of average trade protection between the EU and the 
countries of the broad circle is low (European exports, however, 
may face weighted average protection on the order of 10% 
imposed by India and Mercosur). It is possible to approximate a 
PTIA’s growth potential by calculating for each agreement an indi-
cator for the expansion of the European market, defined as the 
ratio between the GDP of the EU’s trading partner and the EU’s 
GDP (Table 2). This ratio provides an order of magnitude of the 
potential economies of scale and the diversity of goods that the 
given PTIA will allow European companies, and based on that, its 
ability to stimulate Europe’s growth. This indicator reflects how 
predominant the TTIP and the EU-Japan agreement are. However, 
an EU-Taiwan-China agreement would allow the European market 
to expand by 176% by 2030 (not shown in Table 2, as negotiations 
have not opened), with Taiwan acting as a “platform” for the 
Chinese market.
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argument: the better the partner’s regulations, the more the EU is 
forced to improve its own regulations to provide European compa-
nies with the same regulatory quality that its partner offers its own 
businesses. High quality regulations have proven to be a powerful 
tool for changing the relative prices of goods and services. Regula-
tory quality is especially important for the forthcoming PTIAs, 
which will be dominated by regulatory issues, such as product 
standards, regulations shaping the market in services, intellectual 
property rights, etc. Once again this indicator shows the predomi-
nance of the TTIP and the EU-Japan agreement. The specific 
economic impact of these PTIAs has been assessed, with the effects 
on GDP, exports and European imports presented in Table 2. The 
cumulative benefit of the negotiations currently underway will 
come to 150 billion euros, two-thirds of this simply for the TTIP 
and EU-Japan agreement. Over the longer term the cumulative 
gain could rise to 250 billion euros (2% of EU GDP) and generate 
2 million jobs in the EU (European Commission, 2012).
Table 2. Europe's broad circle policy
Average 
weighted 
duty 
imposed 
by the EU1
Average 
weighted 
duty on 
exports 
from EU1
Doing 
Business2
Expan-
sion of the 
European 
market
Expan-
sion 
of the 
European 
market 
PTIA 
Impact 
on EU 
GDP3
PTIA 
Impact 
on EU 
exports3
PTIA 
Impact 
on EU3
2011
In %
2011
In %
 2014
Rank
2010
% GDP
2030
% GDP
billion 
euros
billion 
euros
billion 
euros
Negotiations concluded – model agreement
Korea 1.8 2.1 7 6.3 6.7 9.5 25.2 23.6
Negotiations underway
USA 1.8 1.3 4 94.7 110.9 65.7 29.4 29.0
Japan 3.2 3.7 27 33.9 36.1 42.9 25.2 25.8
Mercosur 4.4 10.5  116* 15.5 28.3 21.5 13.7 14.2
Canada 1.6 2.8 19 9.7 10.3 10.1 14.6 6.0
ASEAN 2.3 2.9 120* 11.4 53.2 4.4 33.7 30.1
India 2.5 9.0 134 10.7 49.7 3.8 11.6 11.8
GCC 0.4 5.8 23* 5.8 11.6 — — —
1. Average of duty applied weighted by the flow of imports/exports.
2. The higher a country’s rank, the weaker its regulatory performance.
3. Different methodology applied to the examination of each free-trade agreement (FTA); results to be taken with 
caution (particularly for the breakdown of the agricultural sector).
* Indonesia (ASEAN), Brazil (Mercosur), United Arab Emirates (Gulf Cooperation Council).
Sources: European Commission (2012), Messerlin (2012b), Doing Business.
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the EU in terms of connectivity, or the platform effect. Clearly, a 
country that already has a network with preferential economic 
agreements with other countries offers Europe’s businesses new 
opportunities – whether these businesses sell their products in the 
partner country itself or invest in the partner in order to produce 
the goods it sells in the countries connected to it. In other words, 
the connectivity of the EU’s partner may allow European compa-
nies to benefit immediately from the partner’s network of 
preferential agreements to penetrate these third countries; for 
example, Korea provides a platform to the United States, Canada, 
the countries of Southeast Asia, Japan and China (ASEAN +3). 
In short, with respect to economic size, regulatory quality and 
connectivity (three key criteria for a PTIA to be a source of growth), 
the European Commission’s choices in 2006 were unfortunate 
(Global Europe). None of the countries targeted by the Commis-
sion (Brazil, India and Russia) meets the above conditions (and the 
serious reluctance of these countries to open their economies to 
international competition further reinforces the unfortunate 
nature of the Commission's choices). On the other hand, the 
United States and Japan do meet these conditions, hence the EU’s 
“pivot” towards these countries in 2013.  
The TTIP and the EU-Japan agreement offer the best support 
available to meet the EU’s urgent need for growth, because these 
two countries are large enough, have a sufficiently high regulatory 
quality, and are well connected enough to have an impact on the 
European economy. Like Korea, Japan, with its preferential agree-
ments in force or under negotiation, seems to be an essential 
“platform” for European companies that are seeking access to 
other Asian economies, without needing to wait for the conclusion 
of PTIAs between the EU and the latter.
3. Will the EU be reactive and creative?
This paper situates the EU's trade policy in the much broader 
context of the integration of regional and international markets. In 
addition to the urgent need for political stability on the EU’s 
borders, there is also a manifest need for economic growth. In the 
short term, the goal for the near circle is above all political, while 
Pierre Boulanger and  Patrick Messerlin 258the broad circle can meet the goal of economic growth. While the 
WTO is arguably the best forum to negotiate quantifiable targets 
(e.g. reductions in tariff protection, discipline in agricultural 
policy) and handle the settlement of disputes, its primacy in regu-
latory matters is less obvious. Negotiations over regulations clearly 
require a certain trust between the prospective parties to the agree-
ment. Today, no country has confidence in its 158 WTO partners.
This brief overview of the targeted opening of the European 
market and those of its main partners calls for several 
recommendations. 
— The EU’s trade policy in its own neighbourhood is a key 
element of its external activity. It is an invaluable tool for 
influence and stability. Whether through full membership in 
the EU or the conclusion of a DCFTA, the trade policy for the 
near circle is oriented above all at a political objective of 
stability and peace, as for European construction more 
generally.
— The integration of the neighbourhood and the application of 
the Community acquis require financial support, such as the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. 
While the short-term objective is above all political, these 
agreements must spread European regulations to third coun-
tries while also promoting investment and labour mobility 
between the partner countries, meaning an increased flow of 
goods, services, people and capital.
— The trade policy for the broad circle must meet the EU’s 
urgent need for growth. The TTIP and the EU-Japan agree-
ment offer the best support available, for these two countries 
are large enough and have a sufficient regulatory quality to 
have an impact on Europe’s economy. In the short term, the 
EU-Japan agreement is nevertheless less controversial than 
the TTIP (the subject of polemics over issues such as geneti-
cally modified organisms, audiovisual matters, and personal 
data). An EU-Japan preferential agreement would also 
provide an exceptional trade platform towards Asia and 
ensure against the discriminatory effects of a possible TPP.
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